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1 Preface
Modern welfare states rely heavily on taxes to finance their expenditures. The education
system, social security and infrastructure are just a few amenities financed by welfare
states through taxes. For example in Germany about 80 percent of state expenditures
are financed through taxes and social security contributions (German Federal Bureau of
Statistics 2019). It is in general undebated that governments need to raise taxes. However,
it is heavily debated who should pay taxes and how much. In other words it is debated
how the tax system should be designed. The question on the optimal design of the tax
system cannot be answered by theory alone. Empirical work is needed to estimate model
parameters (e.g. tax elasticities), to evaluate whether tax policies achieve the intended
goals or to shed light on individuals’ preferences. Therefore it is not only a normative
but also a positive question.
Taxes are not only used to raise revenues but also to redistribute income and to
guide individual behavior in certain directions. This thesis is empirical work and focuses
especially on the latter dimension. The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 quan-
tifies unintended consequences of a negative income tax aiming to increase labor force
participation. Chapter 3 studies individual preferences for tax simplification. Chapter
4 analyses the effects of a capital gains tax which was designed to deter individual in-
vestors from speculating on stock markets. While the data used in chapter 2 and 4 is data
that shows the revealed preferences of individuals the question we address in chapter 3
cannot be answered with such type of data. Therefore we use survey and experimental
data for a representative sample of the German population to study preferences for tax
simplification.
Badly designed tax systems can have severe and unintended consequences. For
example transfer programs often have high transfer withdrawal rates, this saves the money
of tax payers and therefore make anti-poverty programs politically more feasible. At the
same time this causes high marginal tax rates for transfer recipients. As a consequence,
transfer recipients have little incentive to leave the transfer system and remain locked-in
to the system. The earned income tax credit (EITC) in the US tries to reduce poverty of
low wage earners and at the same time incentivize people to take up employment. The
idea of the EITC is to motivate unemployed workers with low hourly market wages to
take-up employment by paying a negative income tax depending on earned income. Still
it has been shown that some of the design features cause tax payers to manipulate their
income in order to maximize their tax refund (Saez et al. 2012). These responses are
unintended in the sense that some tax payers reduce labor supply or evade taxes to get
the maximal refund.
In chapter 2 which is coauthored with Benjamin Elsner and Andreas Peichl we use
state level variation and a border discontinuity design to causally identify and quantify
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the change in income manipulation in response to a change in the EITC rates. We exploit
that US states can set top-up rates, which means that, at a given point in time, workers
with the same income receive different tax refunds in different states. Using an event
study difference in difference approach as well as a border pair design, we document that
a raise in the state-EITC leads to more bunching of self-employed tax filers at the first
kink point of the tax schedule. While we document a strong relationship up until the
Great Recession in 2007, we find no effect thereafter. These findings point to important
behavioral responses to what is the largest welfare program in the US.
From a policy makers perspective these behavioral responses are in part desirable
e.g. increases in labor supply at the extensive margin. On the other hand income ma-
nipulation can also be driven by adverse reactions like income misreporting, by reducing
labor supply at the intensive or for married couples also on the extensive margin. The
incentive to locate close to the kink point stems from the fact that at the first kink point
the marginal tax rate (MTR) jumps upwards. Our results show further that if the jump in
the MTR at the kink point becomes larger, it becomes more likely that taxpayers manip-
ulate their income to locate close to the kink point. For policy makers it seems therefore
advisable to decrease the jump in the MTR. This could be achieved by gradually reducing
the rate at which the EITC is phased-in until the EITC does not increase anymore. By
this means the first kink point could be abolished while maintaining positive labor supply
incentives at the extensive and intensive margin. In addition, it would be advisable to
individualize married couples with respect to the EITC, this would eliminate negative
labor supply incentives for the second wage earner. If it is for some reason impossible to
change the EITC schedule tax authorities could target tax audits to tax payers reporting
income close to the kink point. This would make it more risky and more difficult for tax
payers to misreport their income in order to maximize the refund.
In chapter 3 of this thesis, which is coauthored with Sebastian Blesse and Philipp
Dörrenberg, we aim to improve the understanding of people’s attitudes towards tax com-
plexity. This is an important but largely unexplored question. It adds to the under-
standing on how the government should optimally design the tax system. We focus on
complexity that is caused by deductions and allowances. Deductions and allowances are
a main driver of complexity in a tax system. To see this imagine a tax system without
them. In such a tax system gross income equals the taxable income and therefore there
is no need to study the tax code, to document any expenditures or to discuss with tax
authorities whether a certain expenditure is deductible. The only source for complexity
remaining is then the statutory rate, which could be easily calculated by a computer
program even if the calculation per se is very complex.
The general wisdom seems to suggest that most tax systems are overly complex
and that tax simplification is generally desirable. Consistent with this general wisdom,
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we document in the first part of this chapter that more than 90% of respondents believe
that the tax system should be simplified. However, there also are efficiency and equity
arguments in support of a certain degree of tax complexity and it is puzzling why tax
systems remain highly complex despite the conventional view in favor of more simpli-
fication. The second part of this chapter then investigates if the high support for tax
simplification is driven by a lack of awareness about the trade-offs behind simple and
complex tax systems. Our data show that the support for simplification decreases as we
randomly provide economic arguments against simplification and as we ask respondents
if the tax system should account for specific differences in living situations (such as costly
care of elderly family members). Overall, our findings suggest that the high support for
simpler taxes is to some extent driven by a lack of awareness about the implications of
tax simplification.
From a policy perspective our results imply that in general voters find it quite
difficult to file their taxes and want a simpler tax system. But our results also suggest
that it is not in the interest of voters to implement a flat rate no deductions kind of tax
system to get rid of any tax complexity. Instead there is widespread acceptance for at
least certain deductions and therefore also a certain degree of tax complexity. Moreover,
reactions to our information treatments imply that policy and public debate would benefit
from a more balanced debate about the pros and cons of tax simplification. This could
reduce information asymmetries and help to implement a more efficient tax policy.
Chapter 4 of this thesis which is coauthored with Philipp Dörrenberg, Benjamin
Loos and Johannes Voget analyses how taxes affect the trading behavior of private
stock-market investors. We exploit a large reform of capital-gains taxation in Germany
combined with confidential portfolio-level daily panel data to study the causal effect of
capital-gains taxes on individual stock-trading behavior and the the tendency of investors
to sell gains with a higher probability than losses (disposition effect). In the course of the
reform, Germany moved from a tax system that differentiated between short-term and
long-term capital gains (with tax exempt long-term gains) to a system where all capital
gains (independent of holding period) are subject to a flat tax of 25%. We find substantial
spikes in selling probabilities of losses and gains around the intertemporal tax discontinu-
ity for pre-reform years, and no such spikes in post-reform years. These findings provide
evidence of a causal effect of taxes on holding periods. Using difference-in-bunching and
hazard-rates techniques, we quantify the tax effect and identify interesting patterns of
heterogeneity with respect to gender, age and trading experience. More experienced in-
vestors react stronger to the tax cutoff, i.e. the spike in selling probabilities around the
discontinuity increases in experience. The experience effect is conditional on a set of
controls including age. Therefore the experience effect is not confounded by age.
Results from this research project suggest that a capital gains tax rate decreasing in
7
the holding duration is a useful tool to deter investors from speculating at stock markets.
It works through providing an incentive for investors to delay the realization of capital
gains and by this means reduces trading as long as the investor is borrowing constraint.
Therefore, a well-designed capital gains tax can achieve similar goals as a transaction
tax. At the same time, it has one additional benefit that comes into play if investors are
reluctant to realize their losses. The latter investment mistake has been documented in
the literature (Odean 1998). In a system where the capital gains tax rate decreases over
time waiting reduces the tax shield provided by selling losses. Therefore, decreasing the
rate over time gives an incentive to realize losses early. While giving a clear policy advice
on how a optimal capital gains tax rate looks like is beyond the scope of this chapter. A
well educated guess based on the results is to decrease the tax rate gradually over time,
instead of having a decrease in the tax rate after a certain holding duration as currently
in the US. The big advantage of gradually decreasing the tax rate is that selling decisions
are affected from day one of the holding period. This seems to be unlikely in a tax
system where the reduced rate applies after a holding duration of one year. In addition,
letting the optimal capital gains tax rate converges to zero over time would eliminate firm
level distortions coming from capital gains taxation. Since a long term oriented investor
effectively has a zero rate.
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2 Tax Refunds and Income Manipulation – Evidence
from the EITC
2.1 Introduction
Assessing the responsiveness of individuals to policy changes holds key importance for the
(optimal) design of tax-benefit systems and predicting the effects of policy reforms. Labor
supply and taxable income responses have been studied extensively in the literature (see
e.g. Blundell and MaCurdy 1999, Meghir and Phillips 2008, Keane 2011, Saez et al. 2012
and Bargain and Peichl 2016 for surveys). An important insight of this literature is that
welfare programs aimed at reducing poverty can trigger adverse responses from recipients,
who can maximize their welfare receipt by reducing labor supply or manipulating their
taxable income. Because adverse responses are costly to the taxpayer, it is important for
effective policy design to know the strength of these responses. One way to measure such
behavioral responses is the degree of bunching at eligibility thresholds or kink points in
the tax schedule (Saez 2010a; Chetty et al. 2013a).
In this paper, we document and quantify behavioral responses for the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC), the largest welfare program in the United States. We exploit the
discretion of each state in topping up the federal EITC, whereby recipients with the
same taxable income receive higher tax refunds in some states than in others, leading to
substantial variation in top-up rates across states and over time. Using event studies and
a border pair design, we analyze the extent to which tax filers manipulate their taxable
income in response to a change in the state top-up rate. To measure income manipulation,
we use data by Chetty et al. (2013a) on the share of self-employed tax filers within a
county who bunch around the first kink point of the EITC schedule.
In theory, one would expect that higher top-up rates lead to more bunching at
the kink point because they give income manipulation a higher pay-off. Figure 1, which
illustrates the main finding of our analysis, suggests that the theory is confirmed by the
data. Here, we compare counties in states that raise their top-up rate to neighboring
counties in a different state that do not experience a raise. After removing time trends,
bunching in both groups follows a similar pattern before the raise but diverges thereafter.
In states without a raise, it follows the same downward trend, while in states with a raise
bunching significantly increases.
While this figure provides prima facie evidence of an adverse response, there are
several endogeneity concerns that prevent us from interpreting this relationship as causal.
One important concern is that states set top-up rates with adverse responses in mind.
A state that expects a strong response may be reluctant to raise the top-up compared
with a state that expects no or very little response. Alternatively, as shown by Neumark
and Williams (2016), states may raise the top-up rate to encourage people to participate
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in the federal EITC, thereby increasing the inflow of federal EITC dollars into the state.
Using a border pair design with multiple combinations of fixed effects, we address several
important sources of endogeneity. In this research design, we compare the level of bunch-
ing in counties on opposite sides of a state border. In this setting, tax filers in treated
counties receive a higher tax refund for the same income compared to those living in the
control county across the state border.
Our estimates confirm the behavioral responses to a raise in the top-up rate observed
in Figure 1. We consistently find a positive effect of the EITC top-up rate on the level
of bunching at the kink point. In our preferred specification, an increase in the top-up
rate by one within-county-pair standard deviation leads to an increase in bunching by
about 8% of a standard deviation. To put this result in perspective, suppose that the
average top-up rate would be raised from currently 3 percent by one standard deviation
to 10 percent, which would be equivalent to raising the annual refund from USD 180
to 570. In this case, our estimates predict an increase in the degree of bunching by 0.9
percent. Across the US, in absolute numbers, this corresponds to an additional 930,000
self-employed EITC claimants, of which 20,000 would additionally bunch at the kink
point.
We also document a change in the response to the EITC top-up rate during the
Great Recession in 2008/09. While we observe a strong positive response up until 2007, we
find small and statistically insignificant effects from 2008 onwards. This result appears to
be driven by an overall higher number of self-employed workers claiming the EITC during
the crisis. Because our outcome variable is the ratio of self-employed whose income is close
to the kink point over all self-employed EITC claimants, the ratio remains unchanged
when both the numerator and denominator are affected by the current economic situation.
Our results suggest that tax filers significantly respond to changes in the EITC
schedule by manipulating their taxable income, through either changes in their labor
supply or incorrect reporting of their income. Moreover, the response in the total number
of EITC claimants points to knowledge effects as well as labor supply responses. When a
state introduces a top-up rate, this decision is discussed in the media, which presumably
raises the general awareness for the EITC. This may ultimately lead to more people
claiming it, as well as more people claiming an amount close to the revenue-maximizing
kink point. An alternative explanation for this effect is that the EITC induces people to
shift income from employment to self-employment, in which case income manipulation is
easier.
This paper adds to the growing literature on the economic and social impact of
the EITC.1 Several studies show that the EITC substantially improves the lives of low-
1For surveys, see Hotz and Scholz (2003), Eissa and Hoynes (2006), Meyer (2010) and Nichols and
Rothstein (2016).
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income families in the United States. For example, positive effects are found on infant
health (Hoynes et al. 2015), children’s education outcomes (Bastian and Michelmore
2018) as well as poverty reduction (Hoynes and Patel 2015). Other studies emphasize the
distortive nature of the EITC by showing that the kink points in the tax schedule provide
an important incentive to manipulate taxable income to maximize one’s tax refund (Saez
2010a; Chetty et al. 2013a). This manifests itself through a visible degree of bunching
of taxable incomes around this kink point, although it remains unclear whether this
response is driven by income misreporting or an actual labor supply response.2 While
theses studies have documented and provided a rationale for bunching at the kink point,
the contribution of our paper is to quantify the extent to which income manipulation
responds to changes in the refund rates. Our results are important for assessing the
effectiveness of the EITC and can inform policy-makers about the likely adverse responses
of future increases in top-up rates.
More broadly, this paper contributes to the literature on behavioral responses to
incentives provided by design features of public policies. A vast literature analyzes labor
supply responses, especially to taxation, and numerous surveys and handbook articles
have been written on this topic.3 However, the variation in the magnitude of labor
supply elasticities found in the literature is substantial (see Evers et al. 2008, Bargain
et al. 2014), and there is little agreement among economists on the size of the elasticity
that should be used in economic policy analyses (Fuchs et al. 1998). Heim (2007)
and Blau and Kahn (2007) show that married women’s wage elasticities have strongly
declined over time in the US. A possible explanation for this finding is that a more
stable attachment of women to the labor market is responsible for modest participation
responses to financial incentives in the recent period. In addition to labor supply, more
recent literature has investigated the elasticity of taxable income, following the seminal
contributions by Feldstein (1995), Feldstein (1999) (see Meghir and Phillips 2008 and
Saez et al. 2012, for surveys). There is also evidence that gross income is less responsive
to tax changes than taxable income (Saez et al. 2012; Kleven and Schultz 2014a). Our
paper shows that such incentives are also at play for the EITC, and tax filers significantly
respond to them.
In the remainder of the paper, we first provide detailed information on the institu-
tional background of the EITC (Section 2.2). In Section 2.3, we explain how we measure
2A key result of the existing literature on labor supply reactions to the EITC is that there are positive
effects at the extensive margin (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Grogger 2003;
Hotz and Scholz 2006; Gelber and Mitchell 2012). The latter result, which was found primarily for
single mothers, does not hold true for secondary wage earners, for whom Eissa and Hoynes (2004) find
a decrease in participation. In contrast to these findings, previous research suggests that there are none
or only small effects at the intensive margin (Rothstein 2010; Chetty and Saez 2013).
3 See e.g. Hausman (1985); Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), Heckman (1993),
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Meghir and Phillips (2008), Keane (2011), Keane and Rogerson (2012),
McClelland and Mok (2012), Bargain et al. (2014).
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income manipulation, describe the construction of the dataset and present descriptive
evidence. In Section 2.4, we describe the empirical strategy. In Section 2.5, we present
the main estimation results. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
We begin by providing information about the federal EITC and the state-specific tax
credits (state EITC). We show that EITCs considerably vary across states, such that
workers with the same income receive higher tax refunds in some states than in others.
We further describe bunching at the first EITC kink point, our outcome of interest, and
provide a theoretical discussion concerning why one would expect bunching to increase
after a raise in the state EITC.
2.2.1 The EITC
With 26.7 million workers receiving 63 billion dollars per year, the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) is arguably the largest and most important welfare program in the US
(Nichols and Rothstein 2016). Its aim is to supplement a person’s labor income and
reduce the income tax burden of low-wage earners while providing incentives to work.
The eligibility for the EITC and the amount of tax credit depends on the number of
children as well as one’s taxable income. To claim the EITC, eligible tax payers have
to file a federal tax return. Their income tax liability is then reduced by the amount of
the EITC. If the tax credit exceeds the tax liability, the taxpayer receives a tax refund.
Taxes are in general paid in the state where the income is earned, although some states
have reciprocity agreements that allow taxpayers to file their tax returns in their state of
residence (Agrawal and Hoyt 2016).
The EITC tax schedule comprises three parts. In a phase-in region, starting at
earnings of zero, the marginal refund increases with every additional dollar of labor
income. At the plateau, for a range of annual earnings the tax credit remains constant,
while it gets phased out above a certain threshold. For families with one child, for
example, the tax credit is phased in at a rate of 34% starting from the first dollar of
labor income, reaching the plateau at an annual income of $8,950 in 2009, the last year
in our sample. Above the second kink point at $16,420, the tax credit is phased out at
16%. The maximum tax credit for a family with one child is $3,043, which they receive
when their annual income lies between both kink points. If it lies above or below the
kink points, the tax credit is reduced.4 For workers without children, the maximum tax
credit is very small ($457).
4See Figure 41 in Appendix A.1 for an illustration. For families with two children, the kink points
2009 are at $12,570 and $16,420. The maximum tax credit is $5,028, which results in steeper phase-in
and phase-out regions compared to the schedule for families with one child.
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2.2.2 State-specific tax credits
In our analysis, we exploit the variation in state-specific top-up rates over time. Besides
the federal EITC, which is common to all eligible workers in the US, each state can decide
to top up the federal tax credit by a certain percentage. The total tax credit is computed
as
total tax credit = federal EITC × (1 + top-up rate).
In some states, for example Minnesota and Wisconsin, the top-up rate depends on
the number of children, whereby the top-up is only granted to families with children,
or families with children receive higher top-up rates than singles or childless couples.5
Moreover, some states refund the tax credit if the tax liability becomes negative, while
others have a top-up of zero for negative tax liability. Over the years, the number of states
with a top-up rate has steadily increased. While in 1996 six states granted a top-up, in
2009, the end of our sample period, it was 20 states. As shown in Figure 3, the top-up
rates considerably vary across states, being zero in some states and as high as 40% in the
District of Columbia (DC).6
EITC claimants in states with a low top-up rate are granted a significantly lower
tax credit compared to claimants with the same pre-tax income in states with a high
top-up rate. Figure 2 illustrates the difference in tax credit for EITC claimants with one
child in a state with zero top-up and a state with a top-up rate of 40 percent. A claimant
with an income at the first kink point would receive a tax credit of USD 3,043 in a state
without a top-up, and USD 4,260 in DC, which has the highest top-up rate in the US.
In both states, the kink points of the EITC schedule are the same, although the phase-in
and phase-out region are steeper in the state with the high top-up rate. Therefore, in
2009, a family with one child receiving the maximum credit would receive an additional
tax credit of USD 30 from a one percentage point increase in the top-up rate. The same
family would gain USD 960 through moving from Cheshire county in New Hampshire to
neighboring Windham county in Vermont. In 2009, New Hampshire and Vermont are the
bordering US states with the largest difference in top-up rates (32 percentage points).
2.2.3 Bunching as a measure of income manipulation
With its two kink points, the EITC schedule provides incentives for recipients to manip-
ulate their taxable income. For tax filers whose income is close to one of the kink points,
it is optimal to manipulate their income to be exactly at the kink point. At the first kink
5Wisconsin has a top-up rate of zero for childless people, but top-up rates of 4%, 14%, and 43% for
families with one, two, and three and more children, respectively
6We are aware that DC is technically not a state. However, it has its own EITC.
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point, the marginal tax credit switches from a high positive value to zero, such that every
additional dollar in earnings above the threshold does not result in higher tax credits.
On the other hand, the tax liability increases with every dollar earned, regardless of the
tax credit.
There are several margins along which EITC claimants can manipulate their taxable
income, namely labor supply, income shifting and tax evasion. A legal margin is adjusting
one’s labor supply; for example, workers may decide to work fewer hours, thereby reducing
their annual earnings while increasing their tax refund. Another way to adjust one’s labor
supply, especially for self-employed workers, is to smooth the stream of income over time.
For self-employed workers whose income is close to the first kink point, it could pay off to
postpone projects to the following year, thereby maximizing the tax credit in the present
year. A further — yet illegal — margin of income manipulation is incorrectly declaring
one’s income in the annual tax return.
Such manipulations manifest themselves in a noticeable degree of bunching around
the first kink point of the EITC schedule, as documented by Saez (2010a) and Chetty
et al. (2013a). In the absence of income manipulation, one would expect the income
distribution to be smooth. Instead, however, a large number of EITC claimants report
an income that is very close to the first kink point, resulting in a spike in the earnings
distribution.
Some groups of workers have a much greater scope for income manipulation than
others. As shown by Saez (2010a), pure wage earners — i.e. regularly-employed workers
— display no bunching at the kink point, because their taxable income gets directly
reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by their employer, thus limiting the scope
for mis-declaring one’s income. In addition, work hours are usually fixed in a work
contract, making it difficult to adjust one’s labor supply. By contrast, self-employed
workers have a much greater scope in terms of manipulating their taxable income, as
they report the taxable income to the financial authorities themselves, and they are free
to choose how much they work.
A raise in the top-up rate provides people with a higher payoff for income manip-
ulation. Therefore, we would expect bunching to increase following a raise in the top-up
rate, although we would only expect this effect for self-employed tax filers. Likewise, we
would not expect any effect for tax filers without children, because their federal EITC is
very small in the first place.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Evidence
In this section, we describe the construction of the dataset and provide descriptive statis-
tics for the main variables. In addition, we produce event study graphs that provide
descriptive evidence on an increase in bunching following a raise in the state EITC.
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2.3.1 Data
We construct our dataset by linking county-level data on tax filing with state-level insti-
tutional data on the EITC, as well as county-level demographic data.
Main outcome of interest. Our main outcome of interest is the bunching of self-
employed workers around the first kink point of the EITC schedule. For our analysis, we
use data by Chetty et al. (2013a), which were compiled from the universe of individual tax
records in the US. In this data, bunching is measured as the share of self-employed EITC
claimants in an area whose income falls within a window of USD 500 around the first
EITC kink point. The denominator of this share is the total number of self-employed
EITC claimants in that area. In 2009, this represents about 600,000 people.7 From
Chetty et al. (2013a), this measure is available for all three-digit zip codes from 1996 to
2009.8 The bandwidth of USD 500 is maintained over the entire sample period. While
we do not have the underlying individual data, Chetty et al. (2013a) show that both the
bunching measure itself as well as their regression results are unaffected by the choice of
bandwidth.9 If anything, a noisy measure of bunching at the kink point would increase
the standard errors in our regression without leading to biased estimates.
In additional regressions, we consider three outcome variables representing the ab-
solute number of EITC claimants, namely the number of self-employed claimants near the
kink point (the numerator of the main outcome), the total number of self-employed EITC
claimants (the denominator) as well as the total number of non-self-employed claimants.
Institutional data We combine the county-level data with institutional data on the
state EITC from 1996 to 2009, as well as institutional features such as refunds not being
granted to workers without children, or negative tax credits not being paid out. We take
this data from the NBER TAXSIM database.10
7To put these numbers into perspective, in 2009, the total number of people with income from
self-employment was 16.8 million, which represents 10.7% of the workforce (Source: Social Security
Administration). According to Chetty et al. (2013a), the share of self-employed EITC claimants was
19.6%, whereas the share of EITC eligible filers among all tax filers was 18.9% (Source: Brookings
Institution, Characteristics of EITC-eligible tax units 2015). Therefore, the share of filers that were both
eligible for the EITC and had income from self-employment was around 3.7%.
8For this reason, our analysis spans these years, although in the future it would be desirable to have
data past 2010, which would allow to study the effects of the EITC during and after the Great Recession.
In Appendix A.4, we explain in greater detail how we convert zip-code-level information to the county
level.
9As explained in footnote 14 in Chetty et al. (2013a), the results are robust to (i) defining the de-
nominator of the bunching measure using only self-employed individuals rather than the full population,
(ii) the choice of bandwidth around the kink point, and (iii), a measure whereby bunching is measured
as the excess mass over a smoothly fitted polynomial within a certain bandwidth.
10See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for a documentation.
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County-level demographic data To run balancing tests as well as controlling for pre-
treatment characteristics of counties, we use county-level data on population, employment
as well as average wages. Data on employment and wages are taken from the Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), whereas population data are taken from
the county-level population statistics provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest. Because in one
of our research designs we only use counties that straddle a state border, we separately
report statistics for border counties.
Overall, the outcome variables as well as the regressors of interest strongly increase
over time. The first two panels show the evolution of the state EITC. We first consider
a dummy that equals unity if a county is located in a state with a top-up rate, and
zero otherwise. Over the sample period, the share of counties in states with top-up
rates increased from 11.5% to 44%. Likewise, the average top-up rate across all counties
increased over the same period. Due to the large share of zeros, it only amounted to 1.6%
in 1996, whereas it increased to over 5% in 2009.
Panels 3)-5) display the mean and standard deviation of our outcome variables. The
share of self-employed EITC claimants near the kink point corresponds to the bunching
measure used in Chetty et al. (2013a). The variables displayed in Panels 4) and 5)
represent the denominator and numerator, respectively, of the bunching measure. In
addition, Panel 6) reports the total number of EITC claimants per county.
To compare border counties with all counties, we additionally report population
and labor market statistics for 2004. According to these statistics, border counties do
not differ in their demographic and economic structure from non-border counties. From
1,184 border counties, we construct a dataset of 1,308 border county pairs, whereby a
county that straddles multiple counties in a neighboring state is part of multiple county
pairs.
2.3.3 Descriptive evidence on top-up rates and income manipulation
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that both the top-up rate as well as the extent
of bunching increase over the sample period. In a next step, we provide evidence on how
both are related. We employ an event study design and use the sample of border pairs,
whereby we pay particular attention to the timing of raises in the top-up rate. In order
to be able to conduct a standard event study analysis in which the event dummy equals
one if the EITC is raised and zero if it remains constant, we exclude from the sample the
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few county pairs in which the top-up rate decreased (55 pairs).11 In addition, if a county
pair experiences several changes over the sample period, we only include the first change.
As in Figure 1 in the introduction, we are interested in the time trends in bunching in
counties that experience a raise in the EITC compared to those where the EITC remains
constant. Within each pair, we consider as treated the county that is located in a state
with a change in the top-up rate and as control the county located in a state without a
change. If top-up rates were to have an effect on income manipulation, following a raise
in the state EITC in the treatment group, we would expect to see an increase in bunching
in the treatment but not in the control counties.
To provide more systematic evidence of a response in bunching, we estimate an




αk × 1[t=t∗+k] +
3∑
k=−4
βk treats × 1[t=t∗+k] +X ′stγ + δt + εcpst, (1)
whereby we consider the period beginning four years before the raise and running until
three years after. The subscripts c, p, s and t refer to county, pair, state and time,
respectively. We choose as base period the year before the raise, i.e. t∗ = −1. Our
coefficients of interest are βk, which represent differential changes in bunching between
the treated and untreated counties within a pair p relative to the base year. To control
for time trends that are common to all counties, we include two distinct sets of fixed
effects. The first set, 1[t=t∗+k], controls for average time trends before and after a raise
in the top-up rate, regardless of the year in which the raise occurred. Because within
our sample period of 14 years the raises occur in different calendar years, we additionally
control for year fixed effects δt.
12 The year fixed effects ensure that the response to a raise
in 1996 receives the same weight in the estimate of βk as the response in, say, 2008. We
also control for time-varying features of the tax code (Xst), namely whether the refund
depends on the number of children, and whether a positive refund is given if a person’s
tax credit exceeds his/her tax liability. The error term εcpst captures all determinants of
the outcome that are not explained by the regressors in the above estimating equation.
Figure 4 displays the estimates for βk. Before the raise in the top-up rate, the
estimates are close to zero and statistically insignificant. This is consistent with the
parallel pre-trends shown in Figure 1. After the raise, we find significant positive effects
on bunching in the treatment relative to the control counties. A raise in the top-up rate
11In our main analysis in Section 2.5, these county pairs will be included. We also performed the event
study including these cases. The results remain unchanged. The tables are available from the authors
upon request.
12This approach — controlling for leads and lags as well as year fixed effects — is similar to that used
by Jäger (2016) and Fuest et al. (2018a).
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increases the degree of bunching by half a percentage point, which amounts to 5% of the
mean in 2009.
While these results provide strong evidence of tax filers responding to changes in
top-up rates, there are endogeneity concerns that prevent us from interpreting these
results as causal. The same economic factors that affect a state’s decision to raise its
top-up rate could also directly influence bunching. Despite the parallel pre-trends, we
may not be able to appropriately control for these factors in the above regression. In the
following sections, we address such endogeneity concerns by using a border pair design.
In addition, we define here an event as a raise in the top-up rate, such that our estimates
reflect the impact of an average raise. In the next section, we are able to quantify the
marginal effect of raising the top-up rate by one percentage point.
2.4 Main Analysis - Empirical Strategy
While the event study shows an increase in income manipulation following a raise in the
state top-up rate, there are several endogeneity concerns preventing us from interpreting
these estimates as causal. In this section, we describe our identification strategy, which
relies on a comparison of neighboring counties that are exposed to different EITC top-up
rates.
2.4.1 Empirical model
To quantify the effect of the EITC top-up rates on income manipulation, we consider an
empirical model of the form
ycpst = α + β top-upst +X
′
stγ + FE(p, s, t) + εcpst. (2)
The outcome y in county c, which is located in pair p and state s, at time t is regressed
on the top-up rate in state s at time t. We control for time-varying state-level features
of the EITC (Xst), namely whether the refund depends on the number of children, and
whether a positive refund is given if a person’s tax credit exceeds his/her tax liability. In
addition, we condition on fixed effects along several dimensions, namely pair, state, time,
as well as combinations of these dimensions.
The error term εcpst captures all of the remaining determinants of the outcome.
To account for serial correlation as well as cross-sectional correlation in the error term,
we cluster the standard errors at the county and pair level. In addition, we asses our
inference through permutation tests in Appendix A.6.
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2.4.2 Identification
Given that the top-up rates are not randomly assigned to states but chosen by state
governments, we cannot immediately interpret the estimate of β as causal. A causal
interpretation requires that there is no correlation of the top-up rate with the error term
conditional on controls and fixed effects,
cov(top-upst, εcpst|Xst, FE(p, s, t)) = 0. (3)
There are at least three challenges to a causal interpretation. First, top-up rates
may be set endogenously. A state government that expects a strong reaction of taxpayers
to a raise in the top-up rate may choose a lower top-up rate than a state expecting a weak
reaction. A second problem is economic shocks that affect EITC eligibility as well as the
choice of top-up rate. A state that is hit by a negative economic shock may decide to
raise the top-up rate to alleviate the consequences for low-income families. At the same
time, the shock may lower incomes and thus increase the number of households eligible
for the EITC. Therefore, an economic shock can result in a spurious relationship between
tax refunds and income manipulation.
A third challenge is differential time trends in income manipulation and top-up
rates. As shown by Chetty et al. (2013a), knowledge about the EITC schedule substan-
tially varies across areas and over time. Initially, in some areas, tax filers seem to have no
knowledge about the first kink point being income-maximizing, while in other areas there
is a high concentration of tax filers with a taxable income around the kink point. Over
time, as the knowledge of the EITC spreads, areas with initially zero bunching eventu-
ally catch up with those areas with a high degree of bunching from the outset. Unless
appropriately controlled for, the estimated effect of top-up rates on income manipulation
may reflect those differential time trends rather than a causal effect.
Border pair design. To circumvent these challenges, we apply a border pair design,
whereby we compare neighboring counties that straddle a state border.13 Taxpayers with
the same income are eligible for different top-up rates on either side of the border. This
setting has quasi-experimental character, as it allows us to compare the change in income
manipulation in treated counties that experience a raise in top-up rates to changes in very
similar control counties where the top-up rate remains unchanged. The border pair design
differs from a conventional panel estimator in the definition of the control group. In the
panel estimator, the control group is a weighted average of all other counties, whereas in
the border pair design each treated county is assigned its neighbor as a control county.
We implement the border pair design with two distinct sets of fixed effects.
13Similar approaches have been used by Dube et al. (2010) to evaluate changes in minimum wages in
the US, and by Lichter et al. (2015) to estimate the impact of government surveillance in East Germany.
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Pair and year fixed effects, FE(p, s, t) = δp + δt. In the first model, we condition
on year and pair fixed effects, which restrict the identifying variation to within pairs over
time. A positive estimate of β indicates that a widening of the gap in top-up rates within
a county pair leads to a widening of the gap in the outcome. These fixed effects help us
to overcome the first of the three challenges. The pair fixed effects control for the average
top-up-rate differential in each pair and thus absorb any variation in states’ differential
setting of top-up rates.
Pair and year fixed effects and pair-specific time trends. While useful as a
starting point, the two-way fixed effect model with pair and year fixed effect can yield
biased estimates if county pairs diverge in their time trends, which have been shown to
be present for bunching. To address this challenge, we additionally include pair-specific
time trends in the regression. In this case, the coefficient β is identified off deviations
from the time trend within a pair.
Pair-by-year fixed effects, FE(p, s, t) = δpt. In a more demanding specification,
we include pair-by-year fixed effects, which absorb all average differences in observable
and unobservable characteristics between years within each county pair. Restricting the
variation in way is useful to exclude that the estimation of β is confounded by local
economic shocks or differential time trends between pairs. Take, for example, a pair that
is hit by a negative shock, which in turn leads to a raise in the top-up rates as well as
an increase in the level of bunching. Neither the pair nor the year fixed effects would
account for that shock. However, the pair-by-year fixed effects absorb such shocks, which
raises the plausibility that the identifying assumption (3) holds.
To understand how β can be identified on top of pair-by-year fixed effects, it is
instructive to use as a reference point a model with separate time and pair fixed effects.
In that model, we exploit variation in top-up rates within pairs over time. A slightly more
restrictive model would be one with pair-specific time trends, which exploits variation
within pairs over time on top of the time trends. Our model with pair-by-year fixed
effects goes yet another step further and allows for year-pair-specific economic shocks. It
is possible to identify this model because the top-up rates as well as the outcomes vary
within each pair. In the fixed-effect estimator for β, each pair-year combination receives
equal weight. We no longer use variation within pairs over time, but rather use variation
within and across pairs after differencing out any pair-specific shocks. In Appendix A.5,
we show that a significant amount of variation remains even if we control for pair-by-year
fixed effects.
Are changes in state EITCs exogenous? While the border pair design reduces —
and in the best case eliminates — the influence of unobserved heterogeneity in explaining
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the results, there is a concern that both the state EITC and bunching rates are jointly
determined by a third factor such as differences in minimum wages, tax rates, or the
generosity of social benefits. To address this concern, in Appendix A.2, we investigate
whether state-level variables predict changes in top-up rates. Consistent with Bastian and
Michelmore (2018), we find no evidence that the generosity of the state EITC is driven by
the business cycle, state tax revenues, welfare benefits, or minimum wage levels.14 This
result corroborates the identifying assumption that the level of the State EITC can be
considered exogenous in our regressions.
2.5 Results
In the following, we present our estimates for the impact of the state EITC along several
behavioral margins. We first present our main results for the border pair design, using
different fixed effect specifications. In a further step, we analyze whether the response
changed during the Great Recession in 2008/9. In both analyses, inference relies on
parametric assumptions about the spatial and serial correlation of standard errors. To
assess the robustness of our inference, we perform permutation tests in Appendix A.6,
which confirm our main conclusions.
2.5.1 EITC refund rates and income manipulation
Table 2 presents OLS estimation results based on the regression model in Equation (2).
We consider three fixed-effect specifications, four outcome variables and two treatment
definitions. Each entry is the result of a separate regression of the outcomes listed in
Panels A)-D) on the top-up dummy or rate. In Columns (1)-(3), the regressor of interest
is a binary variable that equals unity if a state has a top-up rate, whereas in Columns
(4)-(6), the regressor of interest is the top-up rate in percentage points (zero for counties
located in states without a top-up rate).
Our main measure for income manipulation is the bunching of self-employed EITC
claimants within a USD 500 interval around the first kink point of the EITC schedule. For
each county, this measure is computed as the number of self-employed EITC claimants
within this interval divided by the total number of self-employed EITC claimants. In
Panels B and C, we separately estimate the impact of the top-up rate on both components
that make up the bunching measure. This allows us to study whether the overall effect
is driven by changes in the number of people around the kink point (numerator) or in
the overall number of tax filers (denominator). Finally, in Panel D, we also consider as
an outcome the number of non-self-employed claimants. If we found an effect of the top-
14This result is also consistent with the findings of Castanheira et al. (2012) for income tax reforms
in Europe and Foremny and Riedel (2014) for local business taxes in Germany. Both studies show that
tax setting is driven by political factors rather than the business cycle.
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up rate on this variable, this would be indicative of knowledge effects and labor supply
responses rather than manipulation of taxable income.
Effect of the state EITC on bunching. In Columns (1)-(3), we only consider changes
in the top-up rate along the extensive margin. The coefficient β̂ = 0.365 in Panel A,
Column (1), means that when a state introduces a top-up rate, bunching increases in a
treated county in that state by 0.365 percentage points relative to the neighboring county
in a different state where the top-up dummy remains unchanged. This effect amounts
to 4.4% of the mean level of bunching in 2004, as well as 19% of a within-pair standard
deviation in bunching. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%
level. In Column (2), when we condition on pair-specific time trends, we find a similar
point estimate, although the estimate is less precise and no longer statistically significant.
In Column (3) — our most conservative specification — we condition on pair-by-year fixed
effects, based on which we obtain an even larger point estimate of β̂ = 0.492, significant
at the 10% level. These results suggest that tax filers respond to the introduction of a
state EITC with a higher share declaring an in-come closer to the revenue-maximizing
kink point.
While these results provide a first indication of an effect, it should be noted that the
effect is driven by changes in a limited number of states. Over the sample period, only
14 states introduced a top-up rate. Within a county pair, the identification comes from
switches in the dummy from zero to one, which can only happen once per county over
the sample period. By contrast, in Columns (4)-(6), we identify the effect off changes in
the top-up rate along both the extensive and intensive margin.
In the model with separate pair and year fixed effects, shown in Column (4), we find
no statistically significant effect of an increase in the top-up rate on bunching. However,
once we condition on pair-specific time trends or pair-by-year fixed effects, the effect is
large and statistically significant. For a within-pair standard deviation in the top-up rate
(sd = 5.43), bunching increases by 5.43× 0.023 = 0.12 percentage point, which is around
6.6 percent of a within-pair standard deviation in bunching.
Effect on the number of self-employed claimants. The results shown in Panel A
represent the effect of an increase in the top-up rate on the share of EITC claimants whose
income is close to the EITC kink point. This share comprises two components, namely
in the numerator the number of self-employed tax filers close to the kink point and in
the denominator the total number of self-employed tax filers. A positive effect in Panel
A indicates that the numerator increases more than the denominator, leading to a higher
share. To assess the relative contributions of both, we separately consider the effects of
the EITC in Panels B and C. In Column (1), we find that the introduction of a top-up
rate increases the number of tax filers near the kink point by 222, which is larger than
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the mean number across all sample years (123). At the same time, it leads to an increase
in the total number of self-employed EITC claimants by 893, which is around 75% of
the mean in 2004. In Column (4), we estimate that a one-percentage-point increase in
the state EITC raises the number of self-employed claimants near the kink point by 8.6
(1.7% of a within-pair standard deviation) and increases the total number of self-employed
claimants by 36.5 (1.6% of a standard deviation). With both regressors, the effect size
increases when we condition on pair-by-year fixed effects. To sum up, the top-up rate
increases both the numerator and the denominator, with the former increasing more than
the latter.
Effect on non-self-employed EITC claimants. Finally, in Panel D, we estimate
the impact of the EITC on the number of non-self-employed claimants. This group is
interesting because they have little scope for manipulating their declared taxable income;
rather, any effect here is indicative of a change in labor supply. The evidence on this
channel is mixed. We find large and statistically significant results when we use the
top-up dummy as a regressor, but small and statistically insignificant results when we
use the continuous measure of the top-up rate. These results provide suggestive evidence
for labor supply effects, although the marginal effect of an in-crease in the top-up rate
on bunching appears to be driven by other channels. This is unsurprising given that in
general it is (more) difficult to adjust labor supply at the intensive margin — i.e. the
number of hours worked — due to frictions in the labor market. Nonetheless, it is possible
that a higher state EITC increases labor supply at the extensive margin, which we cannot
rule out but also not directly test with our data.
2.5.2 The impact of top-up rates before and during the Great Recession
While bunching had been steadily increasing up until 2007, there was a significant drop
in 2008 and 2009, while at the same time the average top-up rate continued its upward
trend. A possible reason for these developments is the Great Recession in 2008/09. As
noted by Moffitt (2013), the role of the EITC during a recession is ambiguous. One
the one hand, if families have lower work income, they may receive higher tax credits.
On the other hand, unemployment leads to the loss of tax credits. The aggregate data,
displayed in Appendix A.3, suggests that the number of claimants increased from 2008 to
2009 relative to the overall positive trend in the number of claimants. During the Great
Recession, the US social safety net underwent a considerable expansion, in particular in
the SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) and unemployment insurance.
In comparison, the expansion of the federal EITC was relatively small; eligible families
with three or more children received higher tax credits. Figure 5 shows that, on average,
top-up rates remained stable from 2009 onwards. If anything, states did not follow the
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previous trend of gradually raising the top-up rates.
To observe whether the impact of the top-up rate changes with the Great Recession,
we estimate a regression with a full interaction of the top-up dummy or rate with dummies
for the pre- and post-Great Recession period.
ycpst = β1 top-upst × 1[t<2008] + β2 top-upst × 1[t>=2008] +X ′stγ + δpt + εcpst. (4)
The first term is an interaction between the top-up rate and a dummy that equals one
in the pre-crisis years, while the second term is an interaction with a dummy that equals
one from 2008 onwards.15 Our results point to a large and significant effect before 2008,
although we find no consistent effects in 2008/9. In Column (1), the effect on bunching
in 2008/9 is negative, which is the case because the denominator — the total number of
self-employed claimants — reacts more than the number of claimants close to the kink
point. These results are broadly consistent with those of Jones (2014) and Bitler et al.
(2017), who show that — relative to other social security programs — the EITC played a
minor role in alleviating poverty during the Great Recession. In addition, similar results
have been found for Ireland by Hargaden (2015), who shows that the extent of bunching
at notches in the Irish tax codes were three times larger before than during the Great
Recession.
2.5.3 Discussion
Overall, our results support the hypothesis that higher tax refunds create a greater in-
centive for income manipulation and thus can trigger behavioral responses along several
margins. While our data do not allow us to fully distinguish between false declaration
of taxable income and labor supply responses at the extensive or intensive margin, our
results suggest that both mechanisms are important. Our finding that a raise in the
top-up rate increases the extent of bunching at the kink point suggests that there are
adverse responses to the state EITC. If the effect was exclusively explained by labor
supply responses — especially at the extensive margin — it would be unlikely that we
find an effect on bunching. For labor supply responses along the extensive margin, we
would rather expect that the numerator and denominator are similarly affected, i.e. the
additional number of claimants near the kink point is proportional to the total additional
number of claimants. By contrast, the positive effect on bunching suggests that the ad-
ditional number of claimants at the kink point is much larger relative to the additional
number of claimants. While not a proof, these overproportional changes at the kink point
to false declarations of taxable income and potentially to labor supply adjustments at
15While these two dummies are multicollinear, it is possible to include these interactions in the regres-
sion because we do not include the dummies on their own.
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the intensive margin.
Nonetheless, the effects on the total number of self-employed EITC claimants sug-
gests that not all behavioral responses to the state EITC can be classified as adverse. One
of the central aims of the EITC is to provide recipients with an incentive to work. The
results in Panel C of Tables 2 and 3 and to some degree the results for non-self-employed
workers in Panel D suggest that these incentives work. A higher top-up rate induces
more people to work, and this additional labor supply appears to be spread out along
the income distribution rather than concentrated at the kink point.
2.6 Conclusion
Virtually all public policies trigger behavioral responses by their recipients. In this paper,
we document and quantify such behavioral responses for the Earned Income Tax Credit,
the largest welfare program in the US. Using data on the extent of bunching at the first
kink point of the EITC schedule, and exploiting variation in state-specific tax refunds
over time, we find significant behavioral responses along several margins.
First, we document that higher EITC top-up rates increase the number of self-
employed people who claim the EITC. This effect can either represent an increase in (self-
employed) labor supply, or a change in tax filing behavior. LaLumia (2009), for example,
shows that raises in the tax refund increase the likelihood that potential recipients declare
their self-employed income.
Second, we show that a raise in the EITC top-up rate leads to an overproportional
increase in the number of self-employed claimants who declare an income close to the
income-maximizing first kink point of the EITC schedule. The increase in this number
is considerably larger than that of the total number of self-employed EITC claimants,
in turn leading to more bunching at the kink point. This result points to a significant
adverse response, namely that tax filers choose to declare their taxable income or their
labor supply or both in a way that maximizes their EITC receipt.
These results suggest that the EITC — like any other welfare program — triggers
behavioral responses. To policy-makers, some of these — for example, labor supply at
the extensive margin — are desirable, while adverse responses are not, such as false
declaration of taxable income. While our results for the effect on bunching suggest that
income manipulation is an important response, we would require more detailed data to
fully disentangle labor supply effects from manipulation of taxable income through false
declaration. For future work, we are hoping that such data become available.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Bunching of self-employed near the kink point in counties with and without a
































Notes: This figure compares the level of bunching before and after a raise in the top-up rate in the
treatment counties — located in a state with a raise in t = 0 — with that in neighboring countries
without a raise in the top-up rate. To make the counties comparable across years, year fixed effects have
been controlled for.
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Notes: This figure displays the EITC schedule for claimants with one child in a state with zero top-up
and a state with a top-up rate of 40 percent in 2009. The vertical lines mark the first and second
kink points. Tax units with adjusted gross income above the earned income threshold are not eligible.
Families with unearned income may be ineligible.





Notes: This Figure shows the variation in top up rates across states in 2009. Darker colors refer to
higher top-up rates.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
All counties Border Counties
Mean SD Mean SD
1 Top-up dummy (1 if state has a top-up rate, in percent)
1996 11.5 32.0 13.1 33.7
2000 22.8 42.0 25.7 43.7
2004 26.3 44.0 29.5 45.6
2009 43.8 49.6 46.6 49.9
2 Top-up rate (in percent)
1996 1.60 5.94 2.17 7.58
2000 2.59 6.03 3.00 6.48
2004 3.14 6.99 3.71 7.61
2009 5.51 8.34 6.03 8.77
3 Share of self-employed EITC claimants near the kink point
1996 5.04 1.55 5.00 1.61
2000 7.18 2.99 7.08 3.13
2004 8.50 3.98 8.29 3.96
2009 9.27 4.68 8.97 4.53
4 Self-employed EITC claimants
1996 817 2,755 753 2,149
2000 866 3,235 826 2,957
2004 1,187 4,309 1,108 3,982
2009 1,434 5,004 1,326 4,782
5 Self-employed EITC claimants near the kink point
1996 54 328 52 264
2000 91 572 99 702
2004 143 751 138 773
2009 194 902 178 904
6 Non-self-employed EITC claimants
1996 4,714 13,244 4,458 12,659
2000 4,734 13,430 4,507 13,054
2004 5,006 13,135 4,736 12,768
2009 5,371 13,336 5,054 12,895
Population, 2004 93,320 302,015 93,581 260,604
Unemp rate, 2004 5.69 1.82 5.67 1.87
Empl rate, 2004 94.31 1.82 94.33 1.87
Average wage, 2004 28,805 6,141 28,909 6,219
Counties 3141 1184
County pairs NA 1308
States 51 49
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest for selected years. The
top-up dummy equals one if a county lies in a state with a top-up rate. The column on the left reports
the statistics for all counties in the US, while the column on the right only reports the statistics for
counties that straddle a state border.
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Notes: This graph displays the coefficient estimates of βk in Equation (1). The specification includes
year fixed effects and controls and is estimated on a sample restricted to counties straddling a same state
border. The reference category is the year before treatment. The vertical line represents the period zero,
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Average Bunching (left axis) Average top-up rate (right axis)
Figure 5: Top-up rates and bunching, 1996-2013
Notes: This figure shows the average level of bunching in percent (left axis), as well as the average top-up
rate. Each dot represents the average across all counties within a given year. The data on bunching are
only available up to 2009.
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Table 3: Top-up rates and bunching before and during the Great Recession.
(1) (2) (3)
Top-up Rate Top-up Rate Top-up Rate
A. Share of self-employed near the kink point
Top-up before 2008 0.019∗ 0.022∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Top-up 2008, 2009 -0.022∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
B. Number of self-employed EITC claimants near the kink point
Top-up before 2008 9.783∗∗ 10.341∗∗ 12.786∗∗
(4.621) (4.898) (5.753)
Top-up 2008, 2009 4.254 3.437 5.419
(3.311) (3.150) (4.609)
C. Total number of self-employed EITC claimants
Top-up before 2008 38.208∗∗ 38.659∗∗ 48.186∗∗
(17.277) (17.859) (21.389)
Top-up 2008, 2009 30.349∗ 19.552 21.548
(17.339) (15.167) (19.960)
D. Total number of non-self-employed EITC claimants
Top-up before 2008 65.071 68.770 90.632
(44.377) (48.234) (58.560)
Top-up 2008, 2009 33.206 30.033 20.166
(36.788) (42.030) (51.956)
Controls:
Year FE Yes Yes No
Pair FE Yes Yes No
Pair-spec Time tr. No Yes No
Pair × Year FE No No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 36608 36608 36592
This table displays results of separate OLS regressions of our outcome variables on top-
up rates, as well as the controls and fixed effects. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01 . Standard errors, clustered at county and pair level, are reported in
parentheses.
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3 Do people really want a simple tax system? Evi-
dence on preferences towards income tax simplifi-
cation
3.1 Introduction
Should tax systems be simplified? The conventional wisdom seems to be: yes, tax systems
should be simpler! As the literature shows, there are indeed many good reasons for sup-
porting tax simplification. For example, recent studies show that the self-employed value
tax simplicity and leave money on the table because of complex tax schedules (Aghion
et al. 2017; Benzarti 2017), that taxpayers underreact to complex tax incentives (Abeler
and Jaeger 2014), that the existence of complexity-adding tax expenditures facilitates
tax evasion (Kleven et al. 2011; Paetzold and Winner 2016), and that tax complexity
reduces the take up of tax refunds by firms (Zwick 2018). Complex tax systems also lend
scope to lobby groups to achieve beneficial tax treatment for the groups they represent
(Brusco et al. 2014), have negative effects on income inequality (Aghion et al. 2017), and
possibly come with substantial resource costs (Pitt and Slemrod 1989). It is therefore
maybe not surprising that many economists propose implementing tax reforms that make
the system less complex, for example through lower rates and broader bases.16 Not only
many economists and academics support a simpler tax system; the conventional wisdom
among policy makers and journalists also seems to hold that simplifying tax systems is
generally desirable.17
However, despite many arguments in favor of tax simplicity, there are also economic
arguments in support of a certain degree of tax complexity (see, e.g., OECD 2010b, Hines
2016, and Hines 2019). For example, a fairly complex tax system with a certain amount
of tax expenditures i) makes it possible to tailor taxes to individual situations and to use
’tagging’ components,18 ii) allows to tax highly elastic goods at effectively lower rates,
iii) avoids tax compounding (e.g., favorable tax treatment of pensions and retirement
savings), and iv) enables to include Pigouivian elements into the tax system that correct
for market failures or internalize negative externalities, e.g. research tax credits (Hines
16The simplification of the tax system is a key objective of many income-tax reform proposals by
economists in various countries. For example, Gale (2001), Rohaly and Gale (2004) and Gravelle and
Hungerford (2012) for the US, James et al. (1997) for Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom,
Tran-Nam (2000) for Australia, and Fuest et al. (2008) and Wagner (2006) for Germany.
17See newspaper coverage for the US showing that many politicians and journalists make a case for
a simplified tax system: e.g., Economist (2005), Economist (2013), NYT (2015), NPR (2015), Forbes
(2017), as well as Vox (2017).
18Tagging is for example studied in Cremer et al. (2010). Gordon and Kopczuk (2014) study the
selection of the income tax base and show that it is advantageous (in the sense of approximating a tax on
ability as good as possible) to allow for particular tax expenditures (such as the dependents’ deduction).
Thus, there is an implicit rationale for not having the simplest possible tax system with a broad base
and without any tax expenditures.
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2016; Hines 2019). These elements of a complex tax system can contribute to making
the tax system more efficient. Complex components of the tax system potentially also
have redistributive purposes – think for example of deducting the costs of elderly care of
family members or allowances for dependent children – and might therefore be viewed as
equity enhancing and fair.19
The arguments in support of tax complexity do not feature prominently in the de-
bate about tax complexity. The general-wisdom support of simple tax systems might
therefore miss out some of the efficiency and redistribution aspects of tax simplification.
In addition, the data show that most tax systems remain very complex and are character-
ized by the presence of a large amount of tax expenditures (e.g., OECD 2010b). Figure 6
shows for the US that there is an upward sloping trend in the growth of tax expenditures,
suggesting that the tax system tends to get even more complex over time. It is thus a
puzzle why most tax systems remain so complex although the general wisdom seems to
hold that substantial tax simplification is desirable.
Considering important arguments both in favor and against simplification, and in
light of lasting complexity of real-world tax systems, attitudes towards tax simplification
among the public may be more nuanced than they seem on first glance. In this paper,
we aim to shed light on the debate about tax complexity and collect new survey and
experimental data to study preferences for tax simplicity among a representative sample
of the German population.20
Our paper has two main objectives: First, we document preferences for tax simplic-
ity and report which fraction of the population supports a simplified tax system. This first
part of the paper particularly investigates if public support for tax simplicity is indeed
consistent with the conventional wisdom and consensus that apparently exist in academic
and public-press debates. Second, we investigate if preferences for tax simplification are
driven by a lack of awareness about the implications and consequences of tax simplifica-
tion. In other words: Is the general wisdom regarding tax simplicity driven by awareness
and information deficits? Do individuals frequently express desires for tax simplification
without appreciating the implications of tax simplification? To address these questions,
we i) elicit if people are in favor of specific tax expenditures which add complexity to the
tax system, and we ii) implement two randomized experiments to study if preferences for
tax simplicity are elastic to information in favor and against tax simplification. That is,
we study if preferences are shifted once people are made aware of the trade-offs behind
19The role of economic theory in this discussion is addressed by Hines (2016) who concludes that:
”Economic theory does not say that an efficient and equitable income tax system has a broad base and
a low rate, and in fact the theory has never said that.” (Abstract).
20Germany has a considerably complex tax system with many tax expenditures. In addition, the
simplification of the tax system is a frequently debated issue in the media and among politicians. The
case of Germany might therefore be a well suited case to study preferences for tax complexity. See
Section 3.2.2 for more details on tax complexity in Germany.
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complexity and simplicity.
The working hypothesis throughout our paper is that preferences for tax simpli-
fication are possibly shifted once individuals are explicitly forced to think about their
simplicity preferences in concrete applications or if they are made aware of information
and aspects of tax complexity that are new to them. Presumably, such a shift in pref-
erences is greater in response to information against tax simplicity than to information
in favor of simplicity, because pro-simplicity arguments play a more prominent role in
the public debate and misperceptions are thus likely to be less prevailing with regard to
pro-simplicity arguments.
We included a set of questions in the context of tax simplification into the German
Internet Panel, a representative survey of the German population (N = 2464). The sur-
vey questions are tailor-made and designed to speak to the two objectives of our paper.
The concept of tax complexity is complex in itself, and for the purpose of the survey
we decided to focus on one particular dimension of tax complexity: the number of tax
expenditures.21 While there are clearly more dimensions of tax complexity (e.g., doc-
umentation requirements, etc.), tax expenditures are a main source of tax complexity
and a major issue in the debate about complexity; moving to a system without any tax
expenditures would clearly make any existing tax system simpler, easier and more com-
prehensible. This definition of tax complexity is consistent with Slemrod and Kopczuk
(2002) and Kopczuk (2005) who characterize an income tax system as complex when it
features many deductions (also see the discussion about tax-complexity measurement in
Abeler and Jaeger 2014). We further focus on the case of the personal income tax (PIT)
which appears to be the natural choice for a survey on tax attitudes among the general
public.
Our survey reveals the following main results. First, more than 90% of respondents
have a preference for tax simplification. We survey this question on a scale from 1 to 6,
where 6 means strong support for tax simplification, and find an average of 5.2. This
result confirms that the prevailing view indeed holds that tax simplification is desirable.
Apparently, supporting tax simplification seems to be the obvious choice and general-
wisdom reply for the large majority of respondents. This finding is the starting point
of our analysis, in which we aim to investigate if the high support for tax simplification
persists as we make people aware of the trade-offs between tax simplicity and complexity.
In other words, we move on from the finding that tax simplification is the obvious choice
in the survey and study if the matter becomes less obvious as we highlight the trade-offs
behind this choice.22
21A straight forward definition of tax expenditures is provided by the Tax Policy Center (2019): ’Tax
expenditures are special provisions of the tax code such as exclusions, deductions, deferrals, credits, and
tax rates that benefit specific activities or groups of taxpayers.’
22An analysis of the anatomy of simplification preferences shows that age, gender and the perceived
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Second, we then dig deeper into preferences for tax simplicity and study if the large
support for simplicity holds as we ask for the preferred tax system in particular contexts.
For this purpose, we have a series of questions in which we present participants with
the living situations of two fictitious taxpayers,23 and then survey if these two taxpayers
should pay the same amount of taxes or if any of the two should pay less in taxes than
the other person. We designed the questions in a way where the two fictitious persons are
similar in all tax-relevant means except for one particular aspect of their living situation.
In particular, the two fictitious taxpayers were different with respect to i) the necessity
to spend money on the elderly care of a family member, ii) the amount they donate for
charity, and iii) the distance between their home and work place.
The results show that in all three scenarios – i) to iii) – a considerable fraction
of respondents indicate that the two persons should not pay the same amount of taxes
and that the taxpayer with the additional cost burden should pay less. In particular,
more than 60% of respondents think that the tax system should account for elderly-care
costs. In the case of the other two scenarios, roughly 40% and 30%, respectively, believe
that the tax system should account for the respective difference between the taxpayers.24
Interestingly, the share of people who indicate that the tax system should not account
for certain differences in living situation (and thus be as simple as possible) is in all three
scenarios considerably smaller than the 90%-share of respondents who generally support
to have a simpler tax system.
These results are thus evidence that many people prefer a tax system which allows
for a differential tax treatment of taxpayers in different living situations. Obviously, such
a differential treatment of two otherwise identical taxpayers can only be achieved through
tax expenditures, and thus through a substantial degree of tax complexity. The survey
respondents might not even realize that their choices imply tax complexity. However, the
exercise provides evidence that people implicitly have preferences for a tax system that
is more complex than a system without any tax expenditures. As we force participants
to think about specific complexity-adding expenditures, many indicate that they wish a
tax system that differentiates between taxpayers in different situations.
We are able to show that the answers to these questions are not solely driven by self
interest; the result picture remains as we condition on not benefiting personally from the
difficulty of filing a tax return are the strongest correlates of simplification preferences.
23This survey question technique is similar to some of the survey question types used by Weinzierl
(2014), Saez and Stantcheva (2016) and Weinzierl (2017). These studies are not in the context of tax
complexity though.
24The observation that the ’elderly care’ scenario induces more participants to vote for differential
taxation than the other two scenarios is interesting in light of the fact that the costs for elderly care
are circumstantial (outside control of taxpayers) while the other two are choices. Our respondents thus
exhibit preferences that are consistent with arguments in the literature strands of optimal taxation and
equality opportunity according to which circumstantial differences should be accounted for in the tax
system while choices should not.
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respective tax expenditure. Our findings thus show that preferences for having certain
tax expenditures in the tax system are not (only) driven by the desire to keep those tax
expenditures from which someone benefits personally. In other words, preferences for a
certain degree of complexity are beyond pure payoff-maximizing considerations.
Third, we implement two randomized survey experiments to study the causal effect
of information about the implications and consequences of tax simplification on prefer-
ences for tax simplification. These experiments are directly linked to our previous results,
according to which a large majority indicate that they support tax simplification, but, at
the same time, a large fraction of respondents prefer to account for the living situation
of taxpayers through the tax system. The randomized experiments shed light on this
puzzle and investigate if preferences for tax simplicity are elastic to information about
the implications of tax simplicity. Eventually, the experiments have the objective of un-
derstanding if the high support for tax complexity is partly driven by a lack of awareness
regarding what it possibly means to simplify taxes (i.e., the trade-off between arguments
pro and con simplification).
To maximize power, we have one experimental intervention at the beginning of the
survey and one experimental intervention towards the end. In each of the two exper-
iments, we have a neutral control group, one group in which preferences are possibly
shifted towards stronger support for tax simplification, and one group in which prefer-
ences are possibly shifted towards less support for tax simplification. This set up thus
allows us to study if preferences for tax simplicity are elastic at all, and if yes, if they
are elastic in both directions (the experimental groups are described in more detail in
Section 3.3). The information and arguments that we use to shift preferences in the
four treatment groups are inspired by some of the most debated issues in the context of
tax complexity (see beginning of this Introduction): i) redistribution and social-policy
aspects, ii) tax avoidance and evasion, iii) efficiency and iv) lobbyism and special-interest
groups.
The first experiment includes three randomly assigned groups. A control group
which is exposed to a neutral statement about the fact that there is an ongoing debate
about whether the tax system is too complex because of various tax expenditures. The
second group, labeled Redistribution group, is exposed to a statement highlighting that
tax deductions can be used to reduce the tax burden for taxpayers which are disad-
vantaged by exogenous circumstances. A third experimental group, labeled Avoidance
group, is exposed to an argument in favor of tax simplification, namely that a complex
system with many deductions offers possibilities to avoid taxes and manipulate taxable
income.25
25Respondents in all three experimental groups see the neutral statement. Respondents in the two
treatment groups are thus exposed to the respective treatment in addition to the neutral statement,
while control-group participants only see the neutral statement. The neutral statement in the control
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The Redistribution-treatment significantly reduces the general support of tax sim-
plification relative to the control group. This is evidence that preferences for tax sim-
plicity are elastic to information about the potentially undesirable implications of tax
simplicity. The Avoidance-treatment did not have any significant effects; coefficients
are much smaller than the effects of treatment Redistribution and the standard errors
are larger than the coefficients. This null-result is potentially explained by the more
prominent role of arguments in favor of simplification in the public debate, and thus less
misperceptions regarding arguments that support more simplification. However, while
the Avoidance treatment did not affect preferences for tax simplicity, it did affect how
people think about the distributional aspects of tax complexity: it increased agreement
with the statement that tax expenditures benefit the rich more.
The second experiment also includes three groups. We again have a control group
with a neutral statement. We then have a group in which we highlight that a system with
deductions and exemptions provides better opportunities to tax individual capacities and
ability; we label this group the Efficiency group. Participants in the third group, labeled
Special Interest Group, are made aware that tax expenditures are potentially used by
lobby and special interest groups to bargain tax exemptions for their clientele.26
The results of this second experiment show that the Efficiency argument signif-
icantly lowers the support for tax simplification, relative to the control group. This
suggests that participants are not aware of the potential efficiency implications of tax
complexity and confirms the finding of the first experiment that preferences for simpler
taxes are elastic to information against simplification. The Special Interest Group treat-
ment did not have an effect, relative to the control group. This is also consistent with
the findings of the first experiment; arguments in favor of more simplicity do not have an
effect on preferences for simplification. For both experiments, we observe that treatment
effects are homogenous across different demographic groups.27
Fourth, we aimed at eliciting which type of simplifying tax reforms respondents
prefer. We offered a choice of different reform approaches towards simplification and
asked respondents to decide which ones they prefer (under the assumption that each of
the offered approaches is revenue neutral). The most preferred reform (chosen by about
1/3 of the respondents) entails an increase in the degree of progressivity, but eliminates all
deductions and tax expenditures. Overall, however, we observe that there is no consensus
among respondents w.r.t. the type of tax-simplifying tax reform. These preferred policy
group serves the purpose of making the topic itself equally salient to respondents in all groups.
26As in the first experiment, respondents in all three experimental groups are exposed to the neutral
statement.
27The experimental intervention also did not have an effect on the previously mentioned questions
regarding the tax burdens of two similar taxpayers that differ w.r.t. one particular dimension.
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choices are also not affected by the first experimental treatment.28
Contribution. We identify the following main contributions of our paper and its
empirical findings (see section 3.2.1 for an overview of the literature to which we con-
tribute). First, we implement the first nuanced survey in the context of tax complexity
and integrate our questions into an established representative survey. The survey design
itself therefore stands as a contribution. To this end, we add to a recent literature using
tailor-made surveys to study specific research topics. Second, we document in a represen-
tative sample of the population that a large majority of individuals has strong preferences
for tax simplification. These preferences in support of tax simplification are consistent
with the large literature showing that complexity is costly. Third, we study if the large
support for tax simplification depends on the extent of awareness about the consequences
and implications of tax simplification. In particular, we show that the support for sim-
plification weakens as respondents are confronted with scenarios and information which
present potential arguments in support of a certain degree of complexity. This shows that
preferences for simplification are elastic to information and context, and suggests that
the debate about complexity could potentially benefit from a more nuanced discussion
of the pros and cons of complexity. Fourth, we speak to the puzzle that tax complexity
keeps increasing despite the largely prevailing view that tax systems should be simpli-
fied. In addition, we document that a large fraction of people would prefer a type of
tax-simplifying reform that maintains the degree of redistribution/progressivity or even
increases it. These two latter points relate to the literature on the political economy of
taxes and tax complexity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the
related literature (3.2.1), elaborates on the German case of tax complexity (3.2.2), and
derives the paper’s working hypotheses (3.2.3). Section 3.3 provides an overview of the
survey (incl. the randomized components) and its implementation. Section 3.4 presents
the survey results. We conclude the paper in Section 3.5.
3.2 Related Literature, Tax Complexity in Germany, and Hy-
potheses
3.2.1 Related Literature
We relate to the following strands of literature. First, we speak to the literature on the
consequences of tax complexity. Several papers show that tax complexity comes with
resource costs and foregone money for firms and individuals (e.g., Pitt and Slemrod 1989,
28The question was asked before the second experiment, implying that we cannot test the effect of the
second experiment on policy choices. The statistical inference of both experiments’ results are robust to
standard errors that are adjusted to multiple hypothesis testing and exact significance tests (see results
section 3.4).
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Aghion et al. 2017, Benzarti 2017, Zwick 2018). In addition, tax complexity has been
shown to affect inequality (Aghion et al. 2017), and it facilitates lobbying for beneficial
tax treatment by special-interest groups (Brusco et al. 2014) as well as tax evasion
(Kleven et al. 2011; Paetzold and Winner 2016; Tsankova et al. 2019). Kopczuk (2012)
shows that the introduction of a flat-tax reform with lower rates and less tax expenditures
increases tax revenues.29
Second, we contribute to a related strand of literature showing that the complexity
of taxes and other policy-measures distorts the responses to these government interven-
tions and reduces their take-up. For example, Abeler and Jaeger (2014) study the causal
effect of tax complexity on tax responses in a lab-experimental situation, and find that
people underreact to complex tax incentives. Saez (2010b), along with the survey ev-
idence of Fujii and Hawley (1988), suggests that individuals do not respond optimally
to the incentives of the EITC. The complex structure of the EITC also seems to drive
its low take-up (Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches 2007; Chetty and Saez 2013; Bhargava and
Manoli 2015). Blaufus and Ortlieb (2009) show that complexity systematically distorts
the decision to invest in retirement plans. A further set of papers shows that people sys-
tematically misperceive tax incentives – presumably due to tax complexity (de Bartolome
1995; Liebman and Zeckhauser 2004; Blumkin et al. 2012; Blaufus et al. 2013; Ito 2014;
Feldman et al. 2016; Rees-Jones and Taubinsky 2016; Gideon 2017; Ballard et al. 2018).
Furthermore, a simplified filing of the tax return affects filing and compliance behavior
(Kotakorpi and Laamanen 2016; Fochmann et al. 2018). Tax complexity is also likely to
be related to the established finding that tax salience is relevant for tax responses (Chetty
et al. 2009; Finkelstein 2009; Goldin and Homonoff 2013; Feldman and Ruffle 2015). Tax
responses also depend on the existence of complexity-adding deductions (Neisser 2017;
Doerrenberg et al. 2017; Paetzold 2019).30
Third, we relate to (rarely made) arguments that highlight some potential upsides
of tax complexity and express a rationale for the implementation of tax expenditures.
James Hines discusses why it is not necessarily desirable to have the simplest tax system
with a broad base and low rates (Hines 2016; Hines 2019). He particularly focuses on tax
expenditures and provides efficiency and equity arguments for why it is costly to reduce
or eliminate tax expenditures (see points i) to iv) above on potential arguments in favor
of some degree of complexity). He also discusses several potential justifications to have a
comprehensive and simple system with a broad base and low rates, and elaborates that
many of these justifications for simplicity do not withstand economic reasoning. OECD
(2010a) also discuss the rationale for implementing tax expenditures. They particularly
point out arguments of i) tax administration costs (costs of broadening the base might
29See the first paragraph of the Introduction for more context for some of these papers.
30Somewhat related also is the finding by Brown et al. (2017) that complexity complicates the ability
of consumers to value life annuities (such as social security benefits).
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exceed the corresponding efficiency gains), ii) equity and social-policy considerations (tax
provisions might have the same purposes as social benefits), iii) correcting of market
failures (internalize positive external effects), and iv) a political-economy argument, that
they borrow from Hettich and Winer (1999), according to which the elimination of tax
expenditures possibly reduces tax revenues (abolishing tax expenditures implies that
government will be less able to discriminate among heterogeneous taxpayers and voters,
which will lead to an increased overall opposition to taxation). Given that the existence
of tax expenditures adds complexity to the tax system, Hines (2016), Hines (2019) and
OECD (2010a) thus provide arguments for keeping a certain degree of complexity and not
move to the simplest possible system. As discussed in footnote 18, Gordon and Kopczuk
(2014) also provide a rationale for not having the simplest possible tax system.
Fourth, we touch upon a literature on the political economy of taxes and tax reforms
(e.g., Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Bierbrauer et al. 2018;
Bierbrauer and Boyer 2018). We point to an apparent puzzle that tax complexity remains
high in the real-world despite the seemingly wide support for tax simplification. To this
end, we for example relate to Hettich and Winer (1988) who model the existing tax
system with several expenditures as the result of a political process and a government
that maximizes political support. A few papers explicitly study tax complexity in a
political-economy set-up and investigate how tax complexity arises in the interaction
between voters and politicians (Warskett et al. 1998; Galli and Profeta 2009). Our paper
speaks to these papers as it suggests that arguments against tax simplicity could play
a more prominent role in the voting process if voters were more aware of the trade-offs
behind tax complexity and simplicity. To the extent that our paper shows that individuals
have misleading information regarding taxes, we also relate to literature showing that
such information frictions induces the government to implement inefficient tax policy
(Boccanfuso and Ferey 2019).
Fifth, we join a set of papers that set up tailor-made surveys with randomized
components to study a particular research topic. Topics that were investigated in such
tailor-made surveys include preferences for redistribution (Cruces et al. 2013; Kuziemko
et al. 2015; Alesina et al. 2018; Roth and Wohlfart 2018), beliefs about behavioral
responses to taxes (Cappelen et al. 2018), immigration (Alesina et al. 2018), social
preferences (Kerschbamer and Müller 2017), inheritance taxation (Bastani and Walden-
stroem 2019), reforms in the Euro area (Dolls and Wehrhoefer 2018), tax-compliance
attitudes (Doerrenberg and Peichl 2018), education (Lergetporer et al. 2018; Lergetporer
et al. 2018), road mileage user fees (Duncan et al. 2014), misperceptions in the context
of different economic policies (Stantcheva 2020), and macro-economic expectations (Roth
and Wohlfart 2019). As we do, the randomized components in these surveys show that
information can have an effect on attitudes and preferences. Several of these studies rely
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on commercial providers who conduct the surveys online and establish representativity
through a reweighting of the initially non-representative sample. We implement our ques-
tions within the GIP, an established survey with a representative sample of the German
population that was explicitly build up for research purposes.
3.2.2 Tax Complexity in Germany
Our survey is conducted in a country with a fairly complex income-tax system. For
example, Germany’s tax schedule presumably includes more than 500 deduction possi-
bilities, according to Kirchhof (2011). A study by Blaufus et al. (2014) finds that the
large number of tax expenditures along with other particularities of the German tax sys-
tem translate into considerable income-tax compliance costs of filing taxes. Using survey
data, the study estimates aggregate compliance costs for Germany of 6-9 billion EUR,
corresponding to 3.1-4.7% of total 2007 tax revenues. Blaufus et al. (2017) show that
expenses for a professional tax preparer are smaller than the savings in tax liability that
are due to the tax preparer. In other words, it pays off to have a professional tax pre-
parer. This is a further indication that the system is complex; in a world with the easiest
possible tax system it would most likely not pay off to have the tax return filed by a
professional. Overall, studying the topic of tax complexity in the context of Germany
thus appears a sensible choice given its complex income tax system. In light of the large
number of tax expenditures, studying complexity through its dimension of the number
of tax expenditures is also reasonable.
A further reason for why Germany is an interesting case to study complexity is that
there are frequently returning debates about tax simplification in the public, media and
among politicians. One prominent example of this debate is the proposal by prominent
politicians (particularly in the conservative center-right party) to simplify the tax system
in a way that makes it possible to file the income-tax return on a sheet of paper that is
not larger than a usual German beer coaster (such proposals were originally made in 2003
and kept coming back ever since; see FAZ 2004 or Goettinger Tageblatt 2018). Another
salient example is the proposal of a prominent academic tax lawyer (Paul Kirchhof)
during election campaigns to introduce an income-tax system with a flat rate of 25% and
considerably less tax expenditures (see e.g., FAZ 2005).
3.2.3 Main Objectives and Hypotheses
As sketched in the Introduction, our paper has two main objectives. Based on the related
literature and the public discussion about tax complexity (as described above), we derive
the following hypotheses regarding these two objectives.
Our first objective is to document preferences for tax simplification among a repre-
sentative sample of the population and to understand related aspects of tax simplification.
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Our expectation with respect to this objective is that the support for tax simplification is
high. This expectation builds on the observation that both the public debate and the pro-
fessional discussion (in academic literature and press) are centered around critiques about
overly complex tax systems and proposals to simplify taxes, while economic arguments in
support of a certain degree of tax complexity play a considerably less prominent role. In
light of the debates, asking people about their desire to simplify taxes then presumably
triggers a natural and obvious reply, namely that the tax system needs simplification.31
We provide first survey evidence documenting if the support for tax simplification is as
high as we would expect in light of the debates about this topic.
Our second objective immediately builds on the first objective. We aim to under-
stand if the (presumably large) overall support for tax simplicity is to some extent driven
by a lack of awareness about the trade-offs behind complex and simple tax systems. Our
first strategy towards this objective is forcing people to think about tax-relevant situa-
tions that are potentially familiar to them and then let them decide how the tax system,
in their view, should deal with these situations. Because the debate about complexity is
leaning towards simplification, we deliberately confront individuals with scenarios which
they do not immediately relate to the debate about complexity and deliberately do not
mention to them that their decisions could have implications for tax complexity. This
allows us to investigate individuals’ preferences towards complexity-adding components
in the tax system in the absence of the public-discussion-induced prejudices towards more
tax simplicity. Our expectation for this part of the paper is that the share of respondents
who indicate that the tax system should not account for certain differences in living
situation (and thus be as simple as possible) is considerably smaller than the share of re-
spondents who generally support to have a simpler tax system. It is of course possible to
believe that the system should account for the described differences in living situations
and at the same time think that the overall tax system should be somewhat simpler.
However, if the general support for simplification is considerably higher than the share of
respondents who think that the system should not account for differences across people,
then this could point in the direction that some people are not aware of certain aspects
of tax complexity.
The three scenarios that we present to respondents differ with respect to their degree
of being circumstantial (exogenous) to taxpayers or the result of a choice. Building on the
literature on optimal taxation and equality of opportunity (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos
2005; Durante et al. 2014; Ooghe and Peichl 2015), we further hypothesize that the share
of people who believe that circumstantial living situations should be accounted for in the
tax system, is higher than the share of people who believe that chosen living situations
31To some extent (and certainly exaggerated), asking for general simplification preferences could turn
out to be similar to asking people if they wish to have a higher disposable income.
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should be accounted for.
The second strategy in the context of our second objective builds on randomized
survey components that expose participants to information/arguments against and in
support of tax simplification. The rationale for this approach is simple: if the provided
information shift individuals’ preferences, then individuals are indeed not aware of certain
aspects of tax simplification. We hypothesize that misperceptions and a lack of awareness
are less prevalent when it comes to information against tax simplification. As a result,
shifts in preferences are presumably larger in response to information against simplifi-
cation than to responses in support of simplification. This hypothesis (again) builds on
the observation that both the public debate and the professional discussion are centered
around tax simplification.
Overall, our paper and the hypotheses relate to papers that emphasize the impor-
tance of the public opinion and the role of taxpayers as voters for the design of the tax
system (e.g., Hettich and Winer 1988). We expect that the public opinion is dependent
on context and information, and that attitudes towards tax simplicity of taxpayers/voters
are more nuanced than it apparently seems on first glance.
3.3 The Survey
3.3.1 German Internet Panel
Our questions are embedded in the German Internet Panel (henceforth: GIP).32 The GIP
is a longitudinal survey that is operated and administered at the University of Mannheim
in Germany.33 The main purpose of the panel survey is to collect ’data on individual
attitudes and preferences relevant in political and economic decision making processes’.
GIP data are collected online on a bi-monthly basis. The survey is representative for
the German population aged 16 to 75 (see Blom et al. 2015 for more details on its
representativity). Recruitment was conducted offline with face-to-face interviews, during
which respondents were invited to the online panel. To ensure the representativeness of
the sample, the GIP includes respondents without prior computer or Internet access by
providing them with the necessary equipment and training (Blom et al. 2017).
The survey includes repeated questions (included in every wave) as well as questions
only included in single waves. We included a block of questions in wave 36, which went
32The background information about the GIP in this subsection are partly based on the respective
subsection in Doerrenberg and Peichl (2018).
33To be more precise, the survey is based at the ”Collaborative Research Center 884 on Political
Economy of Reforms”, which is funded by the German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft, SFB 884). See http://reforms.uni-mannheim.de/ for background information on
the research center. Also see the general survey description in Blom et al. (2015) and at http:
//reforms.uni-mannheim.de/internet_panel/home/. Examples of GIP-based papers include Ker-
schbamer and Müller (2017), Müller and Renes (2017), Dolls and Wehrhoefer (2018), Engelmann et al.
(2018), Doerrenberg and Peichl (2018) and Blesse and Heinemann (2019).
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to the field in July 2018 and included 2464 participants (summary statistics below).
3.3.2 Survey Structure and Questions
We designed a block of 10 survey questions and integrated these questions into the GIP.
Our question block focuses on matters of tax simplicity and for our analysis we can
complement the results from our questions with the results from other questions in the
same wave and other waves of the GIP (for example, background characteristics of the
participants are available although they are not surveyed in our question block). Our
questions were embedded in a regular wave of the GIP (wave 36, July 2018) and were
surrounded by other GIP questions.
Our survey questions and the respective reply categories are shown in full in the
Appendix.34 The GIP has a professional and experienced team of survey experts who
supported us in developing and formulating our survey questions. Our questions therefore
meet up-to-date standards of survey methodology. The survey and its structure (in
chronological order) are summarized in the following.
• Introduction: Opener stating that the next set of questions will be about the
tax system in Germany and in particular about whether the German income-tax
system is complicated or easy to understand. The opener also includes a general
statement that the degree of complexity particularly depends on the number of
possible tax expenditures. This latter statement thus explains to participants which
dimension of complexity we are particularly interested in. The opener also makes
all respondents, independent of treatment status, aware of the topic and ensures
that the topic is made equally salient to all respondents.
• Q1: Difficulty of filing a tax return: We ask participants how difficult they
find it to file their tax return. We use this question to derive a proxy for the
perceived difficulty of the tax system and to investigate whether other questions
and treatment responses depend on the degree of perceived tax complexity.
• Randomized Experiment 1: Participants are randomly assigned to three groups
that are exposed to different information and arguments in the context of tax sim-
plification. See below for more info.
• Q2: Preferences for tax simplification: We ask participants if they think
whether the income-tax system in Germany generally needs to be simplified. This
question elicits preferences for tax simplification and also is a potential outcome
variable in the analysis of the effects of the randomized information.
34These are the translated survey questions. The original German questions are available upon request
from the authors and will also be available on the GIP website (https://reforms.uni-mannheim.de/
internet_panel/Questionnaires/).
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• Q3: General need for tax reform: The question surveys if participants in
general think that the German tax system is in need of reform.
• Q4: Distributional implications of tax expenditures: The question measures
participants’ beliefs about the distributional effects of tax expenditures. We partic-
ularly survey whether someone beliefs that tax expenditures contribute to a fairer
distribution of income or if they tend to benefit high-income taxpayers.
• Q5: Which type of tax-simplifying reform: We offer different types of tax
reforms that potentially contribute to simplification of the tax system. Participants
are asked to indicate which type of reform they prefer under the assumption that
all the listed reforms are revenue neutral.
• Q6-Q8: Should the tax system account for differences in living situa-
tions?: In each of these three questions, we present to the survey respondents the
living situations of two fictitious taxpayers A and B (see Weinzierl 2014, Saez and
Stantcheva 2016 and Weinzierl 2017 for similar survey question techniques). Re-
spondents are told that A and B earn the same gross income and are very similar in
all other (tax relevant) means, but only differ in one particular dimension. We have
three different scenarios of varying living situations, and for each scenario we ask
participants if A and B should pay the same amount of taxes or if any of the two
should pay more. In the three presented scenarios, A and B differ with respect to
i) the amount that has to be paid for elderly care of a poor mother, ii) the amount
that is given to charity, and iii) the distance they commute to work. The three
scenarios are presented in random order to avoid any order effects.
The choice of these three type of tax expenditures is motivated by their economic
importance and real-world prevalence. Tax expenditures for commuting, charitable
giving and elderly care are substantial and large in size, with commuting expen-
ditures being the largest income related expense recognized by tax authorities in
Germany; in 2017, tax expenditures related to commuting alone amounted to about
5 billion Euro (WiWo 2017). Moreover, these items are used by many taxpayers;
about 35 percent of the taxpayers use the commuting expenditure, about 24 percent
of the taxpayers deduct charitable contributions from their tax base, and approxi-
mately 8 percent of the taxpayers use the elderly care deductions (own calculations
based on German administrative tax records (FAST); see FAST 2010).35 Overall,
35The Factually Anonymous Income Tax Statistic (FAST) is a 10% stratified random sample of the
German Income Tax Statistics, comprising information about taxable income, family situation, income
sources, granted deductions and exemptions, revenues and sources of revenues, income tax burden, etc.
The data are available as cross-section scientific use files. For the tax-expenditure calculations here we
use the most recent available year of 2010. See Boenke and Schroeder (2017) for more information.
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the tax expenditures that we chose to rely on in these questions are very important,
salient and likely to be familiar to most of our survey respondents.
In addition, these three tax expenditures represent three different rationales for tax
expenditures, namely i) circumstances that are outside of the control of the respec-
tive taxpayer (elderly care), ii) positive externalities associated with the (self cho-
sen) expenditure (charitable giving) and iii) items representing job-related choices
of taxpayers (commuting).
• Randomized Experiment 2: Participants are again randomly assigned to three
groups that see different information and arguments in the context of tax simplifi-
cation (renewed randomization). See below for more info.
• Q9: Preferences for tax simplification: We again elicit preferences for tax
simplification (as in Q2). We explain to participants that we ask the same question
again because the topic was subject of some of the previous questions and par-
ticipants might have developed a different view on it in the course of the survey
questions. The question primarily serves as an outcome variable for the second set
of experiments.
• Q10: Own use of tax expenditures: We survey which tax expenditures partic-
ipants usually make use of in their annual income tax declaration.
3.3.3 Randomized Survey Experiments
We include two randomized components into our survey block on tax simplification (see
the survey structure above). The two experiments are preceded by separate random-
ization processes. In both experiments, respondents are randomly assigned to either a
control group or one of two treatment groups (i.e. between-subjects design with three
groups). An alternative to having two separate experiments would have been one single
experiment with more treatment groups. However, in light of the number of participants
and the rather subtle experimental interventions, we decided to choose to include two
randomized components in order to maximize statistical power.
Both experiments are structured in the same way: i) We first have a short opener
that serves as a connecting passage to the subsequently provided information. The opener
again explains that tax expenditures potentially contribute to the complexity of the tax
system. All participants (control group and treatment groups) see this opener. The
opener therefore ensures that the issues of tax expenditures and complexity are made
equally aware to control-group participants and treatment-group participants. Any treat-
ment effects are therefor not driven by differences in the extent of topic awareness across
the groups. ii) After the opener, respondents in the two treatment groups are provided
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short information/arguments in the context of tax simplification. iii) Respondents in all
three groups move on to the next survey question.
The information that we provide in the treatments pick up some of the most fre-
quently debated issues and empirical findings in the context of tax simplification; the
treatments are all reflected in the cited literature and presented arguments in section
3.1 and 3.2.1. In each of the two experiments, one treatment aims to shift preferences
towards tax simplification and the other one aims to shift preferences away from tax
simplification. Our treatments thus reflect that there are arguments both against and
in support of tax simplification. In addition, we are able to investigate if preferences for
tax simplification are more elastic with respect to arguments in support or against tax
simplification.36 We describe and motivate the two experiments in the following.
Experiment 1. The first experiment includes two treatments which we label Redis-
tribution treatment and Avoidance treatment. The two treatments are preceded by an
opener that is shown to all respondents (i.e., both treatment groups and control group).
The opener is everything that control-group respondents see in the context of the first
experiment before they move to the next survey question. It ensures that respondents in
all treatment groups are made equally aware of the topic of tax complexity. The opener
reads as follows:
In Germany there is an ongoing debate on whether the income tax system is
too complicated because of many possible deductions and allowances.
The Redistribution treatment highlights that tax expenditures, which add to tax
complexity, potentially have redistributional effects and can be used to reduce the tax
liability of taxpayers who are disadvantaged by circumstances. The treatment addresses
the point that tax expenditures can serve as a social-policy measure and presents a
potential argument in support of a certain degree of complexity. Those respondents
who are initially not aware of the link between tax expenditures and social-policy aspects
might reconsider their tax-simplicity preferences in response to the treatment and become
less supportive of tax simplification. The treatment text follows directly after the opener
and reads as follows:
However, it is sometimes also argued that a tax system with many possible
deductions and allowances has an important social-policy role, particularly in
relation to income redistribution. For example, tax deductions can be used to
reduce the tax burden of taxpayers who are disadvantaged by circumstances.
36The treatment structure is not augmented, meaning that respondents in the second treatment group
do not see both the information in the first treatment group and the information from the second
treatment group, but only see the information from the second treatment group.
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The Avoidance treatment highlights the frequently debated point that the exis-
tence of many complexity-adding tax expenditures potentially facilitates tax avoidance
and tax evasion. Assuming that most people disapprove tax avoidance and evasion, re-
spondents who were initially not fully aware of the potential link between tax complexity
and avoidance/evasion might shift their preferences towards more simplification in re-
sponse to being exposed to this treatment. The treatment text follows directly after the
opener and reads as follows:
In this context, one argument is that a tax system with many possible de-
ductions and allowances offers greater opportunity for tax avoidance and tax
adjustment. For example, when individuals have a better knowledge of the tax
system or make unjustified declarations, they can reduce their tax burden by
taking advantage of certain allowances or deductions.
Experiment 2. The second experiment includes two treatments, labeled Efficiency
treatment and Special interest treatment. The two treatments are preceded by an opener
that is shown to all respondents (i.e., both treatment groups and control group). As
before in the first experiment, this opener is everything that control-group respondents
see in the context of this second experiment. It ensures that respondents in all treatment
groups are equally aware of the general topic, tax complexity. The opener reads as follows:
We would like to once again address the ongoing debate concerning whether
the income tax system is too complicated due to the many possible deductions
and allowances.
The Efficiency treatment highlights the argument that efficiency is potentially
higher in a complex system with many tax expenditures because such a system provides
the opportunity to tailor taxes to individual situations and, thus, to tax individual ca-
pacity and ability. The treatment therefore increases awareness for a potential argument
against tax simplification, and potentially shifts preferences away from tax simplification
– at least among those respondents who did not consider this argument initially. The
treatment is presented immediately after the opener and reads as follows:
One argument that is often used against tax simplification and that has not
been addressed so far is that a tax system with many deductions and allowances
provides better opportunities to tax individuals in accordance with their ability
to pay and is therefore economically more efficient.
The Special Interest treatment highlights that a complex system with many tax
expenditures is more vulnerable to the lobbying activities of special interest groups. The
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argument is that special interest groups try to bargain favorable tax treatment and the
existence of many complexity-adding exemptions facilitates the groups’ efforts; a system
with a narrow tax base and without tax expenditures would make it more to difficult
to implement special interests in the tax system. Provided that most people agree that
special interests should not be accounted for in the tax system, this second treatment
provides an argument in support of tax simplification. The treatment text, that follows
right after the opener, is formulated as follows:
One argument that is often used in favor of tax simplification and that has not
been addressed so far is that a tax system with many deductions and allowances
offers special interest groups greater opportunity for obtaining exemptions for
their clientele.
Discussion of Experimenter Demand Effects and Power Analyses. One fre-
quently raised concern with survey experiments (and surveys in general) is that experi-
menter demand effects drive the survey responses and results. A recent study by Mum-
molo and Peterson (2019) presents a large and carefully conducted test of experimenter
demand effects in the context of survey experiments. They run online survey experiments
with more than 12,000 participants and randomly assign information about experimenter
intent. They find that providing these information does not affect treatment effects; even
financial incentives to respond in line with experimenters’ intent did not trigger any de-
mand effects. These findings provide evidence that survey experiments are on average
robust to experimenter demand effects. The findings are consistent with the results of
de Quidt et al. (2018). They use a similar approach in online experiments and find that
experimenter demand effects are ’small’.
The main survey question in our paper, preferences for tax simplicity, asks respon-
dents for their view on a specific aspect of policy. There is neither a correct or false answer
to this question nor is it in anyhow ethically critical. Participants are therefore not under
the impression that they must provide a particular answer and social-desirability bias
should thus not matter here. In addition, the question is very similar to the questions
that GIP-participants are used to. The information that treatment participants receive
prior to replying to the tax-simplicity preferences are provided in a very neutral and
objective way, and thus do not induce subjects to provide a certain answer. Overall, the
intention behind our survey question and experimental interventions was certainly con-
siderably more subtle than in the above described two studies in the literature. In light of
the findings in the literature and the nature of our questions, we argue that experimenter
demand is not a critical concern in our survey experiment.
Note that performing ex-ante power analyses during the design stage of our survey
experiment was very difficult. The main survey question, preferences for tax simplicity,
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has neither been included in the GIP before nor are we aware of any other survey that
includes a similar question. It was therefore not possible to rely on any reliable predictions
regarding the standard deviation (and mean) for our main survey question at the point
of time when we designed the survey experiment. In light of a lack of comparable studies,
we could neither form any good expectations regarding the effect sizes that would occur
from our treatment interventions. However, these parameters are of course crucial for a
meaningful power analysis. In addition, we faced a given number of participants in the
GIP and it would have been difficult to adjust the sample size in response to the results of
an ex-ante power analysis. We therefore do not present the results of any ex-ante power
analyses.
3.3.4 Sample Characteristics
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics with respect to the demographics of our survey
participants.37 Most demographics in Table 4 were not surveyed in the context of our
specific survey block on tax simplification, but in other parts of the same wave or in other
waves (some variables that do not change over time are linked to the current survey wave
through the panel character of the GIP). The descriptive results for the questions of our
survey block are not in this table, but are instead presented further below in the results
section 3.4.
The table shows that we have a survey sample with balanced gender composition
(48% female) and that we cover all age categories (with 36% of the participants being
older than 58, and 23% retired). 61% of the respondents are married. 17% of the sample
participants live in single households, 46% in 2-person households and 18% in households
with three people. The distribution of education levels is also very reasonable. We split
participants in different income categories and see that 11% are quite poor (net monthly
income less than 1500 EUR) and 15% are relatively rich (net monthly income greater
than 4500 EUR). The share of people in the three income classes in between poor and
rich are quite balanced.
Corresponding with low current unemployment rates in Germany, only about 2%
of the survey participants are unemployed. In terms of political affiliations, we see that
about 38% of the sample are in the rather conservative political spectrum and 47%
are rather left-wing. 8% indicate that they do not have any partisan preferences (left-
right preferences are elicited on a 11-point scale from right to left, where we classify
’conservative’ as <= 5 on this scale).
37Note that the GIP is designed to be representative of the German population, which is why it is
not necessary to compare the summary statistics of our sample with statistics from other representative
data, such as census data (see Blom et al. 2015 for more details on the GIP’s representativeness).
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3.3.5 Balancedness across Experimental Groups
Table 12 presents the results of balancing checks for our first experiment. Following the
strategy in Alesina et al. (2018), we test balance across groups as follows: For each co-
variate, we run three OLS regressions of the form yi = βCovariatei+εi, where Covariate
is the respective covariate that we test. The three dependent variables for which we run
the regressions are dummies indicating the treatment groups – redistribution, avoidance,
and control group. As a result of this procedure, we have the results of 30 OLS regressions
(one regression for each combination of 10 covariates and 3 outcome dummies). Reassur-
ingly, we find strong evidence that randomization worked well and our covariates do not
predict treatment status. Out of 60 estimated coefficients, only 5 are significant at the
10% level and only one is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
This is well in line with these coefficients being significant by chance within their margin
of error.38
The equivalent strategy was used for testing balancedness of the second experiment;
see Table 13 which is structured just as the corresponding table for the first experiment
(Table 12). We here restrict the sample to respondents who were in the control group
of the first experiment (because we are interested in the effect of the second experiment
for this ’unencumbered’ group; see 3.4.4 for a more detailed explanation). The results
are again quite reassuring. Out of 60 coefficients, 7 are significant at conventional levels
of significane (10% or lower). Overall, randomization apparently worked out well, which
is not surprising given that the GIP computer system assigned respondents randomly to
treatment groups and selection into groups was not possible. Further below in our regres-
sions, we present specifications that condition on all observable covariates to mitigate all
remaining concerns regarding balancedness.
3.4 Results
This section presents the results of our survey on tax complexity. We proceed as follows.
First, we document in subsection 3.4.1 the preferences for tax simplification (Q2) and
then investigate the ’anatomy’ of these preferences (i.e., which observable characteristics
are correlated with the preferences). Second, in subsection 3.4.2, we report the results
for further survey questions on the topic of tax complexity. In particular, we document
the results for our survey questions w.r.t. difficulty of filing a return (Q1), general need
for tax reform (Q3), distributional aspects of simplification (Q4), and which tax expen-
ditures the participants use themselves (Q10). We then go and explore in steps 3 and 4
of our analysis to which extent preferences for tax simplification are affected by aware-
ness w.r.t. the pros and cons of tax simplification; in particular: Third, we document in
38With 60 estimated coefficients, one would expect six coefficients with a significance level of 10% even
in the absence of any systematic difefrences between groups.
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subsection 3.4.3 if participants believe that the tax system should account for differences
in the living situations of taxpayers (Q6-Q8). Fourth, we present the results of the two
randomized survey experiments in subsection 3.4.4. Therein, we are particularly inter-
ested in the experimental effects on preferences for tax simplification. Fifth, subsection
3.4.7 documents which type of tax-simplifying reform the survey respondents favor (Q5).
3.4.1 Preferences for Tax Simplification
Preferences Across all Respondents. We elicit preferences for tax simplicity using
a question which surveys whether people believe that the income-tax system in Germany
needs to be simplified (Q2 in the survey structure above). The reply categories were on
a 6-point scale from 1 ’Absolutely not’ to 6 ’Absolutely’.
Figure 7 presents the share of respondents in each reply category across all survey
participants. A large majority believes that the tax system needs to be simplified: Among
all question respondents (i.e., those who gave a non-missing and non-I-don’t-know reply),
53% (= 46.9/(100 − 11.1)) checked reply category six, meaning that the system ’abso-
lutely’ needs to be simplified. Another 23% of the respondents chose the second highest
reply category 5. This then implies that about 76% of the respondents have strong (ei-
ther category 5 or 6) preferences for tax simplification. 16% are in category 4, which also
implies a preference for tax simplification. Overall, more than 90% of the respondents
thus express a preference for a simplified tax system. Only about 8% of the respondents
chose categories 1, 2 or 3, which indicate rather weak preferences for tax simplification.
The mean response across all respondents is 5.16.
The replies of respondents who are in one our information treatments might be
affected by the treatment information. However, the support for tax simplification is also
very high among respondents in the control group who did not receive any information;
the mean reply in the control group was 5.22.
Overall, the results provide clear evidence that preferences for tax simplicity in the
German population are very strong. We are able to confirm that the prevailing view
indeed is in strong favor of tax simplification. As a matter of fact, the strong preferences
for simplifications suggest that the support of simplification is the obvious choice for
participants as they fill out this survey question. We investigate further below if this
choice becomes less obvious as we increase awareness w.r.t. the trade-offs behind tax
complexity and tax simplification.
Anatomy of Preferences for Tax Simplification. In a next step, we study the
’anatomy’ of simplification preferences and investigate which groups (in terms of observ-
able characteristics) are more likely to have strong preferences for tax simplification. For
this purpose, we simply regress (using OLS) our measure of simplification preferences on
53
a wide set of observable characteristics. These characteristics comprise demographic fac-
tors, including gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status, retirement
status and education, as well as a measure of perceived tax difficulty, household income
and political preferences. We report results with robust standard errors. The coefficients
in this regression are (conditional) correlations and should not be given a causal inter-
pretation. However, they nevertheless shed light on the heterogeneity of preferences and
allow us to gain a more nuanced picture.
The results for this anatomy analysis are presented in Table 5. Important demo-
graphic correlates of simplification preferences are age and gender. Older people tend to
have stronger preferences for simplification, and women have weaker preferences. Age
and gender differences are further investigated in Figures 19 and 20 which illustrate un-
conditional differences between age groups and between men and women, respectively.
Figure 19 shows that the average support for simplification steadily increases in age; the
support is 16% higher among respondents older than 58, relative to respondents younger
than 29. As illustrated in Figure 20, the support for simplification among men is roughly
3% greater than among women.
Another important correlate of simplification preferences is the perceived difficulty
of filing a tax return. Respondents who find it easy to file a tax return have lower simpli-
fication preferences than respondents who find it difficult. The unconditional relationship
between simplification preferences and perceived filing difficulty are displayed in Figure
21. The Figure confirms the intuitive result that the perceived difficulty to declare income
taxes is positively associated with support for tax simplification.
Interestingly, respondents who do not file their tax return themselves or employ a
tax preparer are more supportive of simplification than those who file themselves and find
it easy. These non-filers, however, have lower support for simplification than self-filers
who find it difficult to prepare the tax return.
3.4.2 Further Survey Questions
We surveyed further aspects in the context of tax complexity in order to learn more how
respondents think about the topic. We present the results question by question in the
following.
Difficulty of Filing a Return. We survey the perceived difficulty of filing a tax return
on a 5-point scale from 1 ’Very Easy’ to 5 ’Very Difficult’ (Q1). This question particu-
larly allows us to investigate if the substantially high preferences for tax simplification
correspond with the perceived difficulty to file a return.39 The results for this survey
39Recall that the question of perceived difficulty of filing a tax return was asked before treatment
information were presented.
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question are summarized in Figure 8, which, again, presents the share of respondents in
each reply category.
The right part of the Figure shows that more than 1/3 (34.7%) of the respondents
did not indicate their perceived difficulty, either because they do not file a return or
because they have their return filed by someone else (e.g., a tax preparer, spouse). Among
all respondents who file a return (i.e., the other 61.9%), about 18% (11.1/61.9) find it
’very difficult’ to file their return and 32% (19.6/61.9) checked category 4, which also
indicates a fair degree of difficulty. The medium category 3 was checked by about 28%
(17.5/61.9). About 22% ((10.8 + 2.9)/61.9) of the respondents find it rather easy to
file the return. The mean reply for this question is 3.41 (on a scale of 1-5) among all
respondents who file a tax return.
Overall, there is a tendency that tax returns are perceived to be fairly difficult,
but the picture is not as strong as in the case of preferences for tax simplification. This
corresponds with the ’anatomy’ result above: the positive correlation between simplifi-
cation preferences and perceived difficulty to file a return is not perfectly linear. This
suggests that the strong preference for tax simplification is not entirely motivated by own
experiences with too-difficult tax returns.
General Need for Tax Reforms. We also surveyed if participants believe that the
German tax system generally needs to be reformed (Q3). The question was asked on a
scale from 1 ’Absolutely not’ to 6 ’Absolutely’. Figure 9 shows that a large fraction of
46.7% (= 39.4/(100− 15.6)) of question respondents (i.e., those who gave a non-missing
and non-I-don’t-know reply) think that the tax system ’absolutely’ (reply category 6)
needs to be reformed. Another 27.7% also have a strong preference for reforming the
system (reply category 5). A negligible share of people do not see a need to implement
reforms; only about 8% of the respondents checked reply categories 1, 2 or 3. The mean
reply for this question is 5.06. The mean response in the control group is similar (5.09) to
the overall mean. Overall, this part of the survey provides clear evidence that Germans
believe that the tax system in their country is in strong need of reform.
Distributional Implications of Tax Expenditures. One frequently raised concern
in the context of tax complexity is that the rich are able to exploit tax expenditures better
than low-income taxpayers; for example, because they afford professional tax advisors or
because they have income sources with more possibilities for tax planning. However, given
that many tax expenditures also have a redistributive purpose, it is interesting to survey
the public opinion in this context. We therefore survey beliefs about the distributional
implications of tax expenditures. In particular, we ask if deductions and allowances
contribute to equality or if high-income taxpayers tend to benefit from them (Q4). The
reply categories are 1 ’Equality’ to 6 ’High Incomes Benefit’ and the question results are
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summarized in Figure 10.
The results are unambiguous: the majority of question respondents (i.e., those who
gave a non-missing and non-I-don’t-know reply) believe that allowances and deductions
benefit high-income taxpayers, rather than contributing to equality. 33.1% (= 27.3/(100−
17.5)) were in the corner category 6 and another 20.3% are in the second-largest reply
category 5. That is, more than 50 percent of the respondents were in those two categories
which indicate the highest beliefs that high-income taxpayers benefit from deductions and
allowances. Only about 29% of all respondents checked reply categories 1, 2 or 3. The
mean reply for this question is 4.33. This mean response for the overall sample is very
similar to the mean response in the control group (4.28). Overall, the large majority
beliefs that tax expenditures mostly benefit richer taxpayers.
Which Tax Expenditures are Used? We also survey which type of tax expenditures
respondents use regularly (Q10). This survey question mainly serves the purpose of
evaluating if survey answers about particular type of expenditures (see below section
3.4.3) are driven by self-interest. The question, however, is also interesting in itself and
we therefore briefly summarize the results in Figure 11. The Figure presents the share
of people who use particular tax expenditures (note that multiple answers were possible
so the shares do not add up to 100). The list of itemized deductions is, of course, not
exhaustive. The most frequently used tax expenditures in our sample are the commuting-
to-work allowance, the deduction of other type of work expenses (e.g., work-related costs
for books, clothes, etc.), charitable donations, and deductible expenses for pension and
retirement savings. Child allowances and so-called ’standard deductions’40 are also quite
frequently used.
3.4.3 Different Tax Burden for Taxpayers in Different Living Situations?
In the next set of questions (Q6-Q8), we face respondents with two fictitious taxpayers
who differ in one aspect of their living situation, and then ask if these two taxpayers
should pay the same amount of taxes. While a differential tax treatment of the two
fictitious taxpayers would add complexity to the tax system, we do not mention this
complexity aspect of the presented scenario explicitly to respondents. These questions
allow us to evaluate if respondents prefer to account for different living situations through
the tax system at the cost of adding complexity to the tax system. In other words, if
people indicated that specific differences in living situations should matter for the tax
burden, this would imply that they do not desire the simplest possible tax system and
are willing to accept a certain degree of tax complexity.
40This represents the lump sum deduction amount for taxpayers who do not exceed the thresholds in
other deduction categories.
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All three questions are structured in the same way. We ask respondents to imagine
two fictitious taxpayers, A and B, who are comparable in all tax relevant aspects, and
only differ along one of the following dimensions:
i) Person A has to spend a considerable amount for the elderly care of her mother,
while Person B does not have to bear such costs.
ii) Person A spends a considerable amount of income on charitable giving, while Person
B does not donate.
iii) Person A has to travel a considerable distance to work, while Person B lives close
to work.
We then ask who of the two persons, A or B, should pay more taxes (where the
order of reply categories and the order of presented scenarios was randomized). The
results are presented in Figures 12 to 14.41
Figure 12 shows that a majority of about 60% of the survey respondents believe
that the costs for elderly care should reduce the tax burden. In other words, a majority
of about approximately 2/3 of respondents think that the tax system should account for
this difference in living situation, and that Person B should pay more taxes. Almost
40% indicate that taxpayers with and without costs for elderly care should pay the same
amount of taxes, and almost nobody thinks that A should pay more in taxes.
Figure 15 shows that these effects are not driven by self-interest. We split the
sample into those who make use of deductions for care costs themselves and those who
do not. The survey responses among these two groups look very similar. Even among
those who do not use care deductions themselves, a majority of almost 60% believes that
Person B, who does not have care costs, should pay more taxes. Among those who use
the deduction themselves, a little bit more than 60% think that Person B should pay
more.42 Overall, these survey responses provide clear evidence that people favor a system
in which the costs for elderly care are deductible from the tax base.
For the survey questions regarding charitable donations (Figure 13) and expenses for
commuting (Figure 14) we see that a majority of about 66% and 59% of the respondents
think that both persons, A and B, should pay the same amounts of taxes, respectively.
That is, about 2/3 think that differences in charitable donations and commuting expenses
should not imply differential tax payments.
However, a fraction of 32% and 39% of all respondents yet think that higher dona-
tions and commuting costs should imply lower tax burdens. That is, roughly 1/3 of the
41Note that the responses here were not affected by the randomized interventions.
42We acknowledge that it might be possible that a few taxpayers, who do not currently use this tax
expenditure, expect to use it in the future. A support of this tax expenditure might then be driven by
self-interest, even if they do not currently make use of the tax expenditure.
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respondents believe that differential expenses in these areas should result in a reduced
tax burden. This is a considerably smaller share than in the case of elderly care, but 1/3
of respondents still is a substantial fraction that is in favor of accounting for these living
situations in the tax system.
The difference between the ’elderly care’ situation and the other two situations
is interesting: Costs for elderly care are circumstantial and outside the control of the
respective taxpayer, while donations and commuting distance are choices of the taxpayer.
Consistent with the literature on optimal taxation and equality of opportunity (e.g.,
Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Durante et al. 2014; Ooghe and Peichl 2015), our survey
respondents have the intuition that circumstantial differences should be accounted for to
a larger extent by the tax system than deliberate and self-chosen differences.
In line with this, the responses for donations and commuting expenses are more
affected by self-interest, as compared to the responses for elderly care. Figures 16 and 17
present the results separately for those who use the respective tax expenditure themselves
and those who do not. In the case of donations, a quarter of those respondents who do
not use the donation expenditure themselves think that donations should reduce the tax
burden, while the share is 45% among those who do use the donation expenditure. The
pattern is similar for the case of commuting expenditures: among those who do not use
the commuting expenditure, 34% believe that it should reduce in a lower tax burden.
Among those who do use the commuting expenditure, the share of people who believe
commuting should reduce tax payments stands at 47%.
Overall, the differences between those who use the respective tax expenditure and
those who do not are thus larger in the case of donations and commuting than for the
case of elderly care. However, even for donations and commuting we still see that a large
share of those who do not use the expenditure support the notion that the tax system
should account for the respective living situation. This suggests that the result for none
of the three different tax expenditures is entirely driven by self-interest.
3.4.4 Randomized Survey Experiments
Empirical Strategy. We now present the results of the two randomized survey exper-
iments. In case of the first experiment, we use OLS regressions (with robust standard
errors) in which we regress the respective outcome variable on dummy variables indicating
the two information treatments. The resulting coefficients then present the effect of the
respective treatment relative to the omitted control group. In our preferred specification,
we include control variables to improve precision of the treatment effects.
In case of the second experiment, we expect that the treatments of the first exper-
iment impact the treatment effects of the second experiment. For example, consider a
respondent who was assigned to the con-simplification treatment in the first experiment
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and to the pro-simplification treatment in the second experiment. A positive effect of the
pro-argument in the second experiment might then cancel out with the negative effect of
the con-argument of the first experiment and, as a result, we see no effect in the second
experiment, although there actually is a positive effect. We circumvent this concern as
follows: We first fully interact dummies indicating treatment status of the second ex-
periment with dummies indicating treatment status of the first experiment (the control
group always being the reference category), and then use OLS (with robust standard
errors) to regress the outcome variable of interest on the full set of interactions. We only
report the coefficients of the treatment dummies of the second experiment (and not the
interactions). These reported coefficients then present the effects of the second experi-
ment for those respondents who were in the control group of the first experiment. These
respondents have not received any prior treatment in the context of simplification and
therefore are ’unencumbered’ when they enter the second experiment.43 As with the first
experiment, our preferred specifications include control variables which improve precision
of the treatment coefficient of interest.
The main outcome variables are the responses to the question of whether the tax
system should be simplified; i.e., Q2 in the case of the first experiment and Q9 in case
of the second experiment. These are the variables that follow immediately after the
respective randomized intervention. The variable that we use in the regressions is coded
just as the original survey question, on a six-point scale, in order to not throw away any
information. In the context of the first experiment, we further study the treatment effects
on the survey question regarding the perceived distributional effects of expenditures (Q4).
This variable is also coded as the original survey variable (on a 6-point scale). We also
looked at the effects of the experimental intervention on the question about the general
need to reform the tax system (Q3). However, we did not detect any effects for this
question and therefore do not report the results.
We use OLS for reasons of eased interpretation. Ordered probit models, which
account for the discrete and ordered nature of the outcome variables, are presented in
robustness checks.
3.4.5 Experiment 1
Main Effects. Table 6 presents the main results for the first experiment, in which
we provide information about the social-policy role of tax expenditures (Redistribution
group) and about expenditure-induced tax avoidance opportunities (Avoidance group) in
43The coefficients that we report for the second experiment are identical to coefficients that are esti-
mated in regressions in which the sample is restricted to respondents who were in the control group in
the first experiment. We use the full interaction model, and not the sample-split variant, because this
approach improves precision and the resulting coefficients are based on the same sample that is used for
the regressions for the first experiment.
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complex tax systems. Preferences for tax simplicity (Q2) is the outcome variable in all
specifications of the table.
Column (1) of the table shows the effects of the treatment dummies in a regres-
sion specification without conditioning on any additional covariates. The other columns
gradually add further variables in order to increase efficiency and test the sensitivity
with respect to covariates. Column (2) adds several demographic control variables, and
Columns (3), (4) and (5) additionally condition on the perceived difficulty to file a tax
return, household income and political preferences, respectively.
The regression results in all specifications show negative effects of the Redistribution
treatment on preferences for tax simplification (all estimates statistically significant at the
5% level). The coefficients are remarkably stable across the five different specifications.
In Column (5), our preferred specification where we include all covariates, the support
for tax simplification is reduced by about 2.6% (−0.133/5.22 = coefficient/control-group
average), relative to the control-group average. The regressions thus provide evidence
that preferences for tax simplicity are elastic to information against tax simplification.
The effect size is not very large, but it has to be considered in light of the fact that
the overall support for tax simplification is substantial and, given the debate in the public
and press outlets, presumably is strongly anchored among respondents. Our treatment
thus affects preferences for tax simplification although the conventional wisdom on the
topic is very clear and strong. For these reasons, we argue, the effect size should be
interpreted as non-negligible.
The Avoidance-treatment does not have a significant effect on simplification pref-
erences. The coefficients are small and not statistically significant throughout the five
specifications. The standard errors in all five specifications are considerably greater than
the respective coefficient. Statistical precision is thus much weaker than in the case
of the Redistribution-treatment. The coefficients are also considerably different: across
all specifications, the coefficients of the Redistribution-treatment are at least 2.7 times
larger than the coefficients of the Avoidance-treatment, and the difference between the
two is statistically significant throughout specifications (3) to (5) (with p-values in the
range of 0.064 to 0.057).44 We also tried different specifications of the outcome variable
(e.g., a dummy variable indicating very high support for simplification) but never find a
significant effect of the Avoidance-treatment.
The results thus show that preferences for simplification are not elastic to the infor-
mation in support of tax simplification. This null-result might be explained with the very
prominent role of arguments in favor of simplification in the public debate. As a result of
these salient arguments, participants presumably have less misperceptions regarding in-
44Negative coefficients of the Avoidance-treatment are consistent with the treatment having no effect.
If two independent samples are drawn from the same population, it is very likely that one sample is
smaller than the other one.
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formation that support simplification. The high initial support for tax simplicity among
participants (which does not leave much room for even more support) might also play a
role.45
We also investigated the effect of the first experimental intervention on respondents’
views about the distributional implications of tax complexity (Q4). The results of this
exercise are presented in Table 7, which is structured like the previously discussed Table 6.
The Redistribution-treatment does not affect these beliefs (relative to the control group).
The coefficients are close to zero and not significantly different from zero. However, the
information about possible complexity-induced avoidance possibilities in the Avoidance-
group somewhat affect the distributional beliefs. The treatment coefficient is statistically
significant in specifications (3) to (5), and indicates that the treatment increases beliefs
that tax expenditures add to income inequality (the coefficients in specifications (1)
and (2) are imprecisely measured). Considering the specification in column (5), which
includes all covariates, the treatment increased the distributional-beliefs variable by about
4% (0.169/4.285), relative to the control-group average. Comparing the coefficients of
the Redistribution-treatment and the Avoidance-treatment, we find statistical significant
differences for specifications (3) to (5) with p-values ranging from 0.09 to 0.064.
Results for the experimental effects on both tax simplification attitudes and dis-
tributional views are robust to using Ordered Probit regressions that account for the
discrete nature of the outcome variables; the respective results are shown in Tables 14
and 15.
Randomization Tests and Multiple Hypothesis Testing. In a next step, we in-
vestigate if the (robust) OLS standard errors that we reported above are robust to other
ways of computing standard errors. In particular, we adjust standard errors using i) ran-
domization tests in the spirit of Fisher (1935) and ii) tests for multiple comparisons that
follow the procedure proposed by Westfall and Young (1993). Note that the coefficients
are not affected by the alternative types of statistical inference that we present in the
following.
First, we perform randomization tests following Young (2018). The Young (2018)-
procedure performs exact tests which test the sharp null hypothesis that the effect of
the information treatment is zero for all individuals receiving our treatment. That is, it
does not test whether the average treatment effect is zero (which is what we tested in
our main analysis), but whether the treatment effects are zero across all repondents. The
randomization-test procedure, which is in the spirit of Fisher (1935), is more conservative
in computing standard errors: Young (2018) reports that, using his approach, the number
45Note that the constant decreases as we subsequently add control variables across the regression
specifications. This suggests that our control variables can explain a considerable part of the high
baseline support for simplification.
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of significant results of randomized experiments is considerably reduced relative to con-
ventional tests of individual treatment effects. Compared to classical asymptotic-based
testing procedures, these randomization tests have the advantage that they are robust
against concentrated leverage and do not rely on sample size or the characteristics of the
error (Young 2018).46
Using the Young (2018)-procedure with 5000 draws (to approximate the p-value
of the Fisher distribution), the effect of the Redistribution-treatment on preferences for
simplification yields a p-value of 0.015 (in our preferred specification with the full set of
controls). The coefficients are thus statistically significant and the levels of significance of
the classical testing method – as reported above – are confirmed. This stricter procedure
for computing p-values also confirms the insignificant effect of our Avoidance-treatment
on preferences for tax simplicity; the p-value for the Avoidance-dummy is computed to
be 0.6 and thus far off conventional levels of statistical significance.
Overall, all p-values based on the randomization tests are very similar to the ones
obtained by ordinary OLS with robust standard errors. This is reassuring and lends
credibility to the inference used in our main analyses above (which used classical hypoth-
esis testing). The similarity between p-values might be interpreted as an indication that
the treatment effects in our setting are constant among individuals; as noted by Ding
(2017), the sharp-null hypothesis and the null hypothesis of zero average causal effect are
equivalent in the case of constant causal effects.
Second, we use the method proposed by Westfall and Young (1993), and for ex-
ample recently applied by Blattman et al. (2017), to adjust standard errors for multiple
comparisons. As Blattman et al. (2017), we take a rather conservative approach that
adjusts for comparisons across treatments and outcomes: in our first experiment, the
combination of three outcome variables and two treatments implies that six hypothesis
are tested (i.e., for each outcome variable, two treatment effects are tested relative to the
control group). We tested the effect of our information treatments on the following three
outcome variables: preferences for tax simplification (Q2), general need for tax reform
(Q3), distributional implications of tax expenditures (Q4). Note that we only reported
in detail the results for outcomes Q2 and Q4 because we did not find any effects of the
treatment on Q3. However, since we initially intended to study the effect on all three
outcome variables, the correct procedure here requires that we adjust standard errors to
the case with three outcomes and two treatments.
Using the Westfall and Young (1993)-procedure to adjust standard errors for mul-
tiple comparisons, we find a standard error of 0.083 for the effect of the Redistribution-
treatment on preferences for tax simplification (based on our preferred specification with
46We implement the randomization tests using the ado file provided by Alwyn Young on his website;
the exact testing procedure is described in (Young 2018). We report randomization-t tests since the
author finds in practice “randomization-t to be superior to the -c”.
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the full set of control variables). The effect of the Avoidance-treatment on preferences
for tax simplification is insignificant with a p-value of 0.84. We thus confirm the classical
p-values regarding the treatment effects on our main outcome variable, preferences for
tax simplification. The p-value of Avoidance on the perceived distributional implications,
which is significant in the classical inference approach, stands at 0.24 with this method
and therefore turns insignificant. All other hypotheses are insignificant with p-values
greater than 0.7.
Heterogenous Treatment Effects. In a next step of the analysis, we investigate if
particular groups of respondents respond differently to the treatments of the first experi-
ment than other groups of respondents. For this purpose, we interact the treatment-group
dummies with the observable characteristics of the sample population; in particular we
test if there are heterogenous effects with respect to the following variables: age, gender,
marital status, household size, income, education, political preferences, difficulty of filing
a tax return, trust in government, the perceived quality of tax use for public spending,
taste for redistribution (from wave 34 of the GIP), beliefs in luck or effort, and social
mobility perceptions (from wave 33 of the GIP). Overall, the effects of the treatments
seem to be very homogenous. We mostly do not see any significant interactions. For
reasons of brevity and given these results, we do not report the regression results. We
acknowledge that it is possible that the interaction models for detecting heterogeneity
lack statistical power, rather than providing evidence of homogenous treatment effects.
The finding that treatment effects seem to be rather constant across observable charac-
teristics is consistent with the above finding that the classical standard errors and the
adjusted standard errors using the Young (2018)-procedure are very similar.
3.4.6 Experiment 2
Main Effects. The main results for our second randomized intervention are presented
in Table 8, which is organized as the corresponding table for the first experiment. This
second experiment includes a control group, a group that is presented an Efficiency
argument against tax simplification, and a group that is presented a Special interest group
argument in favor of tax simplicity. The dependent variable is the question surveying
tax-simplicity preferences (note that Q9 is the dependent variable here, not Q2 which
we use for the first experiment). Consistent with the results from the first experiment,
we observe that preferences for tax simplicity are elastic towards information against tax
simplification, and not elastic to information in favor of simplification.
The estimated coefficient for the Efficiency-treatment is negative and statistically
significant throughout all five specifications of the regression table. Column 5, our pre-
ferred specification with all covariates, shows that the efficiency argument reduced support
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for tax simplicity by about 5% (= 0.240/5.084), relative to the control-group average.
The effect size should again be considered in light of the fact that the general wisdom
clearly holds that tax simplification is desirable; we therefore consider a 5% effect size to
be non-negligible.
The estimates for the effect of the Special interest group argument in favor of tax
simplicity are very close to zero and non-significant in all of the regression specifications.
Notably, the coefficient of the Efficiency-treatment is at least three times larger than the
coefficient of the Special interest group-treatment across the five specifications. However,
these differences between the two treatment estimates are not statistically significant,
presumably due to power reasons since we only compare reactions for participants who
have been in the control group in the first experiment. The null result of the Special
interest group-treatment is, again, likely to be driven by the more prominent role of
arguments in favor of simplification in the public debate, which reduce misperceptions
regarding pro-simplification arguments.
As shown in Table 16, these results are robust to using ordered probit models.
Randomization Tests and Multiple Hypothesis Testing. As with the first ex-
periment, we again adjust standard errors using Young (2018)-type randomization tests
and Westfall and Young (1993)-type tests for multiple comparisons. Note that we only
have one outcome variable (preferences for tax simplicity) and two treatment groups here,
implying that we test only two hypotheses in the context of this second experiment.
First, the randomization tests come with a p-value for the effect of the Efficiency-
treatment on preferences for tax simplification of 0.019 (in our preferred specification
with full set of controls). That is, the previously reported significance for the Efficiency-
treatment is confirmed. The effect of the Special interest group-treatment remains in-
significant with a p-value above 0.5. As with the first experiment, the p-values are
remarkably similar to the p-values from classical testing methods. This is reassuring and
again indicates that our treatment effects are constant across participants.
Second, the Westfall and Young (1993) method finds adjusted p-values of 0.043 for
the Efficiency-treatment and 0.48 for the Special interest group-treatment (both in spec-
ifications with the full set of control variables). The procedure thus confirms the classical
inference procedure that treatment Efficiency has a significant effect, while treatment
Special interest group does not.
Heterogenous Treatment Effects. As in the case of the first experiment, we investi-
gate if particular groups of respondents respond differently to the treatments of the first
experiment than other groups. We run the same interaction models as in the case of
the first experiment (with the same interacted observable variables) and again find that
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effects of the treatments are very homogenous across different demographic groups; we
mostly do not detect any significant interactions. For reasons of brevity and given these
results, we again do not report the regression results. We acknowledge, again, that it
is possible that the interaction models for detecting heterogeneity lack statistical power,
rather than providing evidence of homogenous effects. However, the lack of heterogeneity
is consistent with the finding that exact p-values following Young (2018) are very similar
to the classical p-values.
3.4.7 Which Simplifying Tax Reform?
In light of the conventional wisdom that tax simplification is desirable, we included a
question to survey how policy should reform the tax system in order to make it simpler.
For the purpose of this question, we provided respondents with a list of potential tax-
simplifying reforms and they could chose which of the offered alternatives they prefer.
This list is of course not exhaustive, it yet features some of the most debated type
of reforms. Respondents are explicitly informed that they should consider each of the
reforms under the assumption of tax-revenue neutrality (i.e., no effects on tax revenues
through the respective reforms) in order to abstract from revenue considerations.47
The results for this question are summarized in Figure 18. The most frequently
chosen type of reform (33%) increases the progressivity of the tax system and abolishes
all types of tax expenditures. About 20% of the respondents would prefer a flat-rate
system which features the same amount of tax expenditures as in the status quo. 15% of
respondents also want a flat-rate system, but without any possibilities for deductions or
allowances.
About 18% of the respondents prefer a different type of tax simplification. Instead
of reforming rates or the amount of tax expenditures, they prefer to change the tax-filing
process through pre-filled tax returns that require less effort to file a return. 6% of our
respondents have a preference for keeping the status-quo and do not implement any tax
reform.
These results are evidence for heterogeneity in the preferred approach for moving
towards a simplified tax system. While the results from the Taxpayer-A-vs-B part of our
survey and the randomized experiments show that there is a lack of awareness about the
trade-offs behind complexity and simplicity, the results here suggest that, in addition,
there is no consensus w.r.t. the tax simplifying reform to be implemented. Both of these
empirical observations add to an explanation for the puzzle that real-world tax systems are
so complex although the conventional wisdom holds that simplicity is strongly desirable.
We also investigated if the policy-reform preferences are affected by our experimental
intervention, i.e. the first experiment as the second experiment was implemented after
47See Q5 in Appendix for the detailed question design.
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the reform survey question. We do not find any evidence that this is the case. This is
somewhat in line with other recent survey experiments finding that policy preferences are
often relatively inelastic to information treatments (e.g., Kuziemko et al. 2015; Alesina
et al. 2018).
3.5 Conclusion
The prevailing view in the academic literature and public debate seems to be that most
tax systems are too complex and should be simplified. However, there also are economic
arguments in support of a certain degree of tax complexity and it is puzzling why tax
systems remain highly complex despite the conventional view in favor of more simplifica-
tion. Using new experimental and survey data for a representative sample of the German
population, we shed light on preferences for tax simplification. We find that most people
are indeed in favor of a simpler tax system. However, once we make people aware of the
trade-offs between simplicity and complexity, preferences for simplicity are reduced. For
example, a large share of respondents believes that the tax system should account for dif-
ferent circumstances in living situations (such as costly care of elderly family members).
This suggests that respondents implicitly favor to add complexity to the tax system by
allowing to deduct the associated costs from the tax base.
Our survey also includes two randomized experiments in which we make respondents
aware of the possible consequences of tax simplification. Both randomized experiments
consistently provide evidence that the support for tax simplification is elastic to infor-
mation against tax simplification, while arguments in support of simplification do not
impact preferences for simplification. The results thus suggest that misperceptions are
more relevant in the context of arguments against simplification, which, in turn, is consis-
tent with the observation that arguments in favor of simplicity are more prominent in the
debates and that the general wisdom holds that simplicity is desirable. Overall, we show
that the high support for simpler taxes is to some extent driven by a lack of awareness
about the implications of tax simplification. Individuals apparently frequently express
desires for tax simplification without appreciating the implications of tax simplification.
Overall, our findings suggest that the (policy, academic, and public) debate about
tax simplification potentially benefits from a more nuanced discussion of the pros and
cons of tax simplification. As a result of more nuanced discussion, the matter would not
be dominated by a general wisdom view anymore and instead potentially gain objectivity.
Recent work shows that information deficits among individuals in the context of taxa-
tion can induce governments to implement inefficient tax policy (Boccanfuso and Ferey




Figure 6: Growth of Tax Expenditures over Time in the US
Notes: US Treasury estimates of tax expenditures, 1986-2013, adjusted for inflation to 2013 dollars.
Source: Tax Foundation, Fiscal Fact, A Brief History of Tax Expenditures. Available online: https:
//files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/ff391.pdf.
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2 3 4 5 Absolutely
Dont know
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question
“Do you generally think that the income tax system in Germany needs to be simplified?” Respondents
could pick one of the following categories: 1 Absolutely not; ... ; 6 Absolutely; I do not know. The figure
is based on 2,423 non missing observations. The mean answer is 5.16. Source: Own calculations based
on German Internet Panel.
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Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question
“How difficult is it for you to fill out your tax return?” Respondents could pick one of the following
categories: 1 Very easy; ... ; 5 Very difficult; I do not know because no taxes are declared in my name;
I do not know because I do not declare taxes myself (rather, my partner or a tax consultant, etc. does
this); I do not know. The figure is based on 2,424 non missing observations. The mean answer for
categories 1 to 5 is 3.41. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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2 3 4 5 Absolutely
Dont know
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question
“Do you generally believe that the income tax system in Germany is in need of reform?” Respondents
could pick one of the following categories: 1 Absolutely not; ... ; 6 Absolutely; I do not know. The figure
is based on 2,423 non missing observations. The mean answer is 5.06. Source: Own calculations based
on German Internet Panel.
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2 3 4 5 High-income citizens benefit
Dont know
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question
“Do you think that numerous deductions and allowances contribute to a fairer distribution of income, or
do you believe that high-income citizens benefit more from these deductions and allowances?” Respon-
dents could pick one of the following categories: 1 They contribute to fairer income distribution; ... ; 6
High-income citizens benefit; I do not know. The figure is based on 2,423 non missing observations. The
mean answer is 4.33. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Maintenance two households Home office
Commuting allowance Other job expenses
Pension expenses Education costs
Care relatives Child allowance
Donations Others
Standard deductions I do not know
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question:
“Which of the following deductions and/or allowances do you usually use when filing your income tax?”
Respondents could pick one of the following categories: Maintenance of two households; Home office;
Commuting allowance; Other job related expenditures; Pension expenses; Education costs; Care relatives;
Child allowance, childcare; Donations; Others [insert text]; No deductions; I do not know. The figure is
based on 2,215 non missing observations. Note shares do not add up to one because respondents could
check multiple items. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Person A Person B Equal amount
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question:
“In contrast to Person B, Person A has a poor mother in need of elderly care and has to spend a
considerable amount of her income for the care of her mother. Person A and B have the same gross
income and are very similar in all other respects.” Respondents could pick one of the following categories
(order of answer categories was randomized): Person A should pay higher taxes; Person B should pay
higher taxes; Person A and B should pay equal tax amounts. The figure is based on 2,397 non missing
observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Person A Person B Equal amount
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question:
“Person A spends a considerable amount of her income on charitable giving. Person B does no such thing.
Both Person A and B have the same gross income and are very similar in all other respects.” Respondents
could pick one of the following categories (order of answer categories was randomized): Person A should
pay higher taxes; Person B should pay higher taxes; Person A and B should pay equal tax amounts. The
figure is based on 2,398 non missing observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet
Panel.
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Person A Person B Equal amount
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question:
“Person A has to travel a considerable distance to work. Person B lives very close to work. Both Person
A and B have the same gross income and are very similar in all other respects.” Respondents could pick
one of the following categories (order of answer categories was randomized): Person A should pay higher
taxes; Person B should pay higher taxes; Person A and B should pay equal tax amounts. The figure is
based on 2,394 non missing observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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No Care Deduc Care Deduc
Person A Person B Equal amount
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories by respondents
claiming care deductions. Since only few people claim deductions for elderly care we consider the broader
category of care deductions. Care deductions include deductions for elderly and child care. Question:
“In contrast to Person B, Person A has a poor mother in need of elderly care and has to spend a
considerable amount of her income for the care of her mother. Person A and B have the same gross
income and are very similar in all other respects.” Respondents could pick one of the following categories
(order of answer categories was randomized): Person A should pay higher taxes; Person B should pay
higher taxes; Person A and B should pay equal tax amounts. The left part shows replies for respondents
who do not use the deduction for elderly care. The right part shows replies of respondents who do use
the deduction for elderly care. The figure is based on 2,397 non missing observations. Source: Own
calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Person A Person B Equal amount
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories by respondents
claiming the deduction. Question: “Person A spends a considerable amount of her income on charitable
giving. Person B does no such thing. Both Person A and B have the same gross income and are very
similar in all other respects.” Respondents could pick one of the following categories (order of answer
categories was randomized): Person A should pay higher taxes; Person B should pay higher taxes; Person
A and B should pay equal tax amounts. The left part shows replies for respondents who do not have
deductible donations. The right part shows replies of respondents who do have deductible donations. The
figure is based on 2,398 non missing observations.Source: Own calculations based on German Internet
Panel.
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Person A Person B Equal amount
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories by respondents
claiming the deduction. Question: “Person A has to travel a considerable distance to work. Person B
lives very close to work. Both Person A and B have the same gross income and are very similar in all
other respects.” Respondents could pick one of the following categories (order of answer categories was
randomized): Person A should pay higher taxes; Person B should pay higher taxes; Person A and B
should pay equal tax amounts. The left part shows replies for respondents who do not use the deduction
for commuting to work. The right part shows replies of respondents who do use the deduction for
commuting to work. The figure is based on 2,394 non missing observations. Source: Own calculations
based on German Internet Panel.
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Flat rate no deduc Flat rate sq deduc
More progr no deduc Prefilled declar.
No change Other
Notes: This figure depicts the percentage share of respondents in the respective categories of the question:
“Which of the following measures to simplify the income tax system would you like the most? Assume
the proposed measures will lead to unchanged tax revenues in each case.” Respondents could pick one of
the following categories: Same rate for all but no deductions and allowances; Same rate for all and same
deductions and allowances as under current system; More progressive tax rates and no deductions and
allowances; Automatic determination of amounts in income tax declaration; No change; Other measure
[insert text]; I do not know. The figure is based on 1,771 non missing observations. Source: Own
calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Notes: Average preference for tax simplification by age categories. The outcome variable is the survey-
based preference for tax simplification as described in Section 3.3. The figure is based on 2,189 non
missing observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Notes: Average preference for tax simplification by sex. The outcome variable is the survey-based
preference for tax simplification as described in Section 3.3. The figure is based on 2,190 non missing
observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel.
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Very Difficult No Tax
Not Self
Notes: Average preference for tax simplification by perceived difficulty. The outcome variable is the
survey-based preference for tax simplification as described in Section 3.3. The figure is based on 2,164
non missing observations. Source: Own calculations based on German Internet Panel
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Experiment 1
Redistribution 2424 0.33 0.47 0 1
Avoidance 2424 0.33 0.47 0 1
Control 2424 0.33 0.47 0 1
Experiment 2
Efficiency 2419 0.33 0.47 0 1
Special interest 2419 0.33 0.47 0 1
Control 2419 0.33 0.47 0 1
Demographics
Single households 2463 0.17 0.38 0 1
2 2463 0.46 0.50 0 1
3 2463 0.18 0.38 0 1
4 2463 0.14 0.35 0 1
5+ 2463 0.05 0.22 0 1
Age <=28 2461 0.09 0.29 0 1
Age 29-38 2461 0.15 0.36 0 1
Age 39-48 2461 0.15 0.36 0 1
Age 49-58 2461 0.24 0.43 0 1
Age >=59 2461 0.36 0.48 0 1
Married 2464 0.61 0.49 0 1
Female 2463 0.48 0.50 0 1
Unemployed 2463 0.02 0.13 0 1
Retired 2463 0.23 0.42 0 1
Low education 2401 0.03 0.17 0 1
Low-med education 2401 0.45 0.50 0 1
High-med education 2401 0.23 0.42 0 1
High education 2401 0.30 0.46 0 1
Difficulty in declaring taxes
No difficulty 2381 0.03 0.17 0 1
2 2381 0.11 0.32 0 1
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3 2381 0.18 0.38 0 1
4 2381 0.20 0.40 0 1
Very difficult 2381 0.12 0.32 0 1
No taxes declared 2381 0.09 0.28 0 1
Not self declared 2381 0.27 0.45 0 1
Household net income
Poor 2464 0.11 0.32 0 1
2 2464 0.19 0.39 0 1
3 2464 0.20 0.40 0 1
4 2464 0.16 0.37 0 1
Rich 2464 0.15 0.36 0 1
No income stated 2464 0.11 0.32 0 1
Not merged 2464 0.07 0.26 0 1
Political orientation
Conservatives 2464 0.38 0.48 0 1
Left-wing 2464 0.47 0.50 0 1
Non partisans 2464 0.08 0.27 0 1
Not merged 2464 0.07 0.26 0 1
Notes: The table depicts the summary statistics for all treatment group dummies and all variables
in our tailored survey block on tax complexity. Variables are defined as follows: experiment 1 and
experiment 2 realizations represent the respective group allocations of respondents in either experiment;
household size comprises single households and household with 2, 3, 4 and 5+ members; age categories
are ≤28, 29-38, 39-48, 49-55 and ≥59; Married equals 1 if respondent is married, 0 otherwise; Female
equals 1 if respondent is female, 0 otherwise; Unemployed equals 1 if respondent is unemployed,
0 otherwise; Retired equals 1 if respondent is retired, 0 otherwise; education categories comprise low
(secondary schooling, no job training), low to medium education (upper secondary schooling or finished
job training), high to medium education (upper secondary schooling and finished job training) and
high eduction (tertiary education); household income variables define net monthly household incomes
on a 5-point scale from poor, i.e. 1 (≤1500 Euro), 2 (1500≥x<2500 Euro), 3 (2500≥x<3500 Euro),
4 (3500≥x<4500 Euro) to 5 being rich (≥4500 Euro) as well as a dummy for no answers (No income
stated) and a dummy for those observations which had not been in the GIP wave where the income
question was asked; conservatives equals ≤5 on a 11-scale left-right placement variable, for > 5 left-
wing equals 1. Non partisans did not report a score for the left-rich placement variable and a dummy
for those observations which had not been in the GIP Wave where the political preference question
was asked. Data comes from German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 36, except for the following items:
political preferences derived from variable left-right placement (wave 31) as well as household incomes
(wave 31).
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Table 5: Anatomy of tax simplification preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Household size 0.030 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Age 0.180*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.169***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Married -0.054 -0.087 -0.092 -0.093 -0.093
(0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Female -0.128*** -0.135*** -0.134*** -0.140*** -0.138***
(0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Unemployed 0.137 -0.046 -0.038 -0.042 -0.034
(0.199) (0.201) (0.204) (0.204) (0.203)
Retired -0.003 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.030
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Education -0.017 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Difficulty 2 0.690*** 0.686*** 0.682*** 0.675***
(0.212) (0.213) (0.213) (0.214)
Difficulty 3 1.033*** 1.033*** 1.034*** 1.028***
(0.204) (0.204) (0.204) (0.205)
Difficulty 4 1.375*** 1.373*** 1.370*** 1.364***
(0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.204)
Very difficult 1.725*** 1.722*** 1.721*** 1.720***
(0.204) (0.204) (0.204) (0.206)
No taxes declared 1.251*** 1.253*** 1.245*** 1.242***
(0.214) (0.215) (0.215) (0.216)
Taxes not self declared 1.209*** 1.206*** 1.205*** 1.203***
(0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.203)
Income gr 2 -0.031 -0.030 -0.034
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Income gr 3 -0.018 -0.016 -0.019
(0.101) (0.101) (0.100)
Income gr 4 0.059 0.061 0.056
(0.103) (0.103) (0.102)
Rich -0.016 -0.011 -0.014
(0.110) (0.111) (0.110)
No income stated 0.036 0.035 0.032
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Not merged -0.050 -0.912*** -0.938***
(0.125) (0.124) (0.125)
Conservative -0.039 - 0.039
(0.048) (0.048)
Non partisans 0.028 0.025
(0.103) (0.103)







Constant 4.566*** 3.407*** 3.419*** 3.406*** 3.456***
(0.145) (0.239) (0.246) (0.246) (0.249)
N 2132.000 2109.000 2109.000 2109.000 2109.000
R2 0.046 0.146 0.147 0.148 0.150
Notes: The table presents the determinants of Preferences for Tax Simplicity using OLS regressions
of preferences for tax simplicity on various covariates. Each column (1)-(5) presents the results of one
regression with different sets of covariates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables are defined as follows: experiment 1 and experiment 2 realizations represent
the respective group allocations of respondents in either experiment; household size comprises single
households and household with 2, 3, 4 and 5+ members; age categories are ≤28, 29-38, 39-48, 49-55
and ≥59; Married equals 1 if respondent is married, 0 otherwise; Female equals 1 if respondent is
female, 0 otherwise; Unemployed equals 1 if respondent is unemployed, 0 otherwise; Retired equals
1 if respondent is retired, 0 otherwise; education categories comprise low (secondary schooling, no
job training), low to medium education (upper secondary schooling or finished job training), high to
medium education (upper secondary schooling and finished job training) and high eduction (tertiary
education); household income variables define net monthly household incomes on a 5-point scale from
poor, i.e. 1 (≤1500 Euro), 2 (1500≥x<2500 Euro), 3 (2500≥x<3500 Euro), 4 (3500≥x<4500 Euro) to 5
being rich (≥4500 Euro) as well as a dummy for no answers (No income stated) and a dummy for those
observations which had not been in the GIP Wave where the income question was asked; conservatives
equals 1 if ≤5 on a 11-scale left-right placement variable, for > 5 left-wing equals 1. Non partisans
did not report a score for the left-right placement variable and a dummy for those observations which
had not been in the GIP Wave where the political preference question was asked. Data comes from
German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 36, except for the following items: political preferences derived
from variable left-right placement (wave 31) as well as household incomes (wave 31).
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Table 6: Exp 1: Effect on Preferences for Tax Simplification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Redistribution -0.115** -0.123** -0.133** -0.134** -0.133**
(0.058) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Avoidance -0.042 -0.039 -0.032 -0.032 -0.029
(0.057) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Constant 5.215*** 4.610*** 3.453*** 3.469*** 3.456***
(0.040) (0.149) (0.242) (0.248) (0.249)
N 2190 2132 2109 2109 2109
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on preferences for tax
simplification. This is estimated by OLS regressions of preferences for tax simplification on treatment
dummies. Tax simplification is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question: “Do you generally
think that the income tax system in Germany needs to be simplified?” The experimental groups
are: Control group, Redistribution group and Avoidance group. Control is omitted, implying that
the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive the following information: “In
Germany there is an ongoing debate on whether the income tax system is too complicated because
of many deduction possibilities and allowances.” Participants in the Redistribution group receive the
following information: “However, it is sometimes also argued that a tax system with many deduction
possibilities and allowances has a social-policy and redistributive compensation role. For example, tax
deductions can be used to reduce the tax burden of taxpayers who are disadvantaged by circumstances.”
Participants in the Avoidance group receive the following information: “In this context, one argument is
that a tax system with many deduction possibilities and allowances offers more scope for tax avoidance
and tax adjustment. For example, tax deductions can be used to reduce one’s own tax burden through
better knowledge of the tax system or through unjustified specifications in the tax return.” Columns
(1)-(5) differ in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status,
household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus perceived difficulty
to declare taxes, (4): (3) plus net household income, (5): (4) plus political preferences. Robust The
scale of the outcome variable is 1 (absolutely not) to 6 (absolutely). Robust standard errors are in
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Exp 1: Effect on Perceived Distributional Effects of Complexity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Redistribution 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.009 0.007
(0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089)
Avoidance 0.118 0.137 0.157* 0.158* 0.169*
(0.089) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.090)
Constant 4.285*** 3.506*** 3.136*** 3.127*** 3.126***
(0.065) (0.215) (0.295) (0.315) (0.314)
N 1998 1946 1931 1931 1931
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on believes about
whether people think that deductions work in favor of the rich. This is estimated by OLS regressions
of beliefs on treatment dummies. The outcome is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question:
‘Do you think that numerous deductions and allowances contribute to a fairer distribution of income,
or do you believe that high-income citizens benefit more from these deductions and allowances?”
The experimental groups are: Control group, Redistribution group and Avoidance group. Control
is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive the
following information: “In Germany there is an ongoing debate on whether the income tax system is too
complicated because of many possible deductions and allowances.” Participants in the Redistribution
group receive the following information: “However, it is sometimes also argued that a tax system with
many possible deductions and allowances has an important social-policy role, particularly in relation to
income redistribution. For example, tax deductions can be used to reduce the tax burden of taxpayers
who are disadvantaged by circumstances” Participants in the Avoidance group receive the following
information: “In this context, one argument is that a tax system with many possible deductions and
allowances offers greater opportunity for tax avoidance . For example, when individuals have a better
knowledge of the tax system or make unjustified declarations, they can reduce their tax burden by
taking advantage of certain allowances or deductions.” Columns (1)-(5) differ in the included sets of
covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status,
retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus perceived difficulty to declare taxes, (4): (3) plus net
household income, (5): (4) plus political preferences. The scale of the outcome variable is 1 (add to a
fair income distribution) to 6 (higher incomes benefit). Robust standard errors are in parentheses ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Exp 2: Effect on Preferences for Tax Simplification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Economic Efficiency -0.197* -0.216** -0.229** -0.237** -0.240**
(0.109) (0.109) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
Special Interest -0.064 -0.062 -0.055 -0.068 -0.067
(0.097) (0.097) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095)
Constant 5.084*** 4.588*** 3.928*** 3.993*** 3.960***
(0.066) (0.160) (0.222) (0.232) (0.232)
N 2187 2134 2114 2114 2114
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions of the second exper-
iment on preferences for tax simplification. This is estimated by OLS regressions of preferences for
tax simplification on treatment dummies and a full set of interactions of the treatment groups of the
first and second experiment. Tax simplification is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question:
“ Now that we have dealt extensively with various aspects of the German tax system in this survey,
we would like to ask again: do you generally believe that the income tax system should be simplified
in Germany?” The experimental groups are: Control group, Economic efficiency group and Special
interest group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All par-
ticipants receive the following information: “We would like to once again address the ongoing debate
concerning whether the income tax system is too complicated due to the many possible deductions and
allowances.” Participants in the Economic efficiency group receive the following information: “One
argument that is often used against tax simplification and that has not been addressed so far is that
a tax system with many deductions and allowances provides better opportunities to tax individuals
in accordance with their ability to pay and is therefore economically more efficient.” Participants in
the Special interest group receive the following information: “One argument that is often used against
tax simplification and that has not been addressed so far is that a tax system with many deductions
and allowances offers special interest groups greater opportunity for obtaining exemptions ” Columns
(1)-(5) all include a full set of interactions of the treatment groups of the first and second experiment,
they differ in the additionally included sets of covariates. (1): no additional covariates, (2): gender,
age, marital status, household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2)
plus perceived difficulty to declare taxes, (4): (3) plus net household income, (5): (4) plus political
preferences. The scale of the outcome variable is 1 (absolutely not) to 6 (absolutely). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4 How do taxes affect the trading behavior of indi-
vidual investors? Evidence from individual port-
folio data
4.1 Introduction
Many aspects of the trading behavior of individual investors are well documented in
the literature (see Barber and Odean 2013 for an extensive overview of the behavior of
individual investors). One aspect of individual trading behavior which is less understood
concerns the causal effect of taxes on trading behavior. Realized capital gains are subject
to taxes in most countries around the world and it is therefore important to have a proper
understanding of their effects on investment behavior. In theory, realization-based taxes
on capital gains induce investors to defer the realization of gains (lock-in effect) and
to realize losses as they accrue (because losses can be used to offset taxable gains).48
However, it has been suggested that such effects of taxes on individual trading behavior
are often swamped or offset by non-tax considerations (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). In
particular, the well documented disposition effect, according to which investors are more
likely to realize gains than to realize losses (Shefrin and Statman 1985; Odean 1998),
runs in opposite direction than the effect of capital-gains taxes on individual investment
behavior.
These considerations motivate the research questions in this paper: First, we study
the causal effect of capital-gains taxes on individual-level holding periods of private stock-
market investments. Second, we study the causal effect of taxes on the disposition effect.
The literature has touched upon these two research questions (for example in Barber and
Odean 2004 and Ivković et al. 2005; see below and section 4.2 for more literature), but
the evidence is surprisingly limited and our paper aims to move beyond existing studies in
understanding the role of investor-level taxes in trading markets. To address the research
questions, appropriate micro-level data need to be combined with an institutional set-up
that offers plausible exogenous variation in taxes. However, there do not exist many
micro-level data for individual investors and exogenous variation in capital-gains tax
rates is very seldom (Poterba 2001, for example, discusses the difficulties of identifying
tax effects in investment behavior). As a result, the combination of appropriate micro
data with a convincing quasi-experimental institutional set-up rarely exists in the existing
literature.49
One strand of literature uses data from individual tax returns to study the link
48The theoretical effects of taxes on trading behavior are for example discussed in Constantinides
(1984) and Ivković et al. (2005). We elaborate on the theoretical predictions in the context of our set-up
further below in the Introduction.
49In the following, we provide a brief overview of different literature strands to illustrate the contribu-
tion of our study. An extensive review of the literature is presented in section 4.2.
90
between overall capital gains and taxes (e.g., Feldstein et al. 1980 and Jacob 2018.
An early survey is Poterba 2002). However, tax-return data usually do not include
information that are potentially important for a comprehensive understanding of tax
effects on trading behavior; in particular, they typically only have aggregated annual
information on the total amount of capital gains and as such lack information on single
sales (such as the holding period of realized sales).50 Tax-return data further do not
include information on unrealized sales (because these are not tax relevant), and they
do not have information about trading activities in non-taxable accounts. Studies from
a different strand of literature use firm and stock level data to shed light on the effect
of investor-level taxes (a review is in Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). However, because
these data are on the firm or stock level, they do not allow studying the individual tax
responses of investors.
Another set of papers overcomes these data challenges and uses individual-level
investor data obtained from brokerage houses to study tax effects on investor behavior
(e.g., Odean 1998, Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001, Barber and Odean 2004, and Ivković
et al. 2005). In light of the limited availability of quasi-experimental institutional set
ups, the identification of tax effects in this literature is often based on the comparison of
trading behavior in taxable accounts and tax-deferred accounts, rather than exogenous
variation in tax rates. However, there potentially exist differences in trading behavior
between taxable and non-taxable accounts for non-tax reasons and it is therefore difficult
to isolate the tax effect in such a setting. Another approach in this literature is to compare
trading patterns in December to trading patterns during the rest of the year, and attribute
the December differences to taxes because of end-of-year tax planning. However, such an
approach offers no direct evidence of tax effects and might for example be confounded by
the momentum effect, window dressing or an overall tendency of investors to ’clean-up’
their portfolios towards the end of the year (see section 4.2 for a more nuanced discussion
of these identification issues).
In our paper, we add to the existing literature by combining individual-level investor
data with a large tax reform that is exploited for causal identification. In particular, we
use confidential portfolio-level data provided by a large commercial bank in Germany.51
These data contain daily information about the entire trading behavior (including pur-
chases and sales of stocks and other assets) in a panel of approximately 100,000 individual
investors for the period 1999 to 2016. Benchmarking with official statistics and the com-
parable US data set used in e.g. Odean (1998), we show that our sample of investors
50Dowd and McClelland (2019) is an exception that uses more frequent tax-return data on sales. See
section 4.2 for more details.
51The type of data are comparable to the frequently used US data set which is propriety data from
a discount brokerage house (e.g. Odean 1998; Barber and Odean 2000; Barber and Odean 2001). Our
data have for example been used by Leuz et al. (2017).
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is representative for the overall population of German investors and similar to U.S. in-
vestors. We focus on the trades of stocks in our analyses and explore the effect of taxes
on the holding duration of stocks.
To identify causal tax effects, we exploit the institutional setting of capital-gains
taxation in Germany before and after a large reform in 2009. This reform consisted of two
major changes: i) Before the reform, the gains arising from sales of assets with a holding
period of less than one year were subject to a so-called ’speculation’ tax. The rate for this
speculation tax was equal to the marginal income tax rate of the selling investor. The
gains of sales with a holding period longer than one year were tax exempt. Short-term
losses with a holding period of less than 365 days could be used to offset tax-relevant gains.
As a result, the before-reform tax system created a holding-period based intertemporal
discontinuity in the taxation of capital gains. The pre-reform system is thus similar to
the tax set-up in the US that also differentiates between long-term and short-term gains,
though the German pre-reform system has a larger tax differential between long-term
and short-term gains (with tax free long-term gains). This speculation tax was abolished
in the context of the reform. ii) After the reform, all capital gains are subject to a flat
tax of 25%. That is, capital-gains taxes became independent of the individual marginal
tax rate and independent of the holding duration of the sold asset. Capital gains from
share sales can be offset by losses from share sales.
We start our empirical analysis with an investigation of the number of realized
sales around the holding-period dependent tax discontinuity. For this purpose, we non-
parametrically plot the number of sales (in bins of seven days) by holding duration before
and after the reform and separately for losses and gains. Theoretically (following e.g.,
Constantinides 1984), we expect that tax-sensitive investors realize losses as long as they
can be deducted from the tax base (i.e., before the intertemporal tax discontinuity is
crossed). This implies that we should see an increased number of realized losses before
the tax discontinuity in pre-reform years. On the other hand, tax-sensitive investors
should delay the sale of gains until they qualify for the preferential tax treatment. We
thus expect an increased number of realized gains after the tax discontinuity in pre-reform
years.52 As the holding period is not tax relevant in post-reform years, we do not expect
to find any irregularities in the number of sold gains or losses around the 365-days holding
period.
The empirical findings are consistent with the predictions. We see in pre-reform
years that the number of sold losses spikes sharply just before the 365-days cutoff. The
52The model in Constantinides (1984) further predicts that gains should be realized immediately once
they qualify for the lower long-term tax rate. This implies that we should see a spike in the number of
sales to the right of the tax discontinuity (i.e, during the first week after 365 holding-period days). Losses,
on the other hand, should be realized as they accrue, according to the model, and their realizations do
not necessarily spike anywhere in the short-term-tax period.
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number of sales in the seven days before the cutoff is roughly 3.2 times as large as the
number of sales during the seven-day bin just after the cutoff. We further see that
investors defer sales of gains until they have reached the 365-days holding period. We
further see a sharp spike in the number of sold gains in the weeks just after the 365-days
cutoff.53 We further show that our findings are not driven by a few very tax-sensitive
investors; the number of distinct investors who sell share packages also spikes around the
time discontinuity.
In the post-reform years where the 365-days cutoff is not tax relevant, we see no
spikes or other irregularities around the holding period of 365 days. The absence of any
spikes whatsoever in post-reform years clearly suggests that the pre-reform spikes are not
driven by any non-tax factors and can indeed be attributed to a causal effect of the tax.
We use a difference-in-bunching method to estimate the elasticity of the length of
the holding period with respect to the tax rate. Conventional bunching methods estimate
the counterfactual distribution by extrapolating the (seemingly) unaffected region away
from the discontinuity to the region in the neighborhood of the discontinuity. As we
elaborate below in section 4.2, in our context the regions away from the discontinuity are
plausibly affected by the discontinuity as well and therefore do not qualify to predict a
counterfactual. To overcome this issue, we use data from a time period without discon-
tinuity (the post reform years) to construct the counterfactual distribution (e.g., Brown
2013, Kleven 2016). For gains, we find a tax elasticity of the holding period between
0.185 and 0.56 (depending on the applicable tax rate of investors which we do not see in
our data). This translates to a tax-induced increase in the holding period of 16 days for
gains. The results for losses are similar: the elasticity estimates range between 0.195 and
0.59 and the change in the holding period is roughly 17 days.
The difference-in-bunching approach also sheds light on the question of where the
excess mass in the number of sales around the time discontinuity (in pre reform years)
comes from. Are the spikes that we see to the right (for gains) and to the left (for losses)
of the discontinuity ’fed’ by sales that investors would have realized before or after the
53It is consistent with the model prediction that we observe a larger number of realized losses to the left
of the discontinuity and a larger number of realized gains to the right of the discontinuity (also see below
where we discuss in the bunching setting where the ’excess mass’ comes from). The spike in realized
gains that we see in the first week after the discontinuity is also consistent with predictions. For losses,
the model does not predict that realizations should spike just before the discontinuity (see footnote 52).
However, the spike may be consistent with loss averse investors who need a self-control mechanism to
realize their losses – as for example described in Shefrin and Statman (1985, section I.D.). Loss averse
investors are reluctant to realize losses and only realize their losses when there is an external self-control
mechanism (commitment device) that induces them to sell losses. The intertemporal tax discontinuity,
which is salient and known to investors, potentially serves as such an external self-control mechanism
(commitment device) because the losses lose their valuable tax-shield function once the discontinuity is
crossed. As a result, losses are not realized immediately as they accrue (because investors do not like
to realize losses) and instead are realized shortly before the time discontinuity (because of its role as a
commitment device).
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cutoff in the absence of the tax? For gains, we see that the mass mostly comes from the
left of the discontinuity; this suggests that investors delay the sales of gains until they
qualify for tax exemption. For losses, we see that the mass of investors mostly comes
from the right side of the discontinuity; this suggests that investors move forward the
realization of sales in order to count them against their tax-relevant gains.
The next steps of our analysis are based on hazard-rate regressions which estimate
for each day of the holding period the probability that a given asset is sold on this day
of the holding period. In contrast to the previous approaches (plotting of the number
of sales by holding period and bunching), hazard-rate regressions allow i) for the use of
daily data, ii) to exploit stocks that are not sold, iii) to include control variables and
interactions which make it possible to study heterogeneous effects, and iv) to study the
disposition effect (literature on the disposition effect usually uses hazard-rates as well).
We present all results of the hazard-rate regressions in graphs that plot for each day of
holding period the coefficient estimating the probability of sale.
The hazard-rate regressions confirm our previous results. In pre-reform years, we
estimate strongly increased selling probabilities just before holding periods of 365 days for
losses and just after 365 days for gains. We see no increased selling probabilities around
the 365-days cutoff in the post-reform years, neither for losses nor gains, which is further
support of a causal tax effect. We also estimate hazard-rates regressions separately for
each year in our sample period. We see spikes around the 365-days discontinuity in all
pre-reform years for both gains and losses, but we never see any spikes or irregularities
around the 365-days holding period in any of the post-reform years. Our main results
are thus not driven by a few exceptional years in our sample. We interpret these findings
as additional evidence that the tax discontinuity clearly affects trading behavior.
Average effects of taxes potentially mask heterogeneity across different types of
investors. Our rich data allow us to study several sources of heterogeneity and understand
which types of investors exhibit the largest tax responses. We focus on three sources of
heterogenity which have received considerable attention in the trading literature (e.g.,
Barber and Odean 2001; Seru et al. 2009; Korniotis and Kumar 2011): age, experience
and gender. We find strong evidence that tax responsiveness is increasing in trading
experience. This finding is based on the observation that spikes in selling probabilities
around the discontinuity increase in experience. Notably, this effect of experience is
conditional on a set of covariates including age, implying that the experience effect is
not driven by age. We further see that the tax response increases in age (conditional on
experience), in particular in the context of losses. Regarding gender, we find that men
are less likely to sell their losses during the days before the discontinuity. We further
explore heterogeneity w.r.t the magnitudes of gains and losses, which has been shown
to be potentially relevant in Ivković et al. (2005). We find that the tax responsiveness
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increases in the size of the gains or losses and that this effect is about double as large for
losses relative to gains.
A robust finding in the literature on trading behavior is that investors have a larger
propensity to realize gains than to realize losses, the so-called disposition effect. Con-
sidering that the disposition effect and tax effects potentially run in opposite directions
(see intuition above), we study how the disposition effect interacts with tax effects. In
post-reform years (without intertemporal tax discontinuity), we observe the disposition
effect on each single day of the holding period; that is, gains are always sold with a higher
probability than losses. This confirms findings in the large literature that documents the
disposition effect. In pre-reform years, however, we detect the disposition effect only for
holding-period days which are sufficiently distant to the tax relevant 365-days disconti-
nuity. In the neighborhood to the left of the intertemporal discontinuity, we observe that
gains are sold with a much smaller probability than losses. To the right of the disconti-
nuity, gains are sold with a greater probability than losses, but this increased probability
is much larger than the ’usual’ disposition effect that we see in post-reform years and
further away from the cutoff. We also find suggestive evidence that the tax discontinuity
affects the disposition effect even on holding-period days distant from the cutoff. Com-
pared to the post-reform benchmark (without tax relevant cutoff), the disposition effect
in pre-reform years tends to be lower during the first year of the holding period and higher
after 365 days holding period have passed on days distant to the 365-days cutoff. This
suggests that the time discontinuity affects the disposition effect even on holding-period
days distant to the discontinuity.54
These findings confirm in a credibly identified set-up the findings of, for example,
Odean (1998) and Ivković et al. (2005) that an intertemporal tax discontinuity affects
the disposition effect. An additional implication of our finding for papers in the literature
on the disposition effect arises because we find that, in a system with an intertemporal
tax discontinuity (such as the U.S.), taxes have an effect on trading behavior and the
disposition effect throughout the entire year and not only in December. Many studies
in the literature on trading behavior and the disposition effect control for tax effects by
allowing for separate December effects; our findings imply that this December approach
is not sufficient to adjust for tax effects. More generally, our findings provide novel
evidence on the causal determinants of the disposition effect. As recently suggested by
Frydman and Wang (2020), the causes of the disposition effect are still subject to debate,
and we are able to add to this debate in that we show that capital-gains taxes have an
54Previous literature finds for the U.S. that older and more experienced investors are less prone to
the disposition effect. The findings from our heterogeneity analysis (see above) indicate that age and
gender effects on the disposition effect are driven by tax effects and that heterogeneity in the disposition
effect along the age and experience dimensions would be mitigated in the absence of intertemporal tax
discontinuities – see the Conclusion (section 2.6) for more discussion on this.
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impact on the disposition effect. To this end, we for example relate to a recent stream
of papers showing that purchase prices (or their salience) causally affect the disposition
effect (Frydman and Rangel 2014; Frydman and Wang 2020; Loos et al. 2020).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the related
literature and discusses how our paper contributes to existing findings. Section 4.2.1
describes the institutional background of capital-gains taxation in Germany during our
sample period. Section 4.3 provides information on the data and the calculation of holding
periods in this data set. We describe the empirical strategy and causal identification in
Section 4.4. The results are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Contribution to the Literature
We relate to (empirical) studies in different fields and literature strands. We therefore be-
lieve that a systematic and extensive overview of the literature studying the tax effects on
trading behavior may be valuable to readers. In the following, we describe the approaches
and findings in the related empirical literature and elaborate on our contribution relative
to the existing studies. We organize the literature review along the different strands of
literature that we identified to be relevant for our paper.
Literature using tax-return data. First, we speak to studies that use data from
individual tax returns to study the link between capital gains and taxes (an early survey
is Poterba 2002). This literature usually finds a negative relation between realizing capital
gains and taxes (e.g. Feldstein et al. 1980; Bogart and Gentry 1995; Daunfeldt et al.
2010; Jacob 2013; Dowd et al. 2015; Jacob 2018).55 Our findings on the behavioral
effects of capital gains taxes relate to this literature and we confirm that capital gains
taxes induce investors to defer the realization of gains. However, as mentioned above,
studies using tax-return data typically only have aggregate annual information on the
total amount of capital gains and as such lack information on single realized sales; i.e.,
whether a single realized sale is a gain or loss or how long the respective asset had been
held by the investor. Tax return data also do not include information on unrealized
sales because these are not tax relevant, and they do not have information about trading
activities in non-taxable accounts. Our paper uses portfolio-level data that allow us to
overcome most of the data restrictions in this literature. For example, one main finding
in our paper relies on the differentiation between gains and losses of single sales, and our
hazard-rate regressions account for unrealized assets and exploit the daily frequency of
our data set.
55Saez (2017) studies the behavioral responses of reported incomes to the 2013 tax reform in the US.
Using annual IRS income statistics, the paper finds considerable responses of reported income to the
reform, with much of the effect being driven by realized gains.
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Two recent studies use US tax-return data that include information on sales at a
less aggregated frequency. Hoopes et al. (2016) have daily data on sales, but their study
is not about tax effects. Dowd and McClelland (2019) use American IRS data on capital
realizations for directly held assets on the level of the single transaction. These data are
based on Form 8949 which requires taxpayers to report the purchase and sale price as
well as the date of acquisition and disposition. Using these data for the tax year 2012, the
authors are able to calculate the holding period (in weekly bins) for single assets and study
whether the holding period is affected by the intertemporal tax discontinuity in the US
that differentiates between short-term and long-term gains. Consistent with our findings,
Dowd and McClelland (2019) find that the number of realized gains spikes in the first
week in which the lower long-term rate is available; i.e., they see a spike in realized gains
to the right of the discontinuity. Losses spike on both sides of the tax discontinuity. As
acknowledged by the authors, this is somewhat surprising since a rational investor should
sell losses as short-term in order to offset short-term gains. The paper then focuses
on gains and uses bunching methods to estimate a counterfactual distribution that is
constructed by predicting sales in the neighborhood of the time discontinuity using sales
further away from the discontinuity. Based on this approach, the authors estimate that a
10 percent reduction in tax rates for high-income taxpayers leads to a 7.3 percent increase
in realized gains shifted to just beyond the one-year holding period.
Our paper moves beyond Dowd and McClelland (2019) along a number of dimen-
sions. i) We have an institutional setup where the intertemporal time discontinuity was
first in place and is then abolished in the course of a reform. This setting yields a proper
counterfactual and allows us to compare the effects of the time discontinuity to years
where the discontinuity did not exist. Dowd and McClelland (2019), who only have one
year of data, use the conventional bunching approach to construct a counterfactual. This
approach relies on the assumption that the number of realized sales away from the cutoff
(which are used to estimate the counterfactual distribution of sales just around the dis-
continuity) are not affected by the tax discontinuity. Theory as well as our results show
that this assumption is unlikely to hold. For example, some of the gains that are realized
just after 365 days might have been realized considerably before the 365 days cutoff in
absence of the tax discontinuity. Our hazard rates confirm this as they show that the
entire distribution of sales probabilities to the left of the cutoff is shifted downwards in
pre-reform years relative to post-reform years (without discontinuity). ii) In addition
to plotting the number of sales by holding period around the intertemporal time dis-
continuity, we estimate hazard-rate regressions which, as discussed in the Introduction,
have several advantages. In particular, they allow to exploit the daily frequency of the
data and account for sales that are not realized (whereas Dowd and McClelland 2019
use weekly data and do not have information on unrealized sales). iii) In contrast to
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Dowd and McClelland (2019), we use the institutional setting of the intertemporal tax
discontinuity, and its abolishment, to shed new light on the interaction of taxes and the
disposition effect. iv) We exploit a panel over several years whereas Dowd and McClel-
land (2019) only have one year of data. v) We study how capital-gains taxes affect the
disposition effect, vi) Looking at the case of Germany, we exploit a set-up where the tax
differential between short-term and long-term gains is larger than in the US case.
Literature using firm and stock level data. Second, we relate to a strand of litera-
ture that uses firm and stock level data to investigate the effects of investor-level capital-
gains taxes (see the overview in Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). This strand of literature
for example studies the effects of investor-level taxes on asset prices, end-of-year market
irregularities, acquisition premiums, turnover patterns, and the role of taxes in reactions
to news disclosures (e.g., Reese Jr 1998; Lang and Shackelford 2000; Seida and Wempe
2000; Poterba and Weisbenner 2001; Shackelford and Verrecchia 2002; Blouin et al. 2003;
Ayers et al. 2003; Ayers et al. 2008; Dai et al. 2008; Blouin et al. 2009). These papers
typically find that capital-gains taxes matter and that they affect asset prices. These
findings are indirect evidence that capital-gains taxes affect individual selling behavior,
but they do not allow for the identification of tax effects on individual behavior directly.
Studying tax effects on individual investors is generally difficult with firm level data.56
Literature using investor-level trading data. Third, we relate to a set of papers
that overcomes data issues and studies the link between taxes and individual trading
behavior using portfolio-level micro data. One of the papers in this literature is Ivković
et al. (2005) who use data from a discount brokerage. These data allow the authors to
track the single investments of individual investors – their US data are very comparable
in spirit to the German data that we use. To shed light on taxation effects, Ivković et al.
(2005) compare trading behavior in taxable accounts and trading behavior in tax-deferred
accounts (IRAs or Keogh plans). The paper finds a negative relation between accrued
gains and the selling probability in taxable accounts for stocks with a holding period of
more than one year, while it does not observe such a relation in tax deferred accounts.
In light of the presumption that taxes should induce investors to defer the realization
of gains (see explanation above) and because this negative relation is only observed in
taxable accounts, the authors suggest that their finding is an indication of taxation effects
(lock-in effect) on trading behavior. The results of the paper also speak to the interaction
between taxes and the disposition effect. The relation between accrued gains and selling
probabilities in taxable accounts is (as described above) negative once a stock has been
held for more than 12 months, and it is positive in the first few months of the holding
56A related stream of papers studies the tax sensitivity of institutional investors (Blouin et al. 2017;
Sikes 2018).
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period. This suggests that the disposition effect outweighs tax effects only in the first
few months after the stock was purchased and that tax effects matter more for longer
holding periods.
Another paper in this literature is Barber and Odean (2004) who also use investor-
level data from brokerages and compare trading in taxable and tax-deferred accounts.
They find that the realization probabilities of gains and losses are very similar across
these two types of accounts, except in December when loss realization is more pronounced
in taxable accounts than in tax-deferred accounts. The authors attribute this ’December’
difference between the two types of accounts to tax-loss selling. This somewhat contrasts
the results of Ivković et al. (2005) who find that investors are more likely to realize losses
in taxable accounts than in tax-deferred accounts throughout the entire year, not just in
December. It is therefore an open question if realization probabilities are always different
between these two type of accounts or just in December.
Overall, rather than exploiting exogenous variation in taxes, identification of tax
effects in Barber and Odean (2004) and Ivković et al. (2005) thus comes from the com-
parison of taxable and tax-deferred accounts. However, differences in trading behavior
between these accounts are not necessarily fully attributable to taxation effects. Trading
behavior might be different between these two types of accounts for non-tax related rea-
sons (even conditional on investor fixed effects and exploiting that many investors have
both taxable and tax-deferred accounts). For example, investors usually use tax-deferred
accounts to save for retirement, and they might therefore be inclined to invest in dif-
ferent types of assets in these accounts than in taxable accounts. In their tax-deferred
retirement accounts, investors might seek to invest in less risky assets or purchase assets
for these accounts with a much longer investment horizon and hence with the explicit
goal of trading these assets less frequently. This assertion that investments in taxable
and tax-deferred accounts are different for non-tax reasons is supported by the literature:
e.g., theory contributions on the optimal allocation of assets come to the result that cer-
tain assets, such as taxable bonds and actively-managed mutual funds, should be held in
tax-deferred accounts, whereas other asset types, such as tax-exempt bonds, passively-
managed mutual funds and stocks, should be located in taxable accounts (Huang 2001;
Dammon et al. 2001; Shoven and Sialm 2004). Consistent with the assertion that non-
tax considerations make a difference for investment behavior across these two accounts,
Barber and Odean (2004) find that turnover is higher in taxable accounts than in tax
deferred accounts. This finding of Barber and Odean (2004) induces Ivković et al. (2005,
page 1617) to acknowledge that investors may view taxable and tax-deferred accounts
differently and that their estimates for tax-motivated trading might therefore be biased.
We move beyond Barber and Odean (2004) and Ivković et al. (2005) in that we use
a similarly rich data set of individual investors, but combine it with quasi-experimental
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variation in tax rates which comes from the intertemporal tax discontinuity and the
abolishment of this discontinuity. Another difference to Barber and Odean (2004) and
Ivković et al. (2005) is that we use data with daily frequency, rather than monthly
frequency. The daily data allow us to zoom in the trading behavior along each day of
the holding period, which is especially useful in analyzing trading behavior around the
holding-period based intertemporal tax discontinuity.
A further set of papers documents in individual-level data sets that trading behavior
in December is different than trading behavior in other months of the year. For example,
Odean (1998) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find evidence of the disposition effect
in all months of the year, except in December. These papers interpret these findings
as evidence that i) capital-gains taxes matter for investment behavior and that tax-
loss selling is prevalent and ii) that the disposition effect is affected by taxes. However,
differences in trading behavior in December vs. other months of the year are only indirect
evidence of tax effects. These papers do not rely on exogenous variation in tax rates and
it is therefore not clear to which extent the ’December’ finding is driven by taxes or
other seasonality patterns. For example, it is not clear why tax-loss selling should not
occur throughout the year. In addition, as noted by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2004,
pages 52-53), the December effect could also be explained with the momentum effect or
window dressing. It has been shown that the momentum effect for losses is much larger
in December than in other months of the year and also much larger than the December
momentum effect for gains (Grinblatt and Moskowitz 2004). This then implies that it
could be rational for investors to sell losses in December even in the absence of tax
considerations. Window dressing may also play a role: December often is the time to
recap one’s portfolio and investors may be embarrassed to carry on losers to the next
year. Considering these concerns, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2004) study if investors sell
losers and then immediately repurchase the same stocks (so called wash sales) and indeed
find evidence for this behavior. This then is a better indication that tax considerations
matter, but is yet no direct evidence of tax effects.
Using exogenous variation in rates and the abolishment of a large intertemporal
tax discontinuity, our paper provides clear and direct evidence for tax effects on trading
behavior and on the interaction of taxes and the disposition effect that does not rely on
trading patterns in December. We therefore complement the existing literature in that
we study a set-up where the concerns about the roots of differential trading behavior in
December do not play a role. Our finding on the interaction between taxes and the dis-
position effect more generally relates to papers that demonstrate that tax considerations
of individual investors are sometimes swamped by non-tax considerations or behavioral
aspects (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).
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Literature on the disposition effect. Fourth, our paper contributes to the general
literature on the disposition effect (in non-tax contexts). As summarized in the hand-
book chapter by Barber and Odean (2013), the evidence is very robust that individual
investors sell gains with a higher propensity than losses. An important question in this
literature is whether and how the disposition effect is causally affected by other factors.
This is potentially relevant because an understanding of the causal determinants of the
disposition effect can help to improve investment behavior. However, as stated by Fry-
dman and Wang (2020, page 233), the cause of the disposition effect is still debated. A
few recent papers provide causal evidence on the determinants of the disposition effect.
Frydman and Rangel (2014), Frydman and Wang (2020) and Loos et al. (2020) show
that changes in purchase prices or changes in the salience of purchase prices affect the
disposition effect. We relate to these papers on the causal drivers of the disposition effect
and provide novel evidence that taxes affect the disposition effect and can even reduce it
temporarily.
A further contribution of our paper to the literature on the disposition effect is to
show that it is not sufficient to have separate December effects to control for tax effects.
Consistent with our finding that taxes affect the disposition effect, the literature has
acknowledged that tax effects should be controlled for in disposition-effect settings. We
provide evidence that taxes affect trading behavior and the disposition effect throughout
the entire year, which then implies that December adjustments will not fully control for
tax effects.
Literature on the behavioral responses to taxes. Fifth, we also contribute to
the large literature on behavioral responses to taxes using individual-level data. This
literature studies the causal effects of taxes along many dimensions, often relying on
bunching approaches and/or large tax reforms for identification.57 We contribute to this
literature in that we add micro-level evidence on the behavioral effect of taxes along
a dimension that has rarely been investigated before, namely individual-level trading
behavior.
4.2.1 Institutional Background
Our analysis is based on the system of capital-gains taxation in Germany between 1999
and 2016 (i.e., the time period of our data set). We focus on the trade of shares and
describe in this section how capital gains occurring from shares are treated in Germany.
57This large literature for example studies causal effects of taxes on: taxable income (Chetty et al.
2011; Saez et al. 2012; Kleven and Schultz 2014b), investment behavior (Yagan 2015), dividend payments
(Chetty and Saez 2005), education (Abramitzky and Lavy 2014), wealth accumulation (Jakobsen et al.
2018), housing prices (Best and Kleven 2018), wages (Suarez Serrato and Zidar 2016; Fuest et al. 2018b),
consumption (Chetty et al. 2009), migration (Kleven et al. 2014; Agrawal and Foremny 2019) and labor
supply (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Martinez et al. 2018).
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A major reform of capital-gains taxation was implemented in 2009 and therefore falls
into our sample period. Both before and after the reform, capital gains from shares are
generally only taxed upon realization (i.e., taxes are due when the share is sold).
Taxation of capital gains before 2009. Before the reform, the tax treatment of
capital-gains was dependent on the holding period of the underlying asset. The gains
and losses of assets sold within a holding period of 365 days or less were subject to
taxation. This tax was commonly refereed to as a ’speculation tax’. The tax rate was
identical to the personal income-tax rate (PIT) of the investor. The PIT depends on the
sum of all income types (wage income, self-employment, etc). The top income tax rate
(PIT rate) was, for example, 42% in 2008 and applied for overall annual taxable income
greater than 52,152 EUR. The entry tax rate in 2008 was 15%. Losses from sales with a
holding period of ≤ 365 days could be used to offset gains from capital gains. Between
2001 and 2008 a so-called half-income method applied: one half of the gains/losses from
capital gains with holding periods ≤ 365 days were subject to the tax.
For illustration, consider a fictitious investor who is subject to the top-income tax
rate of 42%. She realizes gains worth 2000 EUR from shares that she had held less than
365 days, and she sells other shares within the 365-days holding period which come with
losses of 200 EUR. The resulting capital-gains tax liability for this investor then was
1/2× (2000− 200)× 0.42 = 378 EUR.
The gains resulting from assets with a holding period of more than 365 days were
not subject to any taxes; the resulting tax liability on gains was zero if the underlying
asset was held for more than 365 days. Accordingly, losses resulting from assets with a
holding period of more than 365 days could not offset positive capital gains.
This system of capital-gains taxes applied to assets such as stocks (as long as the
investor is not a substantial shareholder), funds, certificates (except guarantee certificate)
and capital gains from bonds (except zero bonds). Overall, the system creates large
incentives to realize gains after the relevant holding period of 365 days, while losses
should be realized within the 365-days holding period to reduce the tax base.
Taxation of capital gains since 2009. The tax treatment of capital gains was sub-
stantially reformed as of January 2009. In stark contrast to the old system, the holding
period of assets is not tax relevant anymore. That is, the holding-period based ’spec-
ulation tax’ was abolished in the context of this reform. It was replaced by a system
where all capital gains and capital losses (independent of holding duration) are subject
to a flat tax of 25% or, if the PIT rate is smaller than 25%, the PIT rate. That is, the
tax on capital gains/losses is min(25%,PIT rate). Losses can be used to offset gains. The
half-income method was abolished.
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Consider again an fictitious investor who is subject to the top PIT rate (which is
> 25%) and who has capital gains of 2000 EUR and capital losses of 200 EUR. Her tax
liability after the reform is independent of the holding periods of the underlying assets
and sums up to: (2000− 200)× 0.25 = 450 EUR. Importantly, any tax incentives to hold
assets for a certain time period were abolished. The old pre-2009 tax rules applied to all
assets bought before January 2009 (resulting in grandfathered assets).
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Data Description and Summary Statistics
We use individual investor and portfolio data from a large German online bank. The full-
service bank has more than half a million customers and operates across the entire country.
We obtain a sample of about 110,000 investors which is randomly drawn out of all of the
bank’s clients. Variants of this data set were for example used by Leuz et al. (2017) and
Loos et al. (2020). For each investor, we have the complete trading history for the period
January 1999 to May 2016. These data allow us to construct an individual-level panel
of daily trading activities over almost 18 years. Trading information in the data include
type of traded asset, transaction volumes, prices, order types (with or without limit) and
dates for purchases and sales. We further have investor information on age, gender, zip
code of residence, marital status, employment type, and for how long the investor has
had the trading account. In addition, the data include self-reported information about
education, income (in categorical ranges), total wealth and risk tolerance.
For the purpose of our paper (in which we focus on the trading of stocks), we restrict
the sample to all investors who have purchased at least one stock during the sample
period. This leaves us with about 93,000 investors. These investors bought about 8.4
million share packages with an overall purchase value of 49 billion EUR during our sample
period (the unit of analysis in most of our analyses will be a share package; see section
4.3.2 below for a definition and more information). Table 9 provides summary statistics
for all investors in our analysis sample. The average portfolio value (incl. all assets in
the portfolio) is 51,725 EUR and the investors in our sample make on average roughly
78 trades in total over the observation period. The average monthly portfolio turnover58
was 10.86 percent, which implies that most investors have quite active accounts. Most
investors in our sample are male (83%) and their average age (by the end of 2015) was
52 years. 6% work in the financial sector and 16% of our sample is self-employed. The
average investor in our sample has held the account at this bank for more than 13 years
(as of the end of 2015); we use this measure as a proxy for trading experience. The share
58Monthly portfolio turnover is calculated as in Barber and Odean (2001) as one-half of the monthly
sales turnover plus one-half the monthly purchase turnover. Sales (purchase) turnover is defined as value
of shares sold (purchased) divided by the portfolio value in the beginning of the month.
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of investors in our sample with a PhD-level degree is 6%, whereas the share over the entire
German population is only about 1.5%. This is in line with prior evidence showing that
individuals with investment portfolios are more educated than the population average
(van Rooij et al. 2011; Cole et al. 2014; Leuz et al. 2017).
We investigate if our sample is representative for the population of investors and
does not only include special groups of investors or play-money accounts. For this pur-
pose, we provide several comparisons of our data sample with i) the German population
of investors and ii) with other comparable data sets that have been used in the literature
(these comparisons build on Leuz et al. 2017 who use a very similar data set). The
portfolio value in our sample (51,725 EUR) is very comparable to the number that the
German central bank (Bundesbank) reports to be the average portfolio value of German
equity investors: 48,000 EUR in 2013 (Deutsche Bundesbank 2013). We further construct
a variable that measures the ratio of portfolio value over annual income for our data and
benchmark this ratio with official statistics reported by the German Federal Office. As
income in our data set is reported in several categorical ranges, we use either the midpoint
or the lower end of each range as a proxy for investor income. Using the midpoint, the
mean ratio of the average portfolio value (over the entire sample period) to annual income
is 1.3. Using the lower ends of each income range as a proxy for annual income, this ratio
is calculated to be 1.2. These numbers are very close to the ratio of total financial assets
to gross household income in the German population: 1.1 (German Federal Bureau of
Statistics 2008b; German Federal Bureau of Statistics 2008a).59 In addition, the ratio of
the median portfolio value to median gross income for the German investors surveyed by
Dorn and Huberman (2005) is 0.6 and it turns out to be 0.6 for our sample as well.60
Overall, these comparisons allow us to conclude that our investor sample is representa-
tive of the population of German investors and should not be significantly biased by play
money accounts.
Demographic and portfolio characteristics of the investors in our sample are also
well comparable to the well-established investor data set used by, for example, Odean
(1998) and Barber and Odean (2001). Their data are obtained from an U.S. online
brokerage house and are similar in spirit to the data that we use. For example, average
age (50.4 vs 52.26) and the share of males (79% vs 86%) is fairly similar across these
data sets. Furthermore, the average portfolio value of about 51,000 EUR is in the same
order of magnitude (considering the different time periods) as the average portfolio value
of 47,000 USD that is reported in Barber and Odean (2001).61
59We manually calculate this value from total financial assets and the monthly gross income reported
in the above sources.
60We manually calculate this from the values given in Tables 1 and 2 of Dorn and Huberman (2005,
pages 443 and 447).
61The EUR-USD exchange rate throughout our sample period was at 1.16 in Jan. 1999 and 1.11 in
104
4.3.2 Unit of Analysis
We are interested in the number of stock realizations around the intertemporal tax dis-
continuity. That is, our primary interest is not regarding the number of investors trading
around the discontinuity (although we analyze this too in one series of analyses) and we
thus do not employ the investor as the unit of analysis. To study the number of stock
realizations, we use ’share packages’ as the unit of analysis throughout most of the paper.
One ’share package’ is independent of the number of shares that are included in this share
package. For example, if an investor buys 100 shares and sells this ’package’ of 100 shares
ten days letter, we generate one observation with a holding period of 10 days (see below
for more on the measurement of holding period). If another investor buys 10,000 shares
and sells her ’package’ of 10,000 shares 10 days letter, we also generate one observation
with a holding period of 10 days. We selected this unit of analysis in order to avoid that
our results are driven by the behavior of a few large-scale investors or penny stocks. Our
approach reflects that we are eventually interested in the individual behavior of investors
and we want to avoid that the individual behavior is weighted with the number of shares
that an individual investor moves. In the previous example (one investor selling 10 and
one selling 10,000 shares), both of these investors are given the same weight in our analy-
sis because we are interested in the tax-induced trading behavior of both these investors.
If single shares were the unit of analysis, the behavior of the smaller 10-shares investor
would be almost negligible relative to the behavior of the bigger 10,000-shares investor.
4.3.3 Measuring the Holding Period
We measure the holding period as the difference in days between purchase date and sales
date of a share package. For example, if a fictive investor buys five shares of some firm
on the second of October and sells all of them on the 15th of October, this would result in
one observation with a holding period of 13 days. If the first purchase of a share package
occured outside our sample period (i.e., prior to January 2009), we cannot calculate the
holding period and have to drop the share package from our analysis.
If there are multiple buys before the first sale occurs we apply the first-in-first out
principle (which is in line with the German tax law). For example, if an investor buys
two shares on Oct 5, ten shares of the same firm on Oct 10, and then sells all 12 shares
on Oct 20, we generate two observations with holding periods of 15 days and 10 days,
respectively.
If one purchase is sold on several days we create one observation for each sale.
For example, consider an fictive investor who buys five shares on October 2, then sells
three of these shares on October 4 and two shares on October 15. We then create two
May 2016.
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observations: one with a holding period of two days and the other with a holding period
of 13 days.
Sometimes shares change their isin or shares are splitted or reverse splitted. We
account for this by using hand collected data for isin changes and data on splits and reverse
splits from datastream.62 In cases were shares have been splitted or reverse splitted, we
adjust prices such that purchase and sale price have the same basis.63 Since we cannot
guarantee 100% that we are able to detect all events with isin changes or changes in the
volume of a trade, we compare the trade volume from the transaction data with the final
stock at each end of the month, which is reported in a separate data file. Per deposit-isin
combination we keep trades until we detect any difference between stock and accumulated
trading volume. We drop all trades for the affected deposit isin combination for points
in time after the first difference.
4.3.4 Final Sample
Our analysis is based on several million share packages. For the years before the reform,
we include 2.74 million observations of appreciated share packages(gains) and 2.47 mil-
lion depreciated share packages (losses). In the after-reform years, we have 1.34 million
appreciated share packages and 0.85 million depreciated share packages. Restricting the
sample to half a year before and after the intertemporal tax discontinuity, we rely on
313,000 appreciated share packages and 380,000 depreciated packages during pre-reform
period, and 212,000 gains and 136,000 for the after-reform period.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy aims at identifying the causal effect of capital taxes on trading
behavior, in particular on holding periods and the probability to sell an asset. We focus
on the trading of share packages throughout our analyses. In addition, we shed light on
the interaction of taxes and the disposition effect.
4.4.1 Number of trades in weeks around the cutoff
The starting point for our analyses are figures in which we plot the number of sold share
packages around the holding-period tax cutoff of 365 days. We group the number of sold
share packages in weekly bins of seven days and primarily look at the year window around
the 365-days cutoff. That is, we plot the number of sales in each week during the 26 weeks
62We also try to identify from the data (reverse) splits which were not reported in datastream and isin
changes. For those cases, we manually check whether there was indeed an isin change or (reverse) split.
63Since the total value of a position is unaffected by the split or reverse split, the price basis before
and after the split is not the same anymore. For example, consider 100 shares with a value of 200 Euro
that are splitted by 2. Without adjustments, the price before the split is 2 Euro while it is just 1 Euro
after.
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prior and 26 weeks after the discontinuity. We use bins of seven days although we have
access to daily sales data because of a mechanical pattern in the daily data which causes
noise and is smoothed out in weekly data. Since it is not possible to trade on weekends,
some day-measured holding periods occur more often than others. For example, a seven
day holding period is possible for sales made on all five weekdays, whereas a four days
holding period is only possible for sales made on Mondays, Thursdays or Fridays.
We plot the number of trades around the 365-days cutoff separately for years before
and after the 2009 reform and separately for gains and losses. Since the holding period
became tax irrelevant in the course of the reform, we expect a smooth distribution of
trades around the 365-days cutoff for the years after the reform. A causal effect of taxes
on trading behavior would imply that we see, in pre reform years, an increased number
of trades of appreciated assets (gains) in the weeks after the 365-days cutoff, and an
increased number of trades of depreciated assets (losses) in the weeks before the cutoff.
To investigate if potential tax effects are driven by a few large tax sensitive investors
who sell many share packages around the time discontinuity, we also plot the number of
distinct investors who sell share packages in a given week of the holding period. For this
purpose, and analogous to the above strategy, we group the number of distinct investors
who sell a share package in bins of seven days and plot the number of investors in each
bin during the 26 weeks before and after the time discontinuity.
4.4.2 Difference-in-Bunching
We go on and use bunching methods to quantify the tax effects around the 365-days
cutoff. Bunching approaches go back to Saez (2010b) and are now commonly used (see
the recent overview by Kleven 2016).64 We use a difference-in-bunching approach where
we use the sales distribution in the post-reform periods as a counterfactual for the pre-
reform distribution (as in e.g., Brown (2013); also see Kleven (2016)).
To make the pre and post reform distributions comparable and to obtain a good
counterfactual, we account for level differences in the number of sales before and after
the reform. We divide all weekly counts by the respective total number of share packages
that have a holding period of at least 26 weeks. We include all share packages in the
denominator, including those which have not been sold, when we perform these divisions.
This is necessary because we observe share packages in the pre reform period for a longer
amount of time than in the post period. As a result, the probability that we observe
the sale for a share package bought in the pre reform period is higher than for a share
package bought in the post reform period. We apply this procedure separately for gains
and losses. We therefore need to determine whether an unsold share package is treated
64Bunching applications for example include: Chetty et al. (2011), Chetty et al. (2013b), Bastani and
Selin (2014), Best et al. (2015), Best and Kleven (2018), and Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2018).
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as a gain or a loss. We count unsold share packages as a gain if the last observed price
of that share packages was higher than the purchase price. Similarly, we count unsold
share packages as a loss if the last observed price of that share packages was lower than
the purchase price.
In many bunching applications, the counterfactual distribution is estimated through
predicting the distribution in the region close to the cutoff using the distribution in the
region further away from the cutoff. Our approach is advanategous to this conventional
approach because it does not rely on the assumption that the distribution further away
from the cutoff is unaffected by the discontinuity at the cutoff. This is particularly
relevant because it is very likely that the large and salient discontinuity in our setting
also affects sales which, in the absence of the discontinuity, would have been sold on
days further away from the 365-days discontinuity. Our hazard-rate Figures suggest that
this is really the case; pre-reform hazard rates away from the cutoff are different than
post-reform hazard rates away from the cutoff.
The identifying assumption in our set-up then is that the post-reform distribution
(without discontinuity) is a plausible counterfactual for the pre-reform distribution (which
has the discontinuity). Looking at our plotted Figures, this assumption appears plausible,
and we find it less strong than the assumption of the conventional bunching method.
Note that the exact counterfactual distribution is particularly relevant for calculating the
exact elasticity of the tax effect. To make the plain case that the spikes that we see in our
data are tax effects, it is sufficient to show that there are no irregularities at all around
the 365-days holding period (neither in the non-parametric plots nor in the hazard-rate
regressions).
The size of the causal tax effect will be proportional to the excess mass in bunch-
ing relative to the counterfactual distribution. To quantify the tax effect, we estimate
parameter b which describes the excess mass around the cutoff relative to the counter-
factual distribution. This parameter is then used to calculate an implied elasticity which
describes the percentage change in holding period in response to a one-percent change in
the tax rate. Based on graphical evidence, we define our bunching window for gains to be
the first four weeks of the holding period after the 365-days discontinuity. The spike for
losses is somewhat more concentrated around the last week before the 365-days cutoff.
We therefore choose the bunching window for losses to be the three last weeks before the
cutoff. Note that an increased bunching window generally simply increases the excess
mass and therefore the tax effect.
We calculate a standard error for the excess mass b using a bootstrap procedure. To
do so, we randomly draw share packages from our sample with replacement on the investor
level to generate a new set of counts and reestimate the excess mass bj. Repeating this
for a thousand times gives us an estimate for the distribution of bj. We use the standard
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deviation of the bj as our estimate for the standard error of the excess mass.
Following for example Chetty et al. (2011) and Glogowsky (2016), we calculate the







Recall that, in pre reform years with tax discontinuity, the applicable tax rate for
realized stock trades with a holding period of less than one year was the personal income
tax (PIT) rate of the investor. At the tax discontinuity, the tax rate thus falls from the
PIT rate of the individual investor to zero. Since we do not have individual tax rates
or taxable income in our data, we calculate two sets of elasticities that differ w.r.t. to
the PIT rate that we use: i) using the top income tax rate in 2008 (42%), ii) and the
minimum income tax rate (15%).
Note that there are no strictly dominated regions in our set-up. There are at least
four reasons why it might be rational to sell an appreciated share even on the day before
it can be sold tax free. First, loss carryforwards: if the investors has sufficient loss
carryforwards, she can sell an appreciated share tax free even if still the long term rate
applies. Second, time discounting: for example the investor needs liquidity in the time
before the cutoff. Third, expected prices: if the investor assumes that the price will
drop strongly on the day after the cutoff, selling on the days before the cutoff might be
advantageous for her. Fourth, risk aversion: even if the investor assumed that prices
remain constant in expectation, it might be optimal for her to sell before the cutoff in
cases where prices might fall with a small positive probability.
4.4.3 Hazard-Rate Regressions
We complement the bunching analyses with hazard-rate regressions (as used for example
in Chang et al. 2016). These hazard-rate regressions estimate for each day of the holding
period the probability that a given share package is sold on this holding-period day. For
this purpose, we set up our data set such that it contains one observation per share
package, individual investor and day of the holding period.65 For example, this would
give us 11 observations for a share package that an individual investor has held for 10
days (0, 1, 2, ..., 10). We then create a dummy variable – Sell – that indicates for each
day of the holding period if the asset was sold on this respective day. We merge the
resulting dataset with daily price information for all assets, extracted from Datastream.
For each day of the holding period, we estimate separate regressions in which we regress
the Sell -dummy on a constant. The resulting coefficient for the constant then describes
65To avoid selection in assets because of missing prices in datastream, we assign the last observed price
to shares where the price is missing. This is the case for about 10% of all assets in our sample.
109
the probability that a share package is sold on this particular day of the holding period.
We again focus on the year around the tax discontinuity. Formally, we estimate the
following regression separately for each day of the holding period t:
Sellijd = β0 + εijd, (6)
where indices indicate a share package i of individual investor j on calender-day date
d. Note that we would not yet need indices j and d for this regression model here, in which
we simply regress the sale dummy for a share package j on a constant. However, further
below we will introduce investor-level (j) variables, which partly vary by calender-day
date (d), and we therefore already introduce indices j and d at this point.
To summarize, our hazard-rate regressions estimate separately for each day of the
holding period the probability that a share package is sold on this day of the holding
period. Here, and across all hazard-rate specifications throughout the paper, the unit of
analysis thus is the share package. Since we focus on the one year holding period window
around the time discontinuity, our approach implies that we estimate one regression
for each of holding period days 185-545. We estimate this set of regressions separately
for pre-reform and post-reform years to see if selling probabilities around the 365-days
holding-period cutoff are different before and after the reform. In light of the differential
tax incentives for gains and losses, we further run separate regressions for gains and losses.
As a result, we thus have estimates four all four combinations of pre and post years as
well as gains and losses.66
For illustrative purposes, we plot the estimated β0 coefficients for each day of the
holding period (separate plots for gains and losses, and post and pre reform). The β0
coefficients measure the probability of sale on a given day of the holding period. This
procedure provides graphical evidence whether the selling probabilities are affected by
taxation. One particular advantage of the hazard-rate approach, relative to the bunching
approach, is the possibility to make use of our daily data. To complement our main
hazard-rate regressions (which bundle all pre-reform or all post-reform years), we also
provide hazard-rate regressions separately for each year in our data sample.
Heterogeneity w.r.t. investor characteristics. Our dataset includes several demo-
graphic variables which allow us to study heterogeneity across different type of investors.
We use the hazard-rate regression setup for this purpose and add investor-level charac-
teristics to the share-package level data. We then run the following type of regression for
each day of the holding period to study heterogeneity:
66In our baseline specifications, we exclude grandfathered assets from the regressions. We provide
robustness checks in which we relax this sample choice.
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Sellijd = β0 + β1Demogrijd +Xijdβ
′
+ εijd, (7)
where i, j and d again indicate share packages, investors and calender-day dates,
respectively. Variable Demogr is the respective variable along which heterogeneous effects
may occur. We focus on three different sources of heterogeneity which have received
attention in the trading literature (e.g., (Barber and Odean 2001; Seru et al. 2009;
Korniotis and Kumar 2011)): age of the investor, investor experience and gender. In
the ’investor experience’ regressions, β1 estimates the increase in selling probability as
experience increases by one year. In cases where the focus is on age, β1 indicates the
effect of one additional year of age on the selling probability. Gender is coded such that
β1 in the ’gender regressions’ measure the difference in selling probability on a given day
for male investors relative to female investors.
In all these regressions, we conditional on a set of observable control variables which
are all included in vector X. These control variables include: age, investor experience,
gender, birth year, income category, wealth category, dummies indicating employment in
the financial sector, having a doctoral degree, and being self-employed. The respective
heterogeneity variable of interest, Demogr, is of course omitted from vector X in the
respective regression (for example, in cases in which we are interested in gender hetero-
geneity, the gender variable is included in Demogr and not included in X). In regressions
in which we are interested in heterogeneity w.r.t. age (i.e., variable Demogr is age), we
exclude birth year from the vector of control variables because age and birth year are
strongly correlated and we do not want to ’control away’ cohort effects when investigating
age heterogeneity. The corresponding summary statistics for all variables used here are
reported in Table 9. Including these control variables for example implies that the effect
of investor experience is going to be conditional on age. In our results graphs, we plot
the β1 coefficients of this regression. These show if the selling probabilities are different
across the groups, and we are of course particularly interested in the differential selling
probabilities around the intertemporal time discontinuity.
Heterogeneity w.r.t. magnitude of gains and losses. The hazard-rate approach
also allows us to estimate if potential tax effects depend on the magnitude of the gain or
loss of an investor. This is potentially relevant because an investor with a large loss faces
larger incentives to sell the share package before the 365-days cutoff because deducting a
large loss reduces the tax base by more than a small loss. In addition, if the loss is only
small the investor might want to wait and see if share package prices rise. Equivalently,
a large gain would trigger a larger tax liability, which increases the incentive to sell a
gain after the cutoff. Studying heterogeneity w.r.t. the magnitude of gains and losses
also relates to Ivković et al. (2005) who provide a similar analysis. For this purpose, we
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include an additional variable into the above regressions which measures the percentage
change in the value of the share package. In this context, we estimate the following
regressions for each day of the holding period t:
Sellijd = β0 + β1Changeijd + εijd, (8)
where the Change variable describes the change between the share price at holding-
day t and the purchasing (
pijtd−pij0d
pij0d
). To avoid that the regression results are driven by
extreme outliers which could be caused by mistakes in the price databank, we exclude
observations for which the price change is not included within the first and 99th percentile.
The constant in these regressions describes the selling probability for share packages
without a price change, (β0 + β1) estimates the selling probability for changes of size 1,
and β1 measures the difference between the selling probabilities of share packages without
any change and a large change of 1. We again estimate these models separately for losses
and gains and pre and post reform periods. In our graphs, we plot the β1 coefficients.
4.4.4 Taxes and the Disposition Effect
We aim to test if taxes affect the extent of the disposition effect. The starting point of
the analysis is to measure the existence and magnitude of a potential disposition effect
in our data. Following the literature (e.g., Chang et al. 2016) and using our previous
hazard-rate regression framework, we regress a Sale-dummy (see above) on a dummy
indicating whether a share package comes with a gain on this day of the holding period.
Formally, we estimate the following regression for each day of the holding period and
using all sample years and shares with both gains and losses:
Sellijd = β0 + β1Gainijd + εijd. (9)
If β1 is greater than zero in this regression, this is evidence of a disposition effect;
i.e., gains are sold with larger probabilities than gains. The coefficient for β1 measures
the magnitude of the disposition effect. We plot these β1 coefficients in our result graphs.
We estimate the above regression separately for pre-reform and post-reform years.
Any difference between pre and post reform years, especially around the 365-days cutoff,
sheds light on the tax effects of the disposition effect. The difference in the disposition
effect between post-reform and pre-reform years can also be estimated in a DiD-type
regression of the following form:
Sellijd = β0 + β1Pre+ β21(Gainijd) + β3Pre× 1(Gainijd) + εijd, (10)
where Pre indicates years before the reform (when the holding period mattered for
the tax liability). The interaction of pre-years and the gain dummy, β3, measures the
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difference in disposition effect before the reform relative to after the reform. We again
estimate this regression separately for each day of the holding period, which allows to
check if the difference between post and pre years is particularly pronounced around the
365-days cutoff. We plot β3 when we present the graphical results for this approach.
4.5 Results
This section presents the empirical results. All of our empirical findings are presented in
graphs which aim to visualize the effects and make them approachable. The chapter is
organized along the same order as the description of the empirical strategy in section 4.4.
4.5.1 Number of trades in weeks around the cutoff
Figure 22 depicts the number of traded gains (i.e., appreciated share packages) in weekly
bins around the intertemporal (365-days) time discontinuity separately for pre-reform
and post-reform years. The red vertical line at zero marks the 365-days holding period.
In pre-reform years, in which the 365-days cutoff was tax relevant, the number of
gains that are sold spikes sharply in the first week after the 365-days cutoff. The number
of sold gains in this first week after the discontinuity is more than 2.5 times as high as in
the week before the 365-days cutoff. In week 2 after the discontinuity the number of sales
is roughly 1.8 times as high as in the week before the reform. This trend then continues
in subsequent weeks: the number of sold gains remains higher than before the cutoff, but
the difference becomes smaller as we move further to the right from the cutoff.
Is the spike in the number of sold gains driven by the capital-gains tax discontinuity?
In post-reform years, in which the 365-days cut-off is not tax relevant, we see a smooth
development of the number of sales around 365 days. Specifically, the number of sold gains
does not exhibit a spike just to the right of the discontinuity. This is clearly indicative
that the large spike in pre-reform years is driven by the capital-gains tax system. We will
compare the number of sales in pre and post years further below when quantify the tax
effect using the bunching approach.
Figure 23 presents the equivalent plot for the number of sold losses (i.e., depreciated
share packages). In pre-reform years (with tax-relevant 365-days cutoff), we see a sharp
spike in the number of sold losses in the week just before the 365-days cutoff. The number
of sold losers is more than 3 times as large in the week before the cutoff than in the week
just after the cutoff. In week -2, the spike is still clearly visible but considerably smaller
than in week -1; the number of sold losers is about 1.7 times larger in week -2 compared
to the week after the cutoff. Importantly, we see a smooth development in the number
of realized losses around the 365-days cutoff in post-reform years where crossing the 365-
days holding period does not have any tax implications. The spike in pre-reform years,
along with the absence of any spike in post-reform years, provides clear evidence that the
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tax discontinuity affects trading behavior.
Overall, our findings for both losses and gains are consistent with the notion that
investors try to realize losses within the holding period that allows using them as a tax
shield, whereas investors defer the realization of gains until they are tax free.
Number of distinct selling investors in weeks around the cutoff. The previous
results showed the number of appreciated and depreciated share packages around the
intertemporal tax discontinuity. Are the spikes in the number of sales around the discon-
tinuity driven by a few investors who are tax aware and sell many of their share packages
around the cutoff? We shed light on this question by plotting the number of distinct
investors who trade in a given week. As before, we plot the weekly numbers separately
for investors who trade gains and losses, as well as for pre and post reform years.
Figures 24 and 25 present the plots for gains and losses, respectively. In pre-reform
years, the number of investors selling gains spikes sharply in weeks to the right of the
discontinuity and the number of distinct investors trading losses spikes sharply in weeks
to the left of the discontinuity. We see no spikes in post-reform years in which the 365-
days cutoff is not tax relevant. The spikes in pre-reform years, along with the absence of
spikes in post-reform years, again indicates a causal tax effect.
Overall, this exercise suggests that the sharp spikes in the number of share packages
above is not driven by a few tax-sensitive investors selling many share packages around
the discontinuity. Apparently, many different investors respond to the tax incentives in
a way that is consistent with our expectations. We study different sources of potential
heterogeneity in tax responses among different investors further below.
4.5.2 Difference-in-Bunching
The Difference-in-Bunching results are presented in Figures 26 (for gains) and 27 (for
losses). As described in section 4.4, we use the post-reform years (without tax disconti-
nuity) as the counterfactual distribution for the tax-affected pre-reform years. Recall that
we divide the number of sales by the respective total number of share packages (including
the ones which have not been sold) in order to account for level differences between pre
and post reform years. in order to account for differences in levels across pre-reform and
post-reform years. In the Figures, the vertical red line depicts the 365-days holding period
and the blue and red line present the weekly bins for the pre- and post-reform periods,
respectively. The patterns in both Figures are (not surprisingly) similar to the patterns
that we saw above in the Figures that simply plot the number of sales. In particular, the
density of realized gains spikes sharply in the week after the 365-days cutoff in pre-reform
years and no such spike is observed in post-reform years. The density of realized losses
has a large spike in the week before the cutoff in pre-reform years and, again, there is no
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spike in post-reform years. The main purpose of our Difference-in-Bunching approach is
to quantify the magnitude of the tax effect and to estimate an elasticity of the holding
duration with respect to the tax rate. In other words, we aim to calculate the percentage
change in holding-period days in response to a one-percent change in the tax rate.
We estimate an excess mass of 2.32 (standard error: 0.07) for gains (see Figure 26)
and an excess mass of 2.43 (standard error: 0.07) for losses (see Figure 26). To derive an
elasticity, these excess-mass estimates can be related to the change in tax rates once the
holding-period of 365 days is crossed. As we described in Section 4.2.1, the applicable
tax rate for assets sold within the first 365 days after purchase is the individual personal
marginal income-tax rate. Our portfolio data do not include personal marginal tax rates
for investors and we therefore calculate the elasticity based on two scenarios: i) the top
marginal income-tax rate of 42% applies, ii) the minimum tax rate (lowest bracket) of
15% applies.67 Using the top marginal income tax rate of 42%, we estimate an elasticity
of 0.185 for gains and an elasticity 0.195 for losses. Using the minimum income-tax rate of
15%, we estimate elasticities of 0.56 for gains and 0.59 for losses. Our estimates translate
to a tax-induced change in the holding period of 16 days for gains and 17 days for losses.
Where does the excess mass come from? Are the spikes ’fed’ by regions to the left
or to the right of the cutoff? For gains, we see that the mass mostly comes from the left
of the discontinuity; this suggests that investors delay the sales of gains until they qualify
for tax exemption. For losses, we see that the mass of investors mostly comes from the
right side of the discontinuity; this suggests that investors move forward the realization
of sales in order to count them against their tax-relevant gains.
4.5.3 Hazard-Rate Regressions
We present the results of our main hazard-rate regressions in Figures 28 (for gains) and
29 (for losses). The red vertical line again indicates a holding period of 365 days. The
blue line plots the daily-estimated coefficients for the selling probability of either gains or
losses in pre-reform years. The red line plots the equivalent line of coefficients for post-
reform years. That is, we plot the β0 coefficients (i.e., the coefficients for the constant)
of regression equation 6 in these Figures. The faded area around the line of coefficients
indicates 95% confidence intervals.
Although we now use regression methods based on daily data, the results are very
much consistent with the patterns that we saw in the preceding analyses. In particular,
we see in pre-reform years that the probability to sell an appreciated share package
spikes sharply during the holding-period days just after the 365-days cutoff, whereas the
probability to sell depreciated share packages spikes sharply during the days just before
67The top marginal income tax rate and minimum tax rate were 42% and 15% during most of the
years in our data sample. Note that most of the investors in our data are likely to be high earners and
closer to the top rate than to the minimum rate.
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the 365-days holding period. We do not see any spikes in selling probabilities around the
time discontinuity in post-reform years.
The magnitudes of the spikes are considerably large. As Figure 28 shows, the
probability to sell a gain on a given day of the holding period jumps from around 0.02
during the days before a 365-days holding period to approximately 0.07 on the day after
the cutoff. No such jump is observed in the post-reform years, again indicating that the
tax incentives have a clear effect on trading behavior. Comparing pre- and post-reform
hazard rates further away from the cutoff, the Figure suggests that investors indeed defer
the realization of gains until they qualify for preferential tax treatment; the pre-reform
selling probabilities tend to be below the post-reform probabilities to the left of the
discontinuity, and then sit above the post-reform probabilities on days after the 365-days
holding period. While plausible, this observation rests on a comparison of different time
periods and should therefore be viewed with caution.
For losses, as shown in Figure 29, the jump is even more considerable than for gains;
the selling probability is below 0.02 during the days after the 365-days holding period and
stands at almost 0.08 on day 364. Along with an absent jump in the post-reform period,
this is further evidence that the tax discontinuity induces investors to realize their losses
as long as they can be used to offset gains. Comparing pre- and post-reform hazard rates
further away from the cutoff, the Figure is suggestive that investors reduce the holding
period of losses for tax reasons. The hazard-rates to the right of the cutoff tend to be
higher in post-reform years than in pre-reform years. This difference in probabilities could
’feed’ the spike to the left of the discontinuity. Again, comparing pre- and post-reform
years away from the cutoff rests on a comparison of different time periods and should be
treated with caution.
Hazard-Rate Regressions by Year. To shed light on the yearly dynamics and to
examine if a few exceptional years drive our main results above, we estimate the daily
hazard-rate regressions separately for each year in our data sample. The resulting Figures,
which are to be interpreted as our main hazard-rate Figures above, are presented in
Appendix Figures 49 to 58. Each of these Figures presents the hazard-rate results for
three consecutive years. We again estimate the hazard rates separately for gains and
losses. To make all yearly Figures comparable, the scale of the y-axis is held constant
across all Figures.
The results for gains in pre-reform years (i.e., where 365 days holding preiod was
tax relevant) are presented in Figures 49 to 51. In 1999, the first year of our sample, the
spike to the right of the 365-days discontinuity is clearly visible and very pronounced.
This spike becomes smaller in the years 2000-2002, though it remains clearly visible across
this time period. The smaller magnitude of the spike in these years is reasonable given
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that gains were less prevalent during the burst of the dot.com bubble and many investors
presumably had losses that they could use to offset gains and which made it less necessary
to sell gains in the tax-free domain. The spike to the right of the discontinuity is then
again large and very prevalent in the years 2003-2007.68 Overall, we see a spike in selling
probabilities to the right of the tax-relevant time discontinuity in all pre-reform years of
our sample period. The results for gains in post-reform years (i.e., where the 365-days
cutoff is not tax relevant anymore) are presented in Figures 52 and 53. We do not see
any spikes or irregularities in selling probabilities around the holding period of 365 days
in any of the six post reform years.
The results for losses in pre-reform years are shown in Figures 54 to 56. We observe
clear and substantial spikes in selling probabilities just before the 365-days holding period
in each pre-reform year (1999-2007). The smallest spike is observed in 2003, but it is
clearly visible even in this year. The results for losses in post-reform years are shown in
Figures 57 and 58. As with gains, we do not observe spikes or irregularities around the
365-days holding period in any of the six post-reform years
Overall, selling probabilities of both gains and losses spike around the 365-days
holding period in all pre-reform years, but we do not see spikes in any of the post-reform
years. We interpret this finding as clear evidence that the tax discontinuity affects trading
behavior.
Heterogeneity w.r.t. investor characteristics. We study heterogeneity with re-
spect to three different investor characteristics: age, investor experience (both measured
in years) and gender (dummy indicating males). The underlying regression models con-
dition on a set of other investor-level characteristics (see section 4.4.3).
Figures 30 and 31 depict the effect of an additional age year on selling probabilities
on each day of the holding period. We particularly see age heterogeneity in the context
of loss-selling behavior (see Figure 31). The likelihood of selling a loss shortly before
the discontinuity sharply increases in age in pre-reform years. That is, older workers
are more likely to sell gains for tax reasons. We see no such effect in the post-reform
years in which the discontinuity is abolished. Age heterogeneity is not very pronounced
in the context of gains and we cannot conclude from the data that older and younger
investors respond differently to the tax discontinuity when it comes to selling gains. In
addition, we see no difference in selling probabilities between older and younger investors
for holding-period-days further away from the discontinuity (this goes for both losses and
gains). Importantly, all our age effects are conditional on our measure of experience; that
is, they are not confounded by trading experience.
68Note that we do not present results for the year 2008 because share packages bought before 2009
are excluded on calendardates later than 12/31/2008 (see section 4.4.3 for a detailed discussion). Hence,
even a share package bought on 01/01/2008 is not reaching the 365 days holding period threshold.
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Figures 32 (for gains) and 33 (for losses) illustrate the coefficients for investor ex-
perience. The result is unambiguous for both losses and gains: experienced investors
react stronger to the tax. This is reflected in the finding that selling probabilities around
the discontinuity sharply increase with each year of experience in pre-reform periods. In
other words, the probability to sell a stock for tax purposes around the time discontinuity
increases in trading experience. Further distant to the discontinuity, we do not see any
significant effects of experience on the probability of selling gains, neither in pre nor in
post reform years. This is different for losses: experienced traders are more likely to
sell losses throughout the entire set of holding-period days before the discontinuity in
pre-reform years. This difference disappears for days to the right of the discontinuity.
Note, again, that these effects of experience are conditional on age of the investor.
Heterogeneity with respect to gender is plotted in Figures 34 (for gains) and 35 (for
losses). We do not see any conclusive evidence for gender heterogeneity in the context of
gains. For losses, we see a large negative spike just before the discontinuity in pre-reform
years. This finding indicates that men are less likely to sell their losses on the day before
the cutoff, implying that men are less tax responsive in the context of loss realizations.
Heterogeneity w.r.t. magnitude of gains and losses. Figures 36 and 37 plot the
β1 coefficients of regression equation for each day of the holding period around the 365-
days discontinuity. These Figures shed light on the question of whether responses to the
tax depend on the magnitude of the loss or gain. The pronounced spike in the blue line
in Figure 36 just after the one year threshold implies that investors become much more
likely to dispose those stocks which had the largest gains. This effect then levels off over
the subsequent weeks. The pattern disappears completely once the flat tax regime is
introduced (red line). The relationship is similar but even stronger for the size of losses:
The strong decrease of the blue line in Figure 37 in the three weeks prior to the one
year threshold implies that investors become much more likely to dispose of those stocks
which have performed the worst.69 Apparently, the last opportunity to at least preserve
some additional value in the form of a tax shield gives an extra impetus to dispose of the
more extreme loss makers. This feature may be particularly valuable from an optimal
investment perspective because investors are in general more hesitant to dispose of the
largest losses as implied by the coefficient plots in the positive range in Figure 37 after
the reform (red line) and before the reform (blue line) – except, as discussed for the blue
line, for the last few weeks before the one year threshold.
69Losses are measured as negative values. Hence, a negative coefficient corresponds with an increased
likelihood to dispose of larger losses.
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4.5.4 Taxes and the Disposition Effect
Figure 38 plots the disposition effect on each day of the holding period separately for pre-
and post-reform years. That is, we plot the β1 coefficients of regression equation 9. In
the absence of a tax discontinuity in post-reform years, we observe the disposition effect
on each day of the holding period. That is, the probability to sell gains is higher one each
day of the holding period than the probability to sell losers. This result is consistent with
the literature where the disposition effect has been shown to be very robust. How does
the magnitude of our disposition effect compare to estimates in the literature? According
to the overview handbook chapter by Barber and Odean (2013), the selling probability
of gains is about 20-70% higher than that of losses. To make our estimates comparable
with these numbers, we divide the sales probability of gains by the sale probability of
losses. Technically, this means we use coefficients from regression equation 9 and divide
the coefficient of the gain dummy, by the constant which indicates the probability to
sell a loss, for each day of the holding period. The results of this exercise are plotted in
Figure 39 (that is, Figure 39 plots the ratio β1/β0). For the purpose of comparing our
disposition effect to the estimates in the literature, we mostly consider the post reform
period (without tax discontinuity) because, as we see below, the disposition effect in the
pre reform period is heavily affected by the intertemporal tax discontinuity. On average
over the entire holding period of days 185-545 in the post period, we observe that the
probability to sell a gain is 67% higher than the probability to sell a loss. This finding is
well in line with the findings in the literature.
Looking at pre-reform years with the tax relevant time discontinuity in Figure 38,
it is clearly visible that the disposition effect is affected by the capital-gains taxes. To
the left of the 365-days cutoff the disposition effect is first reduced and then steadily
drops. The disposition effect then turns negative during the days before the cutoff and
exhibits a sharp negative spike on the last day before the 365-days holding period is
reached. This reveals that the desire to sell losers before the cutoff for tax reasons is
larger than the disposition to sell gains with larger probability than losses. The pattern
is reversed as we explore the days just after the 365-days cutoff. The disposition effect
is heavily accelerated as compared to its usual magnitude; we see a substantial spike in
selling probabilities of gains during the days after the cutoff. On subsequent days, the
disposition effect remains higher than usually and it takes about 35 holding-period days
to go back to the usual level. The findings are consistent with investors selling gains once
they are tax free.
Figure 38 provides clear evidence that the disposition effect is affected by the tax
around the days of the discontinuity. Does the tax discontinuity also impact the magni-
tude of the disposition effect on holding-period days more distant to the cutoff? To shed
light on this question, we require a benchmark against which the disposition effect away
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from the cutoff can be compared. We use the post-reform periods (without discontinuity)
as the benchmark. This exercise obviously relies on the assumption that the post-reform
disposition effect is a good counterfactual for the pre-reform years. Effectively, compar-
ing the post- and pre-reform years is a before-after comparison that should naturally be
viewed with caution. Having this caution in mind, the Figure indicates that, away from
the cutoff, the disposition effect tends to be lower during the first year of the holding
period and higher after 365 days holding period have passed. This suggests that the
time discontinuity affects the disposition effect even on holding-period days distant to
the discontinuity.
All above results are also visible in Figure 40 which plots the coefficients of the
DiD set-up (β3 in equation 10). These coefficients compare the disposition effect between
pre-reform and post-reform years. The Figure particularly confirms that the days around
the discontinuity are substantially different between post and pre years, and additionally
adds to the suggestive evidence that the disposition effect is affected by the discontinuity
even on holding-period days away from the discontinuity.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we contribute to a better understanding of the role of capital-gains taxes
for the stock-market trading behavior of private investors. We provide causal evidence
on two interrelated questions: i) How do capital-gains taxes affect the holding period
of private stock market investments? ii) How do taxes interact with disposition effect?
The literature has addressed certain aspects of these two questions, but the evidence is
surprisingly limited. The lack of evidence is presumably attributable to the challenge of
finding appropriate micro level data on trading behavior in combination with an institu-
tional set up that allows for identification of causal tax effects. Our paper overcomes this
challenge in that it combines high-frequency portfolio-level data (which we confidentially
obtained from a large German bank) with an intertemporal tax discontinuity, and its
abolishment, in the German capital-gains tax system.
Our findings provide clear evidence that capital-gains taxes affect the trading be-
havior of individual investors. Selling probabilities, which we estimate on a daily basis,
are heavily affected by the tax discontinuity and disappear in years after the abolishment
of the discontinuity. Interesting patterns of heterogeneity reveal that more experienced
and older investors respond stronger to the tax incentives.
We also find that the disposition effect – the tendency to sell gains with a larger
propensity than losses – is strongly affected by capital-gains taxes. Depending on the
type of sale – gain or loss – the disposition effect is accelerated or mitigated due to
the tax. Previous studies have found that more experienced and older investors exhibit
smaller disposition effects (e.g., Feng and Seasholes 2005, Dhar and Zhu 2006 and Seru
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et al. 2010). However, as our heterogeneity analyses suggest, this is not an intrinsic direct
effect of age or experience. We find that it is salient intertemporal tax discontinuities
which induce the more experienced investors to dispose of their loss-making positions.
When the salient tax discontinuities are removed, there is no difference in the probability
to dispose of losses anymore between more or less experienced investors or older and
younger investors. This implies that, in the absence of the discontinuity, the disposition
effect is not different between older and younger and between more and less experienced
investors. Hence, if the U.S. were to smoothen the tax schedule for capital gains, the
seemingly stronger resistance of more experienced (or older) investors to behavioral biases
may disappear as well because it is the time discontinuity in the tax schedule which helps
these types of investors to focus their minds / make up their minds on loss-making
positions.70
How do our results relate to the predictions from theoretical models such as Con-
stantinides (1984)? First, our results are consistent with theory in that we see that the
discontinuity induces investors to delay the sale of gains until they qualify for preferen-
tial tax treatment and to realize losses earlier, both relative to a counterfactual without
intertemporal tax discontinuity. Second, the sharp spike in selling probabilities of losses
shortly before the discontinuity is not necessarily consistent with standard theoretical
predictions. However, this result is consistent with the notion that the discontinuity
serves as a self-control device that commits loss averse investors to take care of their
losses. The idea of a self-control mechanism to realize losses was first developed by She-
frin and Statman (1985). According to this idea, investors are reluctant to realizing
losses and they need some nudge to overcome this reluctancy and sell their losses. Our
results show that investors do not realize losses as they accrue and instead wait until the
quickly approaching discontinuity nudges them to realize the loss. To this end, our paper
provides some indication that taxes can serve as a commitment device for investors with
behavioral biases such as loss aversion.
70A complete smoothening of the tax schedule in the U.S. would imply not only the same tax rate on
short and long run capital gains but also a loss carry-back option for the deductibility of capital losses




Table 9: Descriptive statistics for all investors in the sample
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Unit of observation: Investor
Birthyear 93186 1962.74 13.23 1905 2010
Age end of 2015 93186 52.26 13.23 5 110
Trading experience in years end of 2015 93186 13.52 4.28 -0 22
Male 93186 0.86 0.35 0 1
Works in financial sector 93186 0.06 0.24 0 1
Self-employed 93186 0.16 0.36 0 1
Wealth ≤ 30, 000 93186 0.20 0.40 0 1
Wealth > 30, 000 < 100, 000 93186 0.19 0.40 0 1
Wealth ≥ 100, 000 93186 0.07 0.25 0 1
Wealth information missing 93186 0.54 0.50 0 1
Income ≤ 40, 000 93186 0.15 0.36 0 1
Income > 40, 000 < 100, 000 93186 0.30 0.46 0 1
Income ≥ 100, 000 93186 0.04 0.19 0 1
Income information missing 93186 0.51 0.50 0 1
Holding a PhD 93186 0.06 0.24 0 1
Number of trades 93186 77.79 218.29 0 19877
Number of trades 0.5-1.5 years 93186 11.27 24.87 0 876
Average monthly turnover 93109 10.86 15.39 0.00 99.66
Average monthly turnover < 2009 82618 11.80 16.13 0.00 99.41
Average monthly turnover ≥ 2009 87319 9.05 16.12 0.00 100.00
Average portfolio value 93109 51726 239157 0.03 57774533
Average percentage gain per trade 81688 32.63 27.61 0.00 263.64
Average percentage loss per trade 78926 -31.49 18.99 -96.83 -0.01
Average gain (EUR) per trade 86486 9.23 658.07 -5429.97 5345.57
Unit of observation: Share package
Sale in December 7248978 0.08 0.27 0 1
Sale in December: Gain 3925440 0.07 0.26 0 1
Sale in December: Loss 3323538 0.08 0.27 0 1
Notes: The table depicts the summary statistics for all variables used in our analysis. Variables are defined as follows: Birthyear is the
birth year of the investor; Age and trading experience end of 2015 are the age and the trading experience measured by the number of years
the investor has a depot at that bank at 12/31/2015; Male, works in the financial sector, holding a PhD and self-employed are dummy
variables information comes from the MiFID documentation; Wealth ≤ 30, 000, Wealth > 30, 000 < 100, 000; Wealth ≥ 100, 000 and
Wealth missing are 4 mutually exclusive wealth dummies indicating whether the investor belongs to one of the respective wealth groups.
Income ≤ 40, 000, Income > 40, 000 < 100, 000, Income ≥ 100, 000 and Income information missing are 4 mutually exclusive income
dummies indicating whether the investor belongs to one of the respective income groups. The information for wealth and income stems
from the MiFID documentation and is self-reported. Number of trades is the investor average of the total number of share packages (see
section 4.3.2 for a definition) sold; Number of trades 0.5-1.5 years is the investor average of the total number of share packages sold with
holding periods in between 185 and 545 days. Average monthly turnover is the investor average of the average monthly portfolio turnover.
Monthly portfolio turnover is calculated as in Barber and Odean (2001) as one-half of the monthly sales turnover plus one-half the monthly
purchase turnover. Sales (purchase) turnover is defined as value of shares sold (purchased) divided by the portfolio value in the beginning
of the month. Average monthly turnover < 2009 and average monthly turnover ≥ 2009 show the average monthly turnover for monthes
prior and after January 2009 respectively. Average portfolio value is the investor average of the average monthly portfolio value as of end
of the month. Average percentage gain, average percentage loss and average gain per trade are the investor average of the average gain
(loss) of share packages sold by the investor. Sale in December, Sale in December: Gain and Sale in December: Loss show how many of
the sold share packages have been sold in December.
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-26 -13 0 13 26
Holdingperiod in bins of 7 day(s)
Pre reform Post reform
Notes: This figure displays the number of share packages which were sold with a gain in dependency of the holding period.
Each dot represents the number of share packages sold in a 7 days bin of the holding period. Data is shown for 26 weeks
before and 26 weeks after the last week in which gains were taxable. The dotted blue line represents sold share packages
for which the purchase was made prior to 2009. The dotted red line represents sold share packages for which the purchase
was made after 2009. The vertical red line at x-axis value zero marks the last week in which gains were taxable. Pre reform
estimates are based on 44110 investors and 296135 share packages. Post reform estimates are based on 30875 investors and
206263 holding period share packages.
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Holdingperiod in bins of 7 day(s)
Pre reform Post reform
Notes: This figure displays the number of share packages which were sold with a loss in dependency of the holding period.
Each dot represents the number of share packages sold in a 7 days bin of the holding period. Data is shown for 26 weeks
before and 26 weeks after the last week in which losses could be used to offset gains. The dotted blue line represents sold
share packages for which the purchase was made prior to 2009. The dotted red line represents sold share packages for which
the purchase was made after 2009. The vertical red line at x-axis value zero marks the last week in which losses could be
used to offset taxes. Pre reform estimates are based on 43008 investors and 339970 share packages. Post reform estimates
are based on 23757 investors and 126280 share packages.
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Holdingperiod in bins of 7 day(s)
Pre reform Post reform
Notes: This figure displays the number of investors who sold an appreciated share package with the respective holding
period. Each dot represents the number of investors who sold a share package in a 7 days bin of the holding period. Data
is shown for 26 weeks before and 26 weeks after the last week in which gains were taxable. The dotted blue line represents
the number of investors who sold share packages for which the purchase was made prior to 2009. The dotted red line
represents the number of investors who sold share packages for which the purchase was made after 2009. The vertical red
line at x-axis value zero marks the last week in which gains were taxable. Pre reform estimates are based on 44110 investors
and 230352 share packages. Post reform estimates are based on 30875 investors and 155603 share packages.
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Holdingperiod in bins of 7 day(s)
Pre reform Post reform
Notes: This figure displays the number of investors who sold a depreciated share package with the respective holding
period. Each dot represents the number of investors who sold a share package in a 7 days bin of the holding period. Data
is shown for 26 weeks before and 26 weeks after the last week in which losses could be used to offset gains. The dotted
blue line represents the number of investors who sold share packages for which the purchase was made prior to 2009. The
dotted red line represents the number of investors who sold share packages for which the purchase was made after 2009.
The vertical red line at x-axis value zero marks the last week in which losses could be used to offset gains. Pre reform
estimates are based on 43008 investors and 339970 share packages. Post reform estimates are based on 23757 investors and
126280 share packages.
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Holdingperiod in bins of 7 day(s)
Pre reform Post reform
BinsBunch  4 b  2.32  sd .09
 
Notes: This figure displays the share of all purchased share packages with a gain in dependency of the holding period.
Each dot represents the share of all purchased share packages with a gain which were sold in a 7 days bin of the holding
period. Data is shown for 26 weeks before and 26 weeks after the last week in which gains were taxable. The dotted blue
line represents the share of all share packages with a gain purchased prior to 2009 which were sold. The dotted red line
represents the share of all share packages with a gain purchased after 2009 which were sold. The vertical red line at x-axis
value zero marks the last bin in which gains were taxable. BinsBunch denotes the bunching window which in this case
includes the 4 bins right after the last week in which losses could be used to offset gains. b represents the excess mass and
sd the standard errors which are bootstrapped on the investor level. Pre reform estimates are based on 57944 investors
and 589254 share packages. Post reform estimates are based on 43584 investors and 405628 share packages. These numbers
include share packages of shares which have not been sold in the 26 weeks after the cutoff.
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Holdingperiod in bins of 7 day(s)
Pre reform Post reform
BinsBunch  2 b  2.43  sd .1 
  
Notes: This figure displays the share of all purchased share packages with a loss in dependency of the holding period.
Each dot represents the share of all purchased share packages with a loss which were sold in a 7 days bin of the holding
period. Data is shown for 26 weeks before and 26 weeks after the last bin in which losses could be used to offset gains. The
dotted blue line represents the share of all share packages with a loss purchased prior to 2009 which were sold. The dotted
red line represents the share of all share packages with a loss purchased after 2009 which were sold. The vertical red line
at x-axis value zero marks the last bin in which losses could be used to offset gains. BinsBunch denotes the bunching
window which in this case includes the last week in which taxes were taxable and the week before. b represents the excess
mass and sd the standard errors which are bootstrapped on the investor level. Pre reform estimates are based on 66396
investors and 941351 share packages. Post reform estimates are based on 43196 investors and 351090 holding period share
packages. These numbers include share packages of shares which have not been sold in the 26 weeks after the cutoff.
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185 225 265 305 345 385 425 465 505 545
holdingperiod
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod for share packages
with prices above the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the probability that a share-package is sold on this holding-
period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from a series of regressions of the form
Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Gainijd) = 1. The blue line represents estimates for β0 for share packages which were bought
before 2009. The shaded blue area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The red line represents estimates for β0 for
share packages which were bought after 2009. The shaded red area displays 95 percent confidence intervals.The vertical
red line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains were taxable. Pre reform estimates are based on 63743 investors and
91 million holding period share package observations. Post reform estimates are based on 51244 investors and 72 million
holding period share package observations.
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185 225 265 305 345 385 425 465 505 545
holdingperiod
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod for share packages with
prices below the purchase price at the respective day. Coefficients indicate the probability that a share-package is sold on
this holding-period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from a series of regressions
of the form Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Lossijd) = 1. The blue line represents estimates for β0 for share packages which were
bought before 2009. The shaded area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The red line represents estimates for β0 for
share packages which were bought after 2009. The shaded area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The vertical red
line at day 365 marks the last day in which losses could be used to offset gains. Pre reform estimates are based on 70783
investors and 176 million holding period share package observations. Post reform estimates are based on 52290 investors
and 76 million holding period share package observations.
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185 225 265 305 345 385 425 465 505 545
Holding period
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays coefficient estimates for investor experience stemming from hazard-rate regressions for each
day of the holdingperiod. Included are share packages with prices above the purchase price. Coefficients indicate by how
much an additional year in age shifts the probability that a share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients
and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + β1Ageid +
Covariatesijdγ+εijd if 1(Gainijd) = 1. Where Age is the age of the investor on a given calendardate. Covariates include
controls for experience, gender, income category, wealth category, working in the financial sector, having a doctoral degree,
and being self-employed. The blue line represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were bought before 2009. The
shaded area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The red line represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were
bought after 2009. The shaded area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last
day in which gains were taxable. Pre reform estimates are based on 63743 investors and 91 million holding period share
package observations. Post reform estimates are based on 51244 investors and 72 million holding period share package
observations.
132











185 225 265 305 345 385 425 465 505 545
Holding period
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays coefficient estimates for investor experience stemming from hazard-rate regressions for each
day of the holdingperiod. Included are share packages with prices below the purchase price. Coefficients indicate by how
much an additional year in age shifts the probability that a share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients
and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + β1Ageid +
Covariatesijdγ+εijd if 1(Lossijd) = 1. Where Age is the age of the investor on a respective calendar-day date. Covariates
include controls for experience, gender, income category, wealth category, working in the financial sector, having a doctoral
degree, and being self-employed. The blue line represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were bought before
2009. The shaded blue area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The red line represents estimates for β1 for share
packages which were bought after 2009. The shaded red area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The vertical red
line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains were taxable. Pre reform estimates are based on 70783 investors and
176 million holding period share package observations. Post reform estimates are based on 52290 investors and 76 million
holding period share package observations.
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holdingperiod
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays coefficient estimates for investor experience stemming from hazard-rate regressions for each
day of the holdingperiod. Included are share packages with prices above the purchase price. Coefficients indicate by
how much an additional year in experience shifts the probability that a share-package is sold on this holding-period day.
Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from a series of regressions of the form Sellijd =
β0 +β1Expid +Covariatesijdγ+εijd if 1(Gainijd) = 1. Where Exp is measured by the number of years the investor has a
depot at that bank. Covariates include controls for age, birthyear (i.e. cohort), gender, income category, wealth category,
working in the financial sector, having a doctoral degree, and being self-employed. The blue line represents estimates for
β1 for share packages which were bought before 2009. The shaded area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The red
line represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were bought after 2009. The shaded area displays 95 percent
confidence intervals.The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains were taxable. Pre reform estimates
are based on 63743 investors and 91 million holding period share package observations. Post reform estimates are based
on 51244 investors and 72 million holding period share package observations.
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holdingperiod
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays coefficient estimates for investor experience stemming from hazard-rate regressions for each
day of the holdingperiod. Included are share packages with prices below the purchase price. Coefficients indicate by
how much an additional year in experience shifts the probability that a share-package is sold on this holding-period day.
Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from a series of regressions of the form Sellijd =
β0 +β1Expid +Covariatesijdγ+εijd if 1(Lossijd) = 1. Where Exp is measured by the number of years the investor has a
depot at that bank. Covariates include controls for age, birthyear (i.e. cohort), gender, income category, wealth category,
working in the financial sector, having a doctoral degree, and being self-employed. The blue line represents estimates for β1
for share packages which were bought before 2009. The shaded blue area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The red
line represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were bought after 2009. The shaded red area displays 95 percent
confidence intervals.The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains were taxable. Pre reform estimates
are based on 70783 investors and 176 million holding period share package observations. Post reform estimates are based
on 52290 investors and 76 million holding period share package observations.
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holdingperiod
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays coefficient estimates for a male dummy in the hazard-rate regressions for each day of the
holdingperiod. Included are share packages with prices above the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the difference in
selling probability of a share-package between men and women. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard
errors stem from a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 +β1Malei +Covariatesijdγ+εijd if 1(Lossijd) = 1 where
Male is a dummy variable indicating whether an investor is male or not. Covariates include controls for age, birthyear
(i.e. cohort), experience, income category, wealth category, working in the financial sector, having a doctoral degree, and
being self-employed. The blue line represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were bought before 2009. The
shaded blue area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The red line represents estimates for β1 for share packages which
were bought after 2009. The shaded red area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The vertical red line at day 365
marks the last day in which gains were taxable. Pre reform estimates are based on 63743 investors and 91 million holding
period share package observations. Post reform estimates are based on 51244 investors and 72 million holding period share
package observations.
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holdingperiod
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays coefficient estimates for a male dummy in the hazard-rate regressions for each day of the
holdingperiod. Included are share packages with prices below the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the difference in
selling probability of a share-package between man and woman. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard
errors stem from a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + β1Malei + Covariatesijdγ + εijd if 1(Lossijd) = 1.
Where Male is a dummy variable indicating whether an investor is male or not. Covariates include controls for age,
birthyear (i.e. cohort), experience, income category, wealth category, working in the financial sector, having a doctoral
degree, and being self-employed. The blue line represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were bought before
2009. The shaded blue area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The red line represents estimates for β1 for share
packages which were bought after 2009. The shaded red area displays 95 percent confidence intervals.The vertical red
line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains were taxable. Pre reform estimates are based on 70783 investors and
176 million holding period share package observations. Post reform estimates are based on 52290 investors and 76 million
holding period share package observations.
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holdingperiod
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays coefficient estimates for the size of a gain from hazard-rate regressions for each day of the
holdingperiod. Included are share packages with prices above the purchase price. Coefficients indicate by how much an
additional percentage point increase in the price increases the probability that a share-package is sold on this holding-
period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from a series of regressions of the form
Sellijd = β0 + β1Changeijd + εijd if 1(Gainijd) = 1. Where Changeijd is measured as
pijtd−pij0d
pij0d
. The blue line
represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were bought before 2009. The shaded blue area displays 95 percent
confidence intervals. The red line represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were bought after 2009. The shaded
red area displays 95 percent confidence intervals.The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains were
taxable. Pre reform estimates are based on 63695 investors and 88 million holding period share package observations. Post
reform estimates are based on 51185 investors and 71 million holding period share package observations.
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holdingperiod
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays coefficient estimates for the size of a gain from hazard-rate regressions for each day of the
holdingperiod. Included are share packages with prices below the purchase price. Coefficients indicate by how much an
additional percentage point decrease in the price changes the probability that a share-package is sold on this holding-period
day. Note since the change for losses is negative, negative values mean that share packages with higher losses are sold with
a higher probability. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from a series of regressions of the
form Sellijd = β0 + β1Changeijd + εijd if 1(Gainijd) = 1. Where Changeijd is measured as
pijtd−pij0d
pij0d
. The blue line
represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were bought before 2009. The shaded blue area displays 95 percent
confidence intervals. The red line represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were bought after 2009. The shaded
red area displays 95 percent confidence intervals.The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains were
taxable. Pre reform estimates are based on 70752 investors and 172 million holding period share package observations.
Post reform estimates are based on 52238 investors and 76 million holding period share package observations.
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holdingperiod
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays estimates for the average difference in selling probability between gains and losses on each day
of the holdingperiod. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from a series of regressions of
the form Sellijd = β0 + β1Gainijd + εijd. The blue line represents estimates for β1 for share packages which were bought
before 2009. The shaded area displays 95 percent confidence interval. The red line represents estimates for β1 for share
packages which were bought after 2009. The shaded area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The vertical red line at
day 365 marks the last day in which gains were taxable prior to 2009. Pre reform estimates are based on 72059 investors
and 267 million holding period share package observations. Post reform estimates are based on 55698 investors and 148
million holding period share package observations.
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holdingperiod
Post Pre
Notes: This figure displays estimates for the relative difference in selling probability between gains and losses on each
day of the holdingperiod. That is the the coefficient of the gain dummy is divided by the constant. Standard errors are
calculated using the delta method. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from a series of
regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + β1Gainijd + εijd. The blue line represents estimates for β1/β0 for share packages
which were bought before 2009. The shaded area displays 95 percent confidence interval. The red line represents estimates
for β1/β0 for share packages which were bought after 2009. The shaded area displays 95 percent confidence intervals. The
vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains were taxable prior to 2009. Pre reform estimates are based
on 72059 investors and 267 million holding period share package observations. Post reform estimates are based on 55698
investors and 148 million holding period share package observations.
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Holding period in days
Notes: This figure displays difference in difference estimates for the average difference in selling probability between gains
and losses on each day of the holdingperiod. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from a
series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 +β1Pre+β21(Gainijd)+β3Pre×1(Gainijd)+εijd. The blue line represents
estimates for β3. The shaded area displays 95 percent confidence interval. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last
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Lichter, A., M. Löffler, and S. Siegloch (2015). The economic costs of mass surveillance:
Insights from stasi spying in east germany. IZA Discussion Paper 9245.
Liebman, J. B. and R. J. Zeckhauser (2004). Schmeduling. mimeo, Harvard Kennedy
School.
Loos, B., S. Meyer, and M. Pagel (2020). The consumption effects of the disposition
to sell winners and hold losers. NBER Working Paper 26668.
Martinez, I. Z., E. Saez, and M. Siegenthaler (2018, May). Intertemporal labor supply
substitution? evidence from the swiss income tax holidays. Working Paper 24634,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
McClelland, R. and S. Mok (2012). A review of recent research on labor supply elas-
ticities. CBO Working Paper 43675.
Meghir, C. and D. Phillips (2008). Labour supply and taxes. IFS Working Papers 8.
Meltzer, A. H. and S. F. Richard (1981). A rational theory of the size of government.
Journal of political Economy 89 (5), 914–927.
Meyer, B. and D. Rosenbaum (2001). Welfare, the earned income tax credit, and the
labor supply of single mothers. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (3), 1063–
1114.
Meyer, B. D. (2010). The effects of the earned income tax credit and recent reforms.
In J. R. Brown (Ed.), Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 24, pp. 153–180.
Moffitt, R. A. (2013). The great recession and the social safety net. The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 650 (1), 143–166.
Müller, D. and S. Renes (2017). Fairness views and political preferences - evidence
from a large online experiment. University of insbruck working paper 2017-10.
Mummolo, J. and E. Peterson (2019). Demand effects in survey experiments: An
empirical assessment. American Political Science Review . forthcoming.
Neisser, C. (2017). The elasticity of taxable income: A meta-regression analysis.
Neumark, D. and K. E. Williams (2016). Do state earned income tax credits increase
participation in the federal eitc? Discussion Paper .
155
Nichols, A. and J. Rothstein (2016). The earned income tax credit. In R. A. Moffitt
(Ed.), Economics of Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, Vol-
ume 1, pp. 137–218.
NPR (2015). Lots of candidates want to simplify tax code; here’s what




NYT (2015). The tax code can be simpler. but not three pages. New York
Times (NYT) article, online at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/upshot/
a-three-page-tax-code-not-exactly-simple.html.
Odean, T. (1998). Are investors reluctant to realize their losses? The Journal of Fi-
nance 53 (5), 1775–1798.
OECD (2010a). Tax design considerations. in Tax Policy Reform and Eco-
nomic Growth, oecd publishing, paris. doi: https://doi.org/10.1787/
9789264091085-7-en.
OECD (2010b). Tax expenditures in OECD countries. Oecd publishing, paris. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264076907-en.
Ooghe, E. and A. Peichl (2015). Fair and efficient taxation under partial control. The
Economic Journal 125 (589), 2024–2051.
Paetzold, J. (2019). How do taxpayers respond to a large kink? evidence on earnings
and deduction behavior from austria. International Tax and Public Finance, 1–31.
Paetzold, J. and H. Winner (2016). Taking the high road? compliance with commuter
tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers. Journal of Public Economics 143,
1 – 14.
Pencavel, J. (1986). Labor supply of men: a survey. Handbook of Labor Economics 1,
3–102.
Pitt, M. and J. Slemrod (1989). The compliance cost of itemizing deductions: Evidence
from individual tax returns. American Economic Review 79 (5), 1224–32.
Poterba, J. M. (2001). Taxation and portfolio structure: Issues and implications. NBER
Working Paper 8223.
Poterba, J. M. (2002). Taxation, risk-taking, and household portfolio behavior. In
Handbook of public economics, Volume 3, pp. 1109–1171. Elsevier.
Poterba, J. M. and S. J. Weisbenner (2001). Capital gains tax rules, tax-loss trading,
and turn-of-the-year returns. The Journal of Finance 56 (1), 353–368.
156
Rees-Jones, A. and D. Taubinsky (2016). Measuring ”schmeduling”. NBER working
pape no. 22884r.
Reese Jr, W. A. (1998). Capital gains taxation and stock market activity: Evidence
from ipos. The Journal of Finance 53 (5), 1799–1819.
Rohaly, J. and W. G. Gale (2004). Effects of tax simplification options on equity,
efficiency, and simplicity: A quantitative analysis. In H. J. Aaron and J. Slemrod
(Eds.), The Crisis in Tax Administration. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution
Pres.
Roth, C. and J. Wohlfart (2018). Experienced inequality and preferences for redistri-
bution. Journal of Public Economics 167, 251 – 262.
Roth, C. and J. Wohlfart (2019). How do expectations about the macroeconomy affect
personal expectations and behavior? Working paper, available at http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.3016052.
Rothstein, J. (2010). Is the EITC as good as an NIT? Conditional cash transfers and
tax incidence. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2 (1), 177–208.
Saez, E. (2010a). Do taxpayers bunch at kink points? American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy 2 (3), 180–212.
Saez, E. (2010b). Do taxpayers bunch at kink points? American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy 2 (3), 180–212.
Saez, E. (2017). Taxing the rich more: Preliminary evidence from the 2013 tax increase.
Tax Policy and the Economy 31 (1), 71–120.
Saez, E., J. Slemrod, and S. H. Giertz (2012). The elasticity of taxable income with
respect to marginal tax rates: A critical review. Journal of Economic Litera-
ture 50 (1), 3–50.
Saez, E. and S. Stantcheva (2016). Generalized social marginal welfare weights for
optimal tax theory. American Economic Review 106 (1), 24–45.
Seida, J. A. and W. F. Wempe (2000). Do capital gain tax rate increases affect indi-
vidual investors’ trading decisions? Journal of Accounting and Economics 30 (1),
33 – 57.
Seru, A., T. Shumway, and N. Stoffman (2009). Learning by Trading. The Review of
Financial Studies 23 (2), 705–739.
Seru, A., T. Shumway, and N. Stoffman (2010). Learning by trading. The Review of
Financial Studies 23 (2), 705–739.
Shackelford, D. A. and R. E. Verrecchia (2002). Intertemporal tax discontinuities.
Journal of Accounting Research 40 (1), 205–222.
157
Shefrin, H. and M. Statman (1985). The disposition to sell winners too early and ride
losers too long: Theory and evidence. The Journal of Finance 40 (3), 777–790.
Shoven, J. B. and C. Sialm (2004). Asset location in tax-deferred and conventional
savings accounts. Journal of Public Economics 88 (1-2), 23–38.
Sikes, S. (2018). Capital gains lock-in and share repurchases. mimeo.
Slemrod, J. and W. Kopczuk (2002). The optimal elasticity of taxable income. Journal
of Public Economics 84 (1), 91–112.
Stantcheva, S. (2020). Understanding economic policies: What do people know and how
can they learn? mimeo, presentation slides online at https://scholar.harvard.
edu/stantcheva/publications.
Suarez Serrato, J. C. and O. Zidar (2016). Who benefits from state corporate tax
cuts? a local labor markets approach with heterogeneous firms. American Economic
Review 106 (9), 2582–2624.
Tax Policy Center (2019). What are tax expenditures and how are they struc-
tured? The Tax Policy Center’s Briefing Book. a citizen’s guide to the fas-
cinating (though often complex) elements of the federal tax system, online
at https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/briefing-book/
bb_full_2018_1.pdf.
Tran-Nam, B. (2000). Tax reform and tax simplicity: A new and ’simpler’ tax system?
University of New South Wales Law Journal, The 23 (2), 241–251.
Tsankova, T., C. Imbert, M. Luts, and J. Spinnewijn (2019). ’how to improve tax
compliance? evidence from countrywide experiments in belgium.
van Rooij, M., A. Lusardi, and R. Alessie (2011). Financial literacy and stock market
participation. Journal of Financial Economics 101 (2), 449–472.
Vox (2017). Why democrats should support radically simpler taxes. Vox article,
online at https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/8/15442172/
democrats-tax-plan-return-free-filing-trump-ambitious.
Wagner, F. W. (2006). Was bedeutet Steuervereinfachung wirklich? Perspektiven der
Wirtschaftspolitik 7 (1), 19–33.
Warskett, G., S. L. Winer, and W. Hettich (1998). The complexity of tax structure in
competitive political systems. International Tax and Public Finance 5, 123–151.
Weinzierl, M. (2014). The promise of positive optimal taxation: normative diversity
and a role for equal sacrifice. Journal of Public Economics 118, 128 – 142.
Weinzierl, M. (2017). Popular acceptance of inequality due to innate brute luck and
support for classical benefit-based taxation. Journal of Public Economics 155, 54
158
– 63.
Westfall, P. H. and S. S. Young (1993). Resampling-based multiple testing: Examples
and methods for p-value adjustment. John Wiley & Sons.
WiWo (2017). Pendler kosten den fiskus fuenf milliarden euro. WirtschaftsWoche
(WiWo) article, online at https://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/
berufspendler-pendler-kosten-den-fiskus-fuenf-milliarden-euro/
20654060.html.
Yagan, D. (2015, December). Capital tax reform and the real economy: The effects of
the 2003 dividend tax cut. American Economic Review 105 (12), 3531–63.
Young, A. (2018). Channeling fisher: Randomization tests and the statistical insignifi-
cance of seemingly significant experimental results. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 134 (2), 557–598.
Zwick, E. (2018). The costs of corporate tax complexity. NBER working paper no
24382.
159
A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 The EITC tax schedule
Figure 41 illustrates the EITC tax refund schedule for families with one and two children.




















0 10000 20000 30000 40000
Earned Income (2009$)
One child Two children 
Figure 41: The EITC schedule in 2009
Notes: This graph displays the relationship between the tax refund and household labor income according
to the 2009 federal EITC schedule. Tax units with adjusted gross income above the earned income
threshold are not eligibile. First EITC kink point for families with one child: USD 8 950; for families
with two children USD 12 570. Second kink point at USD 16 420.
A.2 Predicting EITC expansions
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that the top-up rate in a state is
uncorrelated with county or state characteristics. A central concern with this assump-
tion is that the generosity of the state EITC is driven by the business cycle, state-level
fluctuations in tax revenue, or changes in minimum wages. To address this concern, we
follow Bastian and Michelmore (2018), and predict the level of the state EITC based
on current and lagged state-level economic variables in a panel regression. If any of the
variables turned out to be statistically significant, this would be reason for concern, as it
would cast doubt on the validity of the identifying assumption.
For this purpose, we collected state-level data on the welfare state (top marginal
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income tax rate, level of minimum wage, monthly welfare benefits), as well as tax revenues,
which can be seen as a measure of the business cycle. The data span the years 1995-
2009.71 The regression results are shown in Table 10. Given that statistically insignificant
results are more likely when standard errors are clustered, we report here conventional
standard errors. None of the regressors is statistically significantly different from zero,
which we interpret as strong evidence that changes in the state EITC are not driven by
state-level fluctuations in the economy.
Table 10: OLS Results: predictors of State EITC top-up rates
Control Variables: Top-up Rate
Top Marginal Income Tax Rate 0.1827
(0.6228)




Lagged Real Minimum Wage 0.6750
(0.4262)
Max Monthly Welfare Benefits, Family of 3 (in 100 USD) -0.4842
(1.1698)
Lagged Max Monthly Welfare Benefits, Family of 3 (in 100 USD) -0.4390
(1.2205)
State Tax Revenue (in 1M USD) 0.0001
(0.0001)






This table displays the results of a panel OLS regression of the state EITC top-up rate
on state-level economic variables. All regressions control for year and state fixed effects.
Wages, welfare benefits and tax revenues are deflated to 2010 USD. Conventional standard
errors are displayed in parentheses.
71Sources: minimum wages: St. Louis Fed, welfare benefits: welfare rules databook, tax revenue:
Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections, consumer price index: St. Louis Fed, marginal
income tax rates: NBER Taxsim.
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A.3 EITC claimants before, during and after the Great Reces-
sion
Figure 42 displays the number of EITC claimants around the time of the Great Recession,
between 2007 and 2012. This number has been increasing throughout, although the































2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
Figure 42: EITC claimers, 2007-2012
Notes: This graph displays the number of people in the US claiming the EITC in a given year. Source:
IRS
A.4 Converting zip-code-level data to county-level data
The dataset by Chetty et al. (2013a) provides data at the level of three-digit zip codes.
Because the border pair design requires information at the county-level, we convert the
data from the zip-code to the county level. The dataset mainly consists of absolute
numbers, such as the number of EITC claimants in a given zip code. If a zip code
comprises more than one county, we divide the absolute numbers evenly across all counties
within a ZIP code. For example, if there are 1000 claimants in zip-code A and A consists
of two counties we assign each county 500 claimants. If, on the other hand, a county is
part of more than one zip code, we assign this county the sum of the absolute numbers. If
the zip code that cuts through a county also covers another county, we split the absolute
numbers between these countries before adding up within counties. For example, if zip
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codes A (1,000 claimants) and B (500 claimants) are completely contained in county X, we
assign county X 1,500 claimants. If, however, zip code A also covers another county while
B is fully contained in X, we assign county X 500 claimants from A and 500 claimants
from B.72
For the 3,141 counties in our dataset, we apply the first method — split the numbers
between counties within a zip code — to 1,179 counties. For another 1,960 counties, we
apply both methods, namely we split numbers between counties as well as aggregate
numbers within counties. The remaining two counties coincide with the zip codes.
A.5 Identifying variation
Table 11 displays the amount of variation — measured by the standard deviation —
in the most important variables for different samples as well as different fixed effect
specifications. Column (1) displays the variation for all counties, whereas Columns (2)-
(4) display the variation for border counties only. In the border pair sample, some counties
appear more than once if they have more than one neighbor in a different state. Going
from left to right, one can see that the amount of variation is reduced as more fixed effects
are added. However, even after controlling for pair-by-year fixed effects, there remains
substantial variation in top-up rates as well as the outcome variables.
72We found splitting the number of claimants evenly between counties the most transparent way of
converting zip-code-level data to county-level data. It would also be possible to (dis-)aggregate the
numbers based on population measures. However, without further assumptions, this would only be
possible for disaggregation (one zip code contains more than one county), but not for aggregation (one
county contains more than one zip code).
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Table 11: Variation in key variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Counties Border Counties Border Counties Border Counties
Top-up rates
SD 6.86 7.56 5.43 4.88
Top-up dummy
SD 0.44 0.45 0.33 0.29
Share of self-employed near the kink point
SD 3.83 3.75 1.89 1.42
EITC claimants, self-employed
SD 3956.62 3391.67 2299.95 2175.05
EITC claimants, non-self-employed
SD 13245.24 13029.56 8284.27 8238.79
Self-employed claimants near the kink
SD 684.01 686.86 504.16 460.22
Controls:
Year FE No No Yes No
Pair FE No No Yes No
Pair × Year FE No No No Yes
N 43967 36616 36616 36616
This table displays the variation — measured by the standard deviation — in the main
variables with various sets of fixed effects. The all-county dataset comprises all counties
in the US. The border county dataset comprises counties straddling a state borders only.
Columns (1) -(2) display the raw standard deviations. Column (3) shows the residual
variation after a transformation of separate year and pair fixed effects. Column (4) shows
the residual variation after a transformation of year-by-pair fixed effects
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Figure 43 further illustrates the relationship between state-specific top-up rate (hor-
izontal axis) and the degree of bunching (vertical axis) in a binned scatter with ten equally
sized bins on each axis. The graph controls for state-specific characteristics of the EITC
— a dummy that equals unity if the the refund depends on the number of children,
and a dummy that equals unity if a positive refund is given if a person’s tax credit ex-
ceeds his/her tax liability — as well as pair-by-year fixed effects. The regression line




































-5 0 5 10 15
Top-up rates demeaned by pair-by-year fixed effects
Figure 43: Bunching vs. top-up rates
Notes: This graph displays the relationship between the share of self-employed at the first kink point of
the EITC and the state specific top-up rates in a binned scatter, whereby each variable is divided in ten
equally sized bins. Both variables have been demeaned by pair-by-year fixed effects, and we control for
state-level features of the EITC.
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A.6 Assessing inference through permutation tests
While the border design facilitates estimating a causal effect by providing clear treat-
ment and control counties, it also complicates statistical inference. The error terms can
be correlated across space as well as within counties over time, which can lead to an
underestimation of standard errors, and an under-rejection of the null hypothesis of no
effect (Bertrand et al. 2004). Moreover, in the border pair design, some counties are part
of multiple pairs, such that their errors are mechanically correlated. As a first step, to
account for correlations in the error term, we applied to all estimates a two-way clustering
procedure at the county and pair level. However, this may not eliminate all systematic
correlations of the error terms.
To assess the statistical significance of our estimates without relying on assumptions
about clustering, we additionally perform permutation tests for the four main outcomes.
In these tests, we first obtain an empirical placebo distribution of estimates that would
occur under the null hypothesis of there being no effect. In a second step, we compare our
estimates to the placebo distribution and obtain a empirical p-value that describes the
probability of obtaining a result that is at least as extreme as ours.73 In a conventional
case — namely one in which a treatment is as-signed once — the placebo distribution
is obtained by repeatedly randomizing the treatment across observations and estimating
the same model in each replication. The complication in our case is that top-up rates
within states are path-dependent. States do not randomly set a top-up rate every year,
but rather adjust the rate of the previous year. To account for path-dependency, we
therefore randomize over 14-year paths in top-up rates. In each replication, we randomly
assign each state a path for its top-up rate and estimate the model.
Figure 44 displays the cumulative density function of the placebo distributions
based on 5,000 replications, as well as the z-scores of our estimates (vertical lines) from
Column (6) in Table 2. The horizontal lines describe the 90-th percentile of the placebo
distribution. Statistical significance at the 10% level requires that the intersection of
both lines is located South-East of the placebo distribution. This is the case for the
outcomes displayed in Panels A-C, where the empirical p-values are 0.055, 0.014, and
0.027, respectively. For the outcome in Panel D — namely the total number of non-
self-employed claimants — the p-value is 0.128, which means that this estimate is not
statistically significant at the 10% level.
These results confirm the inference drawn from the two-way clustering approach in
Table 2. Raises in the top-up rate significantly increase bunching near the kink point,
which is the result of an overproportional increase in the number of claimants with an
income close to the kink point. As before, we find no statistically significant effect on the
total number of non-self-employed EITC claimants.
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Figure 44: Permutation tests
Notes: These graphs display the results of permutation tests for each of the four outcomes. Each panel
displays the cumulative density from 5,000 replications, as well as the empirical p-values.
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B Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Additional Figures and Tables
Table 12: Balancing Tests First Experiment
Variable Redistribution Avoidance Control
Gender: Reference category Male
Sex 0.022 -0.029 0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Marital status: Reference category: Not married
Married 0.013 0.029 -0.036*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Unemployed: Reference category: Employed
Unemployed -0.011 -0.061 0.063
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Retirement status: Reference category: Not retired
Retired 0.042* 0.016 -0.042*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Household size:
HH-size -0.007 0.012 -0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education:
Education -0.010 -0.011 0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Household net income: Reference category poor
2 -0.006 0.031 -0.016
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
3 -0.030 0.065* -0.032
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
4 -0.032 0.047 -0.010
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Rich -0.020 0.041 -0.014
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
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No income stated -0.033 0.053 -0.001
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Age category:
Age 0.017** -0.004 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Political orientation: Reference category: Left-wing
Conservative -0.022 -0.056*** -0.033
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Non partisans -0.051 -0.003 0.050
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Difficulty in declaring taxes: Reference category: No difficulty
2 0.022 0.099 -0.022
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
3 -0.066 0.116* -0.050
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
4 -0.059 0.064 -0.005
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Very difficult -0.012 0.020 -0.009
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
No taxes declared -0.055 0.086 -0.031
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Taxes not self declared -0.030 0.089 -0.059
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Notes: Randomization checks for the first experiment. The table shows the coefficients and standard
errors (in parentheses) from a series of regressions of the form: yi = βCovariatei+εi. Where Covariatei
is the respective covariate listed above. In Column (1) yi equals 1 if participant i is in the redistribution
group and 0 otherwise. In Column (2),yi equals 1 if participant i is in the avoidance group and 0
otherwise. In Column (3), yi equals 1 if participant i is in the control group and 0 otherwise. Standard
errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 13: Balancing Tests Second Experiment
Variable Economic efficency Special interest Control
Gender. Reference category Male
Sex -0.025 0.021 -0.001
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
Marital status: Reference category: Not married
Married -0.038 0.032 0.012
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
Unemployed: Reference category: Employed
Unemployed 0.302** -0.165 -0.134
(0.118) (0.120) (0.118)
Retirement status: Reference category: Not retired
Retired 0.031 -0.002 -0.026
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Household size:
HH-size -0.01 0.009 -0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Education:
Education -0.018 0.011 0.009
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Household net income: Reference category poor
2 -0.069 0.027 0.043
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
3 -0.012 -0.008 0.020
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
4 -0.138** 0.063 0.075
(0.063) (0.064) (0.063)
Rich -0.092 -0.004 0.088
(0.064) (0.065) (0.065)




Age -0.004 0.014 -0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Political orientation: Reference category: Left-wing
Conservative -0.007 -0.019 0.026
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
Non partisans 0.141** -0.160*** 0.022
(0.059) (0.060) (0.059)
Difficulty in declaring taxes: Reference category: No difficulty
2 -0.025 -0.009 -0.125
(0.104) (0.106) (0.103)
3 0.117 0.021 -0.145
(0.101) (0.102) (0.100)
4 0.135 0.050 -0.191*
(0.099) (0.101) (0.098)
Very difficult 0.206** -0.091 -0.115
(0.104) (0.106) (0.103)
No taxes declared 0.175 0.021 -0.197*
(0.108) (0.110) (0.107)
Taxes not self declared 0.116 0.012 -0.128
(0.098) (0.100) (0.097)
Notes: Randomization checks for the second experiment. The table shows the coefficients and standard
errors (in parentheses) from a series of regressions of the form: yi = βCovariatei+εi. Where Covariatei
is the respective covariate listed above. Sample restricted to those participants who were in the control
group in the first experiment. In Column (1) yi equals 1 if participant i is in the economic efficency
group and 0 otherwise. In Column (2),yi equals 1 if participant i is in the special interest group and 0
otherwise. In Column (3), yi equals 1 if participant i is in the control group and 0 otherwise. Standard
errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 14: Exp 1: Effect on Preferences for Tax Simplification. Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Redistribution -0.109* -0.123** -0.144** -0.146** -0.144**
(0.060) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Avoidance -0.041 -0.038 -0.024 -0.024 -0.019
(0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Constant -0.120*** 0.482*** 1.537*** 1.499*** 1.516***
(0.043) (0.150) (0.216) (0.227) (0.228)
N 2190 2132 2109 2109 2109
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on preferences for
tax simplification. Estimated by an ordered probit regressions of preferences for tax simplification on
treatment dummies. Tax simplification is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question: “Do you
generally think that the income tax system in Germany needs to be simplified?” The experimental
groups are: Control group, Redistribution group and Avoidance group. Control is omitted, implying
that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants receive the following information:
“In Germany there is an ongoing debate on whether the income tax system is too complicated because
of many deduction possibilities and allowances.” Participants in the Redistribution group receive the
following information: “However, it is sometimes also argued that a tax system with many deduction
possibilities and allowances has a social-policy and redistributive compensation role. For example, tax
deductions can be used to reduce the tax burden of taxpayers who are disadvantaged by circumstances.”
Participants in the Avoidance group receive the following information: “In this context, one argument is
that a tax system with many deduction possibilities and allowances offers more scope for tax avoidance
and tax adjustment. For example, tax deductions can be used to reduce one’s own tax burden through
better knowledge of the tax system or through unjustified specifications in the tax return.” Columns
(1)-(5) differ in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status,
household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus perceived difficulty
to declare taxes, (4): (3) plus net household income, (5): (4) plus political preferences. Robust The
scale of the outcome variable is 1 (absolutely not) to 6 (absolutely). Robust standard errors are in
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 15: Exp 1: Effect on Distributional Effects of Complexity. Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Redistribution -0.004 -0.007 -0.010 -0.004 -0.004
(0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060)
Avoidance 0.079 0.092 0.109* 0.110* 0.120**
(0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Constant 0.463*** 0.976*** 1.216*** 1.229*** 1.238***
(0.046) (0.142) (0.195) (0.211) (0.211)
N 1998 1946 1931 1931 1931
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on beliefs about
whether people think that deductions work in favor of the rich. Estimated by an ordered probit
Regressions of believes on treatment dummies. The outcome is measured on a 6 point scale based
on the question: ‘Do you think that numerous deductions and allowances contribute to a fairer dis-
tribution of income, or do you believe that high-income citizens benefit more from these deductions
and allowances?” The experimental groups are: Control group, Redistribution group and Avoidance
group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All participants
receive the following information: “In Germany there is an ongoing debate on whether the income
tax system is too complicated because of many possible deductions and allowances.” Participants
in the Redistribution group receive the following information: “However, it is sometimes also argued
that a tax system with many possible deductions and allowances has an important social-policy role,
particularly in relation to income redistribution. For example, tax deductions can be used to reduce
the tax burden of taxpayers who are disadvantaged by circumstances” Participants in the Avoidance
group receive the following information: “In this context, one argument is that a tax system with
many possible deductions and allowances offers greater opportunity for tax avoidance . For example,
when individuals have a better knowledge of the tax system or make unjustified declarations, they can
reduce their tax burden by taking advantage of certain allowances or deductions.” Columns (1)-(5)
differ in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status, household
size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus perceived difficulty to declare
taxes, (4): (3) plus net household income, (5): (4) plus political preferences. Robust The scale of the
outcome variable 1 (add to a fair income distribution) to 6 (higher incomes benefit). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 16: Exp 2: Effect on Preferences for Tax Simplification. Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experimental Group Reference category: Control
Economic Efficiency -0.153 -0.182* -0.210** -0.220** -0.224**
(0.102) (0.105) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
Special Interest -0.041 -0.037 -0.023 -0.038 -0.035
(0.096) (0.098) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Constant 0.048 0.527*** 1.145*** 1.066*** 1.107***
(0.068) (0.155) (0.205) (0.218) (0.219)
N 2187 2134 2114 2114 2114
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax difficulty No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Income No No No Yes Yes
Political Preference No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions of the second experi-
ment on preferences for tax simplification. Estimated by an ordered probit regressions of preferences
for tax simplification on treatment dummies and a full set of interactions of the treatment groups of the
first and second experiment. Tax simplification is measured on a 6 point scale based on the question:
“Now that we have dealt extensively with various aspects of the German tax system in this survey,
we would like to ask again: do you generally believe that the income tax system should be simplified
in Germany?” The experimental groups are: Control group, Economic efficiency group and Special
interest group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. All par-
ticipants receive the following information: “We would like to once again address the ongoing debate
concerning whether the income tax system is too complicated due to the many possible deductions and
allowances.” Participants in the Economic efficiency group receive the following information: “One
argument that is often used against tax simplification and that has not been addressed so far is that
a tax system with many deductions and allowances provides better opportunities to tax individuals
in accordance with their ability to pay and is therefore economically more efficient.” Participants in
the Special interest group receive the following information: “One argument that is often used against
tax simplification and that has not been addressed so far is that a tax system with many deductions
and allowances offers special interest groups greater opportunity for obtaining exemptions ” Columns
(1)-(5) differ in the included sets of covariates. (1): no covariates, (2): gender, age, marital status,
household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (3): (2) plus perceived difficulty
to declare taxes, (4): (3) plus net household income, (5): (4) plus political preferences. The scale of
the outcome variable is 1 (absolutely not) to 6 (absolutely). Robust standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
175
B.2 Illustration of treatment conditions
B.2.1 First experiment
Figure 45: Redistribution treatment
Figure 46: Avoidance treatment
B.2.2 Second experiment
Figure 47: Economic efficiency treatment
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Figure 48: Special interest group treatment
B.2.3 Detailed Questionnaire
This appendix section presents the translated survey questions including reply categories.
The order of presentation and the numbering of the question corresponds with the de-
scription of the survey structure in section 3.3.2.
• Introduction: In the following, we would like to ask you some questions about
the tax system in Germany. We will focus in particular on rules surrounding the
income tax and whether they are complicated or easy to understand. Whether a tax
system is generally complicated or easy to understand depends in particular on the
number of possible deductions and allowances.
• Q1: How difficult is it for you to fill out your tax return?
1 Very easy ;...; 5 Very difficult ; I do not know because no taxes are declared in my
name; I do not know because I do not declare taxes myself (rather, my partner or
a tax consultant, etc. does this); I do not know
• Randomized Experiment 1: See body of the text (section 3.3.3) and section B.2
above.
• Q2: Do you generally think that the income tax system in Germany needs to be
simplified?
1 Absolutely not ;...; 6 Absolutely ; I do not know
• Q3: Do you generally believe that the income tax system in Germany is in need of
reform?
1 Absolutely not ;...; 6 Absolutely ; I do not know
• Q4: Do you think that numerous deductions and allowances contribute to a fairer
distribution of income, or do you believe that high-income citizens benefit more
from these deductions and allowances?
1 They contribute to fairer income distribution;...; 6 High-income citizens benefit ;
I do not know
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• Q5: Which of the following measures to simplify the income tax system would you
like the most? Assume the proposed measures will lead to unchanged tax revenues
in each case.
Same rate for all but no deductions and allowances ; Same rate for all and same
deductions and allowances as under current system; More progressive tax rates and
no deductions and allowances ; Automatic determination of amounts in income tax
declaration; No change; Other measure [insert text] ; I do not know
• Introduction for Q6-8 Imagine two persons, A and B. Which person do you think
should pay more taxes in the following situation?
• Q6: In contrast to Person B, Person A has a poor mother in need of elderly care
and has to spend a considerable amount of her income for the care of her mother.
Person A and B have the same gross income and are very similar in all other
respects. (randomize order of answer categories)
Person A should pay higher taxes ; Person B should pay higher taxes ; Person A and
B should pay equal tax amounts
• Q7: Person A spends a considerable amount of her income on charitable giving.
Person B does no such thing. Both Person A and B have the same gross income
and are very similar in all other respects. (randomize order of answer categories)
Person A should pay higher taxes ; Person B should pay higher taxes ; Person A and
B should pay equal tax amounts
• Q8: Person A has to travel a considerable distance to work. Person B lives very
close to work. Both Person A and B have the same gross income and are very
similar in all other respects.(randomize order of answer categories)
Person A should pay higher taxes ; Person B should pay higher taxes ; Person A and
B should pay equal tax amounts
• Randomized Experiment 2: See body of the text (section 3.3.3) and section B.2
above.
• Q9: Now that we have dealt extensively with various aspects of the German tax
system in this survey, we would like to ask again: do you generally believe that the
income tax system should be simplified in Germany?
1 Absolutely not ;...; 6 Absolutely ; I do not know
• Q10: Which of the following deductions and/or allowances do you usually use when
filing your income tax?
Maintenance of two households ; Home office; Commuting allowance; Other job
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related expenditures ; Pension expenses ; Education costs ; Care relatives ; Child al-
lowance, childcare; Donations ; Others [insert text] ; No deductions ; I do not know
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C Appendix to Chapter 4
180


























185 275 365 455 545
Holding period (2001)
Notes: This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod separately for the years
1999-2001. Included are share packages with prices above the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the probability that a
share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from
a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Gainijd) = 1. Regressions are estimated for each day of the
holding period. The blue line represents estimates for β0. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains
were taxable. Estimates for 1999 are based on 20516 investors and 11.5 million holding period share package observations.
Estimates for 2000 are based on 28274 investors and 7.6 million holding period share package observations. Estimates for
1999 are based on 20695 investors and 4.5 million holding period share package observations.
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185 275 365 455 545
Holding period (2004)
Notes: This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod separately for the years
2002-2004. Included are share packages with prices above the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the probability that a
share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from
a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Gainijd) = 1. Regressions are estimated for each day of the
holding period. The blue line represents estimates for β0. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains
were taxable. Estimates for 2002 are based on 18958 investors and 7.1 million holding period share package observations.
Estimates for 2003 are based on 20859 investors and 12.6 million holding period share package observations. Estimates for
2004 are based on 23991 investors and 12.5 million holding period share package observations.
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185 275 365 455 545
Holding period (2007)
Notes: This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod separately for the years
2005-2007. Included are share packages with prices above the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the probability that a
share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from
a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Gainijd) = 1. Regressions are estimated for each day of the
holding period. The blue line represents estimates for β0. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains
were taxable. Estimates for 2005 are based on 25118 investors and 15.3 million holding period share package observations.
Estimates for 2006 are based on 28202 investors and 14.2 million holding period share package observations. Estimates for
2007 are based on 21473 investors and 5.3 million holding period share package observations.
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185 275 365 455 545
Holding period (2011)
Notes:This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod separately for the years
2009-2011. Included are share packages with prices above the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the probability that a
share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from
a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Gainijd) = 1. Regressions are estimated for each day of the
holding period. The blue line represents estimates for β0. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains
were taxable. Estimates for 2009 are based on 19304 investors and 11.5 million holding period share package observations.
Estimates for 2010 are based on 22902 investors and 10.1 million holding period share package observations. Estimates for
2011 are based on 22129 investors and 10.3 million holding period share package observations.
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Holding period (2014)
Notes: This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod separately for the years
2012-2014. Included are share packages with prices above the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the probability that a
share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from
a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Gainijd) = 1. Regressions are estimated for each day of the
holding period. The blue line represents estimates for β0. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which gains
were taxable. Estimates for 2012 are based on 19350 investors and 9.9 million holding period share package observations.
Estimates for 2013 are based on 22118 investors and 13.6 million holding period share package observations. Estimates for
2014 are based on 22356 investors and 10.3 million holding period share package observations.
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185 275 365 455 545
Holding period (2001)
Notes: This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod separately for the years
1999-2001. Included are share packages with prices below the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the probability that a
share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from
a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Lossijd) = 1. Regressions are estimated for each day of the
holding period. The blue line represents estimates for β0. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which losses
could be used to offset gains. Estimates for 1999 are based on 19527 investors and 8.1 million holding period share package
observations. Estimates for 2000 are based on 44045 investors and 53.4 million holding period share package observations.
Estimates for 1999 are based on 32947 investors and 30.1 million holding period share package observations.
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185 275 365 455 545
Holding period (2004)
Notes: This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod separately for the years
2002-2004. Included are share packages with prices below the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the probability that
a share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem
from a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Lossijd) = 1. Regressions are estimated for each day
of the holding period. The blue line represents estimates for β0. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in
which losses could be used to offset gains. Estimates for 2002 are based on 26297 investors and 18.6 million holding period
share package observations. Estimates for 2003 are based on 17310 investors and 6.6 million holding period share package
observations. Estimates for 2004 are based on 23255 investors and 10.5 million holding period share package observations.
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185 275 365 455 545
Holding period (2007)
Notes: This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod separately for the years
2005-2007. Included are share packages with prices below the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the probability that a
share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem from
a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Lossijd) = 1. Regressions are estimated for each day of the
holding period. The blue line represents estimates for β0. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in which losses
could be used to offset gains. Estimates for 2005 are based on 21079 investors and 7.1 million holding period share package
observations. Estimates for 2006 are based on 28061 investors and 12.8 million holding period share package observations.
Estimates for 2007 are based on 30331 investors and 27.1 million holding period share package observations.
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185 275 365 455 545
Holding period (2011)
Notes: This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod separately for the
years 2009-2011. Included are share packages with prices below the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the probability
that a share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors
stem from a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Lossijd) = 1. Regressions are estimated for each
day of the holding period. The blue line represents estimates for β0. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last
day in which losses could be used to offset gains (prior to 2009). Estimates for 2009 are based on 15025 investors and
5.2 million holding period share package observations. Estimates for 2010 are based on 23644 investors and 13 million
holding period share package observations. Estimates for 2011 are based on 27081 investors and 20.9 million holding
period share package observations.
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185 275 365 455 545
Holding period (2014)
Notes: This figure displays the hazard-rate regressions estimates for each day of the holdingperiod separately for the years
2012-2014. Included are share packages with prices below the purchase price. Coefficients indicate the probability that
a share-package is sold on this holding-period day. Coefficients and on the investor level clustered standard errors stem
from a series of regressions of the form Sellijd = β0 + εijd if 1(Lossijd) = 1. Regressions are estimated for each day
of the holding period. The blue line represents estimates for β0. The vertical red line at day 365 marks the last day in
which losses could be used to offset gains (prior to 2009). Estimates for 2012 are based on 19277 investors and 9.9 million
holding period share package observations. Estimates for 2013 are based on 19761 investors and 8 million holding period
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Transfersystem – Fehlanreize, Reformoptionen und ihre Wirkungen auf
inklusives Wachstum joined with Max Löffler and Andreas Peichl
2017 – 2019 BMWI Short Expertises: Forschungsrahmenvertrag “Ökonomische Be-
wertung verschiedener Reformoptionen im deutschen Steuer- und Trans-
fersystem” joined with Holger Bonin, Eric Sommer and Holger Stichnoth
2018 BMFSJF Arbeitsangebotseffekte einer Reform des Kinderzuschlags
joined with Holger Bonin, Eric Sommer and Holger Stichnoth
2016 European Commission Convergence of Unemployment Benefit Sche-
mes in Europe joined with Mathias Dolls, Carla Krolage and a team of
the JRC in Sevilla
